*Deccan College Building Centenary & Silver Jubilee Series: 26*

# THE VĀKYAPADĪYA OF BHARTṚHARI WITH THE VṚTTI

## CHAPTER I
## ENGLISH TRANSLATION

BY

K. A. SUBRAMANIA IYER

DECCAN COLLEGE
Postgraduate and Research Institute
Poona
1965

# THE VĀKYAPADĪYA OF BHARTṚHARI WITH THE VṚTTI

## CHAPTER I

## ENGLISH TRANSLATION

*DECCAN COLLEGE*

*Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Series*

**26**

# *THE VĀKYAPADĪYA OF BHARTṚHARI WITH THE VṚTTI*

## CHAPTER I

## ENGLISH TRANSLATION

BY

K. A. SUBRAMANIA IYER

DECCAN COLLEGE
Postgraduate and Research Institute
Poona

# THE VĀKYAPADĪYA OF BHARTṚHARI WITH THE VṚTTI

## CHAPTER I

## ENGLISH TRANSLATION

BY

K. A. SUBRAMANIA IYER, M.A., (LONDON)

*Sometime Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit Lucknow University; Ex-Vice-Chancellor, Lucknow University and the Vārāṇaseya Saṃskṛta Viśvavidyālaya*
*Visiting Professor, Centre of Advanced Study in Linguistics, Deccan College, Poona*

POONA

1965

CODE No.: BC 106

*First Edition : 1000 Copies; October 1965*



**Price: Rs. 10.00**

Printed by S. Ramaswami at G. S. Press, 21, Narasingapuram Street, Mount Road, Madras-2 and Published by S. M. Katre for the Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute, Yervada, Poona-6.

CONTENTS

# FOREWORD

On the 15th of October 1964 the Deccan College celebrates the centenary of its main Building, and curiously enough this period coincides with the Silver Jubilee of the Postgraduate and Research Institute which, as successor to the Deccan College, started functioning from 17th August 1939 when members of the teaching faculty reported on duty. When I suggested to members of our faculty the novel idea that the centenary should be celebrated by the publication of a hundred monographs representing the research carried on under the auspices of the Deccan College in its several departments they readily accepted the suggestion. These contributions are from present and past faculty members and research scholars of the Deccan College, giving a cross-section of the manifold research that it has sponsored during the past twentyfive years. From small beginnings in 1939 the Deccan College has now grown into a well developed and developing Research Institute and become a national centre in so far as Linguistics, Archaeology and Ancient Indian History, and Anthropology and Sociology are concerned. Its international status is attested by the location of the Indian Institute of German Studies (jointly sponsored by Deccan College and the Goethe Institute of Munich), the American Institute of Indian Studies and a branch of the Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient in the campus of the Deccan College. The century of monographs not only symbolises the centenary of the original building and the silver jubilee of the Research Institute, but also the new spirit of critical enquiry and the promise of more to come.

7th March, 1964. S. M. KATRE

## INTRODUCTION

It is not without some diffidence that I place before scholars this translation of Kāṇḍa I of the *Vākyapadīyam* of Bhartṛhari and of the ancient commentary on it called *Vṛtti*. Bhartṛhari is a great name in the history of Sanskrit Vyākaraṇa. All the material which it would be most desirable to have to make a satisfactory study of this author is, however, not yet available. Only a fragment of his commentary on the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali has so far been found and that in a single manuscript, now in the library of the University of Tübingen. That is only now being edited and published separately by the Benares Hindu University and by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. I understand that another edition is being prepared in West Germany, under the direction of Prof. P. Thieme. The only available manuscript of the Vṛtti on Kāṇḍa II of the Vākyapadīyam is full of gaps. Both Helārāja and Puṇyarāja are known to have commented on Kāṇḍas I and II. Helārāja's commentary, as he himself tells us[1] in the opening verse No. 2 of his commentary on Kāṇḍa III, was based on the *Vṛtti*, most probably the ancient commentary which we now have in an incomplete form. It was called *Śabdaprabhā*.[2] Unfortunately, it has so far not been found. While Puṇyarāja's commentary on Kāṇḍa II is available and has been published, that on Kāṇḍa I is not so. The commentary on Kāṇḍa I that was published in 1887 in Benares by Pandit Gangadhara Shastri MANAVALLI as that of Puṇyarāja is not his at all, as the colophon at the end of the commentary (p. 62) clearly shows. It runs as follows:—

*"Iti śrīmad-mahāvaiyākaraṇa-Harivṛṣabhaviracitavākyapadīyaprakāśe āgamasamuccayo nāma brahmakāṇḍaṃ prathamaṃ samāptam."*

1. *Vāk.* III, pt. 1, p. 1 (Deccan College Monograph Series 21, (1963).
2. *Ibid.*, p. 45, l. 3.

The name Puṇyarāja is totally absent here. In view of this, the statement —

"*Vākyapadīyaṃ Puṇyarājakṛtaprakāśākhyaṭīkāsahitaṃ prakāśyate*"

found on p. 1 of this publication is a mere editorial error. This may be contrasted with the colophon at the end of the commentary on Kāṇḍa II which runs as follows —

"*Iti Śrī Puṇyarājakṛta Vākyapadīyadvitīyakāṇḍaṭīkā samāptā*".

Here Puṇyarāja's name is mentioned in an unambiguous manner. The real position is that we do not have Puṇyarāja's commentary on Kāṇḍa I, though, from the way in which he begins his commentary on Kāṇḍa II, one can reasonably conclude that he must have written it.[3] This editorial error regarding the commentary on Kāṇḍa I was pointed out long ago by Dr. Kunhan RAJA[4] and others, but it is still being repeated by scholars.[5] According to Vṛṣabhadeva, many commentaries on the Vākyapadīya existed before him, but he does not mention any author or work by name. Nor have I found any quotation from any previous commentary in his own commentary called *Paddhati*.[6] The great Abhinavaguptācārya is known to have written a work called '*Prakīrṇakavivaraṇam*', most probably a commentary on the IIIrd Kāṇḍa of the *Vākyapadīyam*, but that also has not yet been found. The basic portion of the *Vākyapadīyam* consists of kārikās. They are extensively quoted, not only in grammatical litera-

3. *Vak.* a. p. 63.

4. Dr. Kunhan RAJA—I-tsing and Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya (*Dr. Krishnaswamy Aiyangar Commemoration Volume*, p. 285 ff.)

5. For example (a) Gauri Nath ŚASTRI—*The Philosophy of Word and Meaning* (Calcutta, S. C. Research Series, V) Wherever this scholar quotes the Benares commentary on Kāṇḍa I, in the foot-notes, it is quoted as that of Puṇyarāja, (b) p. XI of *Vākyapadīya* (University of Poona Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, Vol. II, 1965.

6. It is being published in a critical edition by me in the Deccan College Monograph Series.

ture, but also in the philosophical literature, brahmanical, buddhist and jain, showing that the work was much studied once upon a time. While a few quotations have been found also from the ancient commentary which is here translated, it appears that the study of it was not much pursued in recent times. Hence the difficulty in getting manuscripts of it.

If, in the midst of this incompleteness of material, I have ventured to make this translation, it is only as a humble contribution to the study of an author whose importance is now being realised and to the understanding of whose ideas others are also making contributions.

It is well known that ancient Sanskrit works written in the form of sūtras or kārikās require a commentary for their understanding, written preferably by the author himself, or atleast by one close to him and very familiar with the traditions under the influence of which he himself wrote. Mammaṭa's Kāvyaprakāśa, Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*, Utpalācārya's *Pratyabhijñākārikās* are examples of kārikā works for which the author's own Vṛttis are available. It is, therefore, a matter of good fortune that, atleast for the first kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīyam, we have this ancient commentary called Vṛtti in a complete form. Whether it is by the author himself will be discussed here later. It is correspondingly very regrettable that, for the second kāṇḍa, this commentary is available only with many gaps, some of which are long ones.

The *Vṛtti* is not a word for word explanation of the kārikās. It is only rarely that the words of the kārikās are cited in the Vṛtti for the purpose of explanation. Normally, the *Vṛtti* consists of observations on the subject matter of the kārikā. These observations clarify the main idea expressed by the verse. Sometimes, they are quite elaborate as in the case of the Kā. I. 23 and 24-26. The *Vṛtti* contains quotations from the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, the *Vārttikas* of Kātyāyana, the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali, the *Saṅgraha*, the Vedas, Purākalpa, Itihāsa and many anonymous works. It gives the views of others, introduced by expressions like *kecit*, *apare*, etc. Previous authors

are hardly ever mentioned by name but are referred to in a general manner, such as Śikṣākāra, Sūtrakāra, Bhāṣyakāra, Ācārya, etc.[7] Even the author of the Saṅgraha is mentioned as Saṅgrahakāra, and not by his name. With the exception of the *Saṅgraha* and the *Bhāṣyavivaraṇa* (*Vṛtti* on I.82) previous works are also referred to in a general way such as *Āgama, Vidyābhāṣya* (I.128.) and so on.

One of the things which strikes a student of the *Vṛtti* is that it is written in a rather unusual style. There is a certain strangeness or obscurity about it which must be distinguished from the fact of being merely archaic. The style of the *Mahābhāṣya*, a much older work, is a bit archaic too, but it never strikes one as being strange or obscure. Quite the contrary, in fact. The *Vṛtti* gives the impression of having been composed under the influence of a different tradition of writing. Sometimes, it reminds me of the style of the *Vyāsabhāṣya* on the Yogasūtras of Patañjali. Not that it is easy to pick out characteristics of style and declare with confidence that they are peculiar to a particular work and cannot at all be found elsewhere. And yet it may not be without interest to point out a few features which recur in the *Vṛtti* without asserting dogmatically that they cannot be found elsewhere. The impression of obscurity is not due to the presence of unknown words or to the author's use of his own new technical terms. Some of the obscurity of the *Vṛtti* is, of course, due to the nature of the subject matter itself. That on I.142 in which the different aspects of the Vaikharī, Madhyamā and Paśyantī are described is a good example. Some of it, is, however, due to the peculiar construction of sentences and compound words. Sometimes the language is very terse. Too much is taken for granted. There are not those indications which compel one to understand the words and sentences in a particular way.

To begin with, there is a tendency to use long and rather involved sentences. Sometimes, the whole commentary on a

7. *Vāk.* b. I, 115, p.104.

verse consists of just one sentence. Those on I, 27, 46, 54, 91, 147; II, 14, 17 may be mentioned as examples. The mere fact that a sentence is long need not result in obscurity, though the chances are greater. Even when the sentence is not long, its meaning may not be clear. In the last sentence of the *Vṛtti* on I,60. the author wants to say that the sūtra P. 1.1.68 makes the word 'agni' found in P. 4.2.33 the name (*saṃjñā*) of the word 'agni' actually used in speech, to which the suffix 'ḍhak' is to be added. The sentence reads as follows —

> *"Tasmād agniśabdo yenārthabhūtenābhinnarūpeṇāgniśabdenārthavān tam agniśabdāntarābhidheyasya tulyaśruter agniśabdasya saṃjñābhāvaṃ pratipādayatīti."*

The obscurity of this sentence is due to the following —

(1) It is not made clear that 'agniśabdaḥ' means the word 'agni' found in a sūtra like 'agner ḍhak'. (2) 'abhidheyasya' is a repetition of 'arthabhūtena' and 'tulyaśruteḥ' of 'abhinnarūpeṇa'. (3) It seems that 'agniśabdaḥ' is the agent of the verb *pratipādayati,* but on reflection, it is clear that it is the sūtra 'svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasya' which is the agent. The translation (p. 65) follows the text as it is and it is hoped that it will be clear enough to the reader.

Similarly,

> *"na hyabhivyaktimatām abhivyañjakair āśritānām evābhivyaktir niyamena kriyate"* (p. 32).

does not mean anything more than that suggestors (manifestors) do not necessarily suggest (manifest) what inheres in them, but this meaning does not come out quickly. It lacks the literary quality of 'prasāda'. In I.53 the author of the *Vṛtti* wants to say that, just as the speaker, when he wants to say something, first pays attention to the word expressive of it, in the same way, the listener also, knowing that unless he grasps the form of the word, he would not be able to understand its meaning, first tries to grasp it with all its attributes. The litener's part is described as follows:

*"Tathā pratipattāpi śabdarūpaparicchedādhīnam arthagrahaṇam manyamānas taṃ taṃ śabdaṃ sarvaiḥ sambandhibhir viśeṣaṇair āśritasaṃsargānugrahaṃ nirdhārayati.*

Here 'āśritasaṃsargānugraham' is rather obscure because it is not clear whether it is an adjective qualifying 'śabdam' or an adverb modifying 'nirdhārayati'. In either case, it is obscure, because the connection is between 'viśeṣaṇaiḥ' and 'saṃsarga', but the word 'āśrita' comes between the two and prevents the author's meaning from becoming clear. Sometimes, connected words are separated by many other words coming between them, as in—

*"Apoddhāre hi śāstravyavahārārtham samudāyāt saṃsṛṣṭāyāḥ kasyāścid arthamātrāyāḥ kriyamāṇe..."* (p. 40).

Here the connection is between 'apoddhāre' and kriyamāṇe, separated from each other by six other words. It is not that the connection cannot be understood. This way of constructing the sentence, however, causes delay in understanding the meaning. The following first sentence in the *Vṛtti* on I. 29 is obscure for other reasons—

*"Ko hi śiṣṭaḥ sambhinnabuddhir api lokaṃ pratyanabhiniviṣṭo durjñānaṃ duradhyeyaṃ ca svarasaṃskārādiniyamaṃ laukikavaidikānāṃ śabdānāṃ prayojanaṃ vyavasthāpayitum utsahate".*

To begin with, it is not clear whether the text was 'anabhiniviṣṭah' or 'abhiniviṣṭaḥ'. In either case, it has to mean somebody who has no sympathy towards the world, but dislikes it. Vṛṣabha adopts the reading 'abhiniviṣṭaḥ' and explains it as one who is driven by the desire to trouble the world. Nor is it clear whether the verb 'vyavasthāpayitum' is to be connected with 'svarasaṃskāraniyamam' or with 'prayojanam' or with both. As the main idea of the verse is to justify the composition of the science of Grammar, the word 'prayojana' probably refers to the purpose of grammar, namely, the regulation of the accent and other signs of the correctness of words, but it is not openly stated. No wonder

that the word has been replaced by 'prayogaviṣayam' in the Benares readaptation of the *Vṛtti* (*Vāk.* a. p. 15).

A sentence like

"*Tatra śabdāntarārthaḥ śabdāntarārthasya prasiddhabhedasya saṃjñitvenopādīyamānasya saṃjñibhāvaṃ pratipadyate iti* (p. 73)

is a little obscure. What is meant is that 'śabdavyakti' is 'saṃjñā' and 'śabdajāti' is 'saṃñin'. To refer to both of them as 'śabdāntarārtha' is using very peculiar language. A compound word like 'paricchedasaṃskārabhāvanābījavṛttilābha' (p. 85) is obscure because *saṃskāra*, *bhāvanā* and *bīja* are almost synonyms and yet they have been combined. The long sentence in the *Vṛttii* on II. 24 is a good specimen of its obscure style:—

"*Atha gatir api nityā sarvam evāvyatipāti ca pratijñāyate, athaitā vyāvahāriṇya eva viśvasya mātrāḥ, tatra ca pūrvaṃ samīhitam asaṃsṛṣṭam eva vyatipatati, nirupākhyayośca pūrvāparayoḥ koṭyor madhyam anavabaddhaṃ paścāt purastāccūnālaṃbanam anupākhyam pūrvabhāgāparabhāgapratyavamarśinevāhaṅkāreṇānusyūtam apakarṣaparyantagatam abhidheyam apyasataḥ pararūpasyopagraheṇa cātyantam anupagrāhi parimāṇābhede'pi mithyābhyāsād aviduṣo dīrgham iva prakāśate*".

Here the obscurity is due to the fact that the author takes too much for granted for a modern reader. The reader of his day would probably have understood it more readily.

Another noteworthy feature of the language of the Vṛtti is the addition of the word 'ātman' to other words and though there is usually a distinct addition in meaning, sometimes it is not clear what extra meaning the compound word thus formed expresses. Here are a few examples:

(a) *Eko'yaṃ vedākhyo darśanātmani sthito dṛsyo'rthaḥ* (I.5. p. 14.)

(b) *labdhakrame vāgātmarūpe prāpitaḥ* (I.5. p. 14).

(c) *Vṛkṣaḥ plakṣaḥ...arthātmanām nirūpaṇaṃ na vidyate* (I.24-26, p. 37.)

(d) *sthitalakṣaṇastu...ekaḥ kriyātmā* (I.24-26, p. 37.)

(e) *kāryakāraṇa...tasyārthātmanaḥ śabdo nimittam* (I.24-26, p. 39.)

(f) *tat...abhidheyātmani prāpyamāṇam...* (I.47, p. 58.)

(g) *Atattvabhūtas tasminneva vākyātmani* (I.73, p. 76.)

(h) *samādhānaṃ hi....viṣayātmani....* (I.79, p. 81.)

(i) *...kampajāḥ śabdāḥ...sphoṭātmānam abhisaṃskurvanti.* (I.106, p. 101).

(j) *śrutir eva hi...svarūpapadātmani...darśayati* (I.129, p. 117.)

(k) *sa hi tasyāṃ pratyāyyātmanā nityam avasthitaḥ* (I.129, p. 117.)

(l) *Ṛṣayaḥ kecit pratibhātmani vivartante* (I.145, p. 133.)

This is only an illustrative list from the *Vṛtti* on Kāṇḍa I. Similar examples can be culled from the *Vṛtti* on Kāṇḍa II also. But what has been said so far is enough to give an idea of the unusual language and style of the Vṛtti.

Ever since the publication of the *Vṛtti* as Bhartṛhari's own work, that view has been generally accepted by scholars, as can be seen from the way in which it is referred to as 'svopajñavṛtti' in all writings relating to Bhartṛhari. The recent Sanskrit University (Vārāṇasī) publication of it with the commentary called 'Ambākartrī' by Pt. Raghunath SHARMA also refers to the *Vṛtti* as Bhartṛhari's own (svopajñayā ṭīkayā). It is not that doubts had not occurred to students of the *Vṛtti.* They had occurred to me and I know of others who have expressed their doubts to me. But they were only doubts. Now that Dr. M. BIARDEAU has definitely expressed her opinion[8] that the *Vṛtti* is by Harivṛṣabha,

8. See M. BIARDEAU—Bhartṛhari-*Vākyapadīya,* Brahmakāṇḍa, avec la Vṛtti de Harivṛṣabha, Traduction, Introduction et notes. (Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation indienne, Fascicule 24), Paris, De Boccard, 1964.

a different person from Bhartṛhari, the author of the Kārikās, it is necessary to pass in review the whole question, so that one may know where one stands. I propose to place before the reader the main arguments and considerations which lead one to think that the Kārikās and the Vṛtti are by the same author and those which might produce the opposite conclusion, namely, that their authors were different. A few of these arguments on both sides are mine while others have been put forward by scholars whose books or articles where they have expressed their views are given in the bibliography.

That Bhartṛhari, the author of the Kārikās, had himself written a commentary on Vāk. I and II is mentioned by the Chinese pilgrim I-tsing who visited India in the 7th cent. A.D.[9] Though it is now clear that what I-tsing says about Bhartṛhari is incorrect in some respects, as for example, in the matter of his date, it is not necessary to discard his testimony as altogether incredible. One can make a critical use of it. He says that the first two Kāṇḍas of the *Vākyapadīya* contained 700 ślokas and that the commentary on them by the author himself contained 7000 ślokas. The extent of the text, as recorded by him, agrees approximately with that of the two kāṇḍas which we have. As for the size of the commentary, it is difficult to say whether I-tsing has reported correctly or not, because what we have is incomplete. The *Vṛtti* on kāṇḍa II is full of gaps, sometimes long ones. The work is in prose with many quotations in verse. I-tsing, by saying that the commentary contained 7000 ślokas, could not have meant that it was composed in verse. It has long been the practice in India to calculate the extent of even prose works in ślokas, taking thirty-two syllables as equal to one śloka. In the absence of the complete *Vṛtti*, there is no need to reject I-tsing's statement as impossible. All that we have to note now is that in the 7th century A.D., I-tsing was informed that Bhartṛhari had written his own

9. J. Takakusu—*A Record of the Buddhist Religion as prescribed in India and the Malay Archipelago*, Oxford 1896, p. 180.

commentary on kāṇḍas I and II. Is that the commentary which we now have? That is the problem. A very important problem too, as our interpretation of the Vākyapadīya would depend very much on how we answer this question.

*The Kārikās and the Vṛtti are by the same author.*

Pt. Charu Deva SHASTRI who edited the authentic text of the *Vṛtti* for the first time has drawn attention to the colophon at the end of the first kāṇḍa, consisting of the kārikās and the commentary in all the manuscripts. It runs as follows:—

*"Iti Śrī Harivṛṣabhamahāvaiyākaraṇaviracite Vākyapadīye āgamasamuccayo nāma prathamakāṇḍaṃ samāptam".*

This colophon, coming at the end of the manuscript containing both the kārikās and the Vṛtti gives the name Brahmakāṇḍa to both of them taken together. If that is so, it follows that both have been written by the same person. And that person, named Harivṛṣabha in the colophon, is no other than Hari, that is, Bhartṛhari, Vṛṣabha being no more than a title of respect. It is true that in the colophons of the manuscripts of the Kārikās only, the author's name is usually given as Bhagavadbhartṛhari, but that does not mean that Bhartṛhari and Harivṛṣabha are not the same person. In fact, the colophon of one of the manuscripts of the kārikās only reads as follows[10]:—

*"Iti Śrīmadbhagavadbhartṛharivṛṣabhamahāvaiyākaraṇapādaviracite".*

Here the author's name is given as Bhartṛharivṛṣabha, confirming that Bhartṛhari and Harivṛṣabha are the same person. It is true that colophons of Sanskrit manuscripts have been frequently found to contain errors and have, therefore, to

10. MS 5026 = BURNELL 307, India Office Library, London. See Wilhelm RAU—Über sechs Handschriften des Vākyapadīya, *Oriens*, Vol. 15, pp. 386-388.

be used with caution. One cannot, however, ignore them. After all, it is only on the basis of colophons that one can attribute the *Vṛtti* to a separate person called Harivṛṣabha. Whatever names of authors and works we know, it is the colophons of manuscripts which have given us the information.

Another argument[11] advanced by Pt. Charu Deva SHASTRI in favour of the identity of the authorship of the Kārikās and the *Vṛtti* is that nowhere does the Vṛtti record any variant reading in the Kārikās whereas later commentators like Helārāja do.[12] One must admit that if there is an interval of time between an author and his commentators, variant readings of the original text commented upon are more likely to have arisen.

The view that the two authors are identical is not based solely on colophons of manuscripts or on the absence of variant readings in the *Vṛtti*. Their evidence is corroborated by references in later literature. Quotations from and references to the Kārikās in later literature are legion. But we are here concerned with the *Vṛtti* and here the position is that for the last one thousand two hundred years at least, the *Vṛtti* which we now have has been looked upon and used by very eminent Ācāryas of Ancient India as Bhartṛhari's own commentary on his Kārikās. Some examples are given below:

A. Maṇḍana Miśra (VII-VIII century A.D.) not only quotes, in his *Sphoṭasiddhi*, Vāk. I, 82-84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90-91,[13] but his commentary on his own verses 19[14] and 20[15] is based

11. *Vāk.* b. I, p. 17 (Upodghāta).

12. See *Vāk.* III, pt. 1, p. 35, l. 10; p. 60, l. 13-15. (Deccan College Monograph Series, 21, 1963).

13. The *Sphoṭasiddhi* of Maṇḍana Misra (Madras University Sanskrit Series, No. 6.) pp. 132, 157, 162 158, 143, 159.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 139.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 145.

on the Vṛtti on I, 89 and 88 respectively. In his explanation of his own verse 21, he quotes the verse:—

*Na jñeyena vinā jñānaṃ*
*Vyavahāre'vatiṣṭhate,*
*Nālabdhakramayā vācā*
*Kaścid artho'bhidhīyate.*[16]

immediately after quoting I. 86, implying that they are from the same work. Actually, this verse is found in the *Vṛtti* on I.86, as a quotation, being preceded by the words 'evam hyāha'. It is clear that Maṇḍana Miśra looked upon the Kārikās and the Vṛtti on Kāṇḍa I to have been written by the same author, namely Bhartṛhari.

B. Somānanda (9th cent. A.D.), in his *Śivadṛṣṭi*, Āhnika II, criticises the Śabdādvaita of the grammarians and quotes[17] the *Vākyapadīya* for refutation. Immediately after quoting Kā. I. 1 and 123, he quotes, as though coming from the same work, the verse:—

"*Avibhāgā tu paśyantī sarvataḥ saṃhṛtakramā, svarūpa-jyotir evāntaḥ sūkṣmā vāganapāyinī.*

which is found in the Vṛtti on I.142, as a quotation. Here also, the Kārikās and the *Vṛtti* of *Vāk.* I have been looked upon as one work, written by one person. It is the conception of Paśyantī, embodied in the above quotation from the *Vṛtti,* which is particularly analysed and criticised by Somānanda.

C. One is led to a similar conclusion from the way in which Utpalācārya, (9th-10th cent. A.D.) a disciple of Somānanda and the commentator of the *Śivadṛṣṭi,* quotes from our *Vṛtti.* He obviously knew the *Vṛtti* which we have and looked upon it as the work of the author of the Kārikās. Commenting on Somānanda's quotation of I, 1, Utpala says:—

16. *Ibid.,* p. 162.
17. Somānanda—*Śivadṛṣṭi* (p. 43-44), (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies).

"*Asatyāvibhaktānyarūpopagrāhitā vivartaḥ*"[18]

which is the well-known definition of 'vivarta' found in the *Vṛtti* on I.1 (p. 5). There are other quotations from the *Vṛtti* in Utpala's commentary:—

> " '*Pratilabdhasamādhānā ca*'[19]
> '*Viśuddhā ca*'[20]
> '*Praśāntapratyavabhāsā ca*'[21]
> '*Pratisaṃhṛtakramāpyantaḥ satyapy abhede samāviṣṭakramaśaktiḥ paśyantī*"[22]

All these little phrases are found in the *Vṛtti* on I.142 (p. 126.). So is the verse:—

> "*Sthāneṣu vivṛte vāyau kṛtavarṇaparigrahā,*
> *Vaikharī vāk prayoktṛṇāṃ prāṇavṛttinibandhanā*".

which is a quotation in the same *Vṛtti* from some older work, most probably 'Itihāsa' mentioned there a little earlier (p. 127). Somānanda is obviously criticising Bhartṛhari as the Kārikā quotations show and Utpala, while quoting from the *Vṛtti* which we have, does not give the slightest hint that he was quoting from some other author than Bhartṛhari or some other work than the Vākyapadīya.

D. If there is any lingering doubt that these Kashmir Śaiva writers, who quote from the *Vṛtti*, thought of anybody else than Bhartṛhari as its author, it is dispelled by another writer, belonging to the same tradition, namely, the great Abhinavagupta (10th-11th cent. A.D.) who says[23]:—

> "*Yadāha tatrabhavān-Pratisaṃhṛtakramarūpā, tu satyapi (a?) bhede*, etc."

18. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
23. Abhinavagupta—*Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī*, Vol. II, p. 189 (Kashmir Sanskrit Series).

This is the same phrase from the *Vṛtti* on I.142 referred to above as quoted by Utpala, and Abhinavagupta definitely ascribes it to Tatrabhavān, which is his favourite way of referring to Bhartṛhari. In some places, he openly says: Tatrabhavān Bhartṛhariḥ.[24] There can be no doubt that he, his paramaguru Utpala and the still earlier Somānanda, regarded the *Vṛtti* which we have as the work of Bhartṛhari.

E. Coming now from Śaiva writers to grammarians, Helārāja (10th cent. A.D.) who was one of the teachers of Abhinavagupta and who had written a commentary on *Vāk* I and II, as he himself says,[25] on the basis of the *Vṛtti* quotes or refers to the *Vṛtti* which we have in his commentary on *Vak.* III. For example:—

(i) *"Ata eva purākalpe'nṛtādibhir ivāpabhraṃśair api rahitā vāgāsīd iti brahmakāṇḍa uktam".*[26]

This is a clear reference to the *Vṛtti* on I. 154 (p. 137) which reads as follows:—

*"Śrūyate purākalpe svaśarīrajyotiṣāṃ manuṣyāṇāṃ Yathaivānṛtādibhir asaṃkīrṇā vāgāsīt tathā sarvair apabhraṃśaiḥ".*

(*ii*) *Tathā ca vidyāvidyāpravibhāgam apravibhāgaṃ brahmeti brahmakāṇḍa uktam".*[27]

This may be compared with the following phrase from the *Vṛtti* on I. 1. (p. 4).

. . . *"Vidyāvidyāpravibhāgarūpam apravibhāgam brahma etc".*

(iii) *Tathā ca yadadhiṣṭhānāḥ śrutayaḥ pratyāyyam artham abhiniviśanta iti brahmakāṇḍa abhihitam.*[28]

24. For example, *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 226, where also he quotes from the Vṛtti on I, 142, this time a longer passage.

25. *Vāk.* III, pt. 1, p. 1, introductory verse 2 (Deccan College Monograph Series, 21, 1963).

26. *Ibid.*, p. 143, l. 14.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 169, l. 6-7.

28. *Vāk.* c. p. 202.

This is an echo of

"*Yadadhiṣṭhānā yadupāśrayā yadādhārāḥ śrutayaḥ pratyāyyam arthaṃ pratipadyante tasya nimittatvam.* (*I.* 44. p. 55).

What should be noted in the three quotations given above from Helārāja is that, in all of them, the *Vṛtti* is designated as the Brahmakāṇḍa, as in the colophons of the manuscripts. For him, the kārikās and the *Vṛtti* together constituted the Brahmakāṇḍa. In other words, he regarded both as having been written by the same author. Many sentences in the *Prakīrṇakaprakāśa* of Helārāja are either verbatim reproductions or echoes of those in the *Vṛtti* even when they are not given as quotations. For example:—

(iv) "*Yadā tvavayavaprabandhaḥ krameṇopalabdho bhavati atha śabdajātiviśeṣopādhiyuktā vyavahārā avatiṣṭhante*",[29]

is a reproduction of the following *Vṛtti* on I. 23, p. 32.

"*Yadā tvavayavaprabandhaḥ krameṇopalabdho bhavati atha jātiviśeṣopādhiyuktā vyavahārā avatiṣṭhante.*"

F. Puṇyarāja's (11th-12th cent. A.D.?) identification of the *Vṛtti* which we have as the commentary of Bhartṛhari is even more explicit. He frequently refers to Bhartṛhari as the ṭīkākāra, whether because of the latter's ṭīkā on the *Mahābhāṣya* or of the commentary on the kārikās of the *Vākyapadīya*, is not clear. In his commentary on *Vāk.* II. 77-83, he says[30]—

"*Eteṣāṃ ca vitatya sopapattikaṃ sanidarśanaṃ svarūpaṃ padakāṇḍe lakṣaṇasamuddeśe vinirdiṣṭam iti granthakṛtaiva pratipāditam*".

29. *Vāk.* III, pt. 1, p. 18, l. 9-10 (Deccan College Monograph Series, 21, 1963).

30. *Vāk.* b. II, p. 46.

Here Puṇyarāja informs us that the author, i.e., Bhartṛhari, has, in his commentary, told us himself that he has explained in detail (*vitatya*), with all arguments and examples, the maxims of the Mīmāṃsā in the section dealing with maxims (*lakṣaṇasamuddeśa*) of the chapter dealing with the individual word (*padakāṇḍa*). Now this is an obvious reference to the following passage found in our *Vṛtti*—

> *"Tatra dvādaśa ṣaṭ caturviṃśatir vā lakṣaṇānīti lakṣaṇasamuddeśe sāpadeśaṃ savirodhaṃ vistareṇa vyākhyāsyate".*[31]

Similarly, Puṇyarāja says[32]—

> *"Yat punar anena vṛttāvuktam udāharaṇamātram etat, anyānyapi vākyalakṣaṇāni darśayiṣyatīti tad vārtikakārīyavākyalakṣaṇāder antarbhāvam anapekṣyeti mantavyam."*

Here there is a reference to Bhartṛhari's own *Vṛtti*, but unfortunately, we cannot verify this reference because the only ms. of our Vṛtti begins with Kā. 13 for Kāṇḍa II. The beginning is missing. The quotation which Puṇyarāja gives must have been taken from the *Vṛtti* on Kāṇḍa II, 1-2. The same thing can be said about another quotation from the *Vṛtti* by Puṇyarāja[33]—

> *"Eṣā ca ṭīkākṛtā sa ca tulyabaleṣvasaṃbhavād ityādinā bahuprakārā darśitā".*

There is a big gap in our available *Vṛtti* for the Kārikās II, 77-153 and the above quotation was probably taken from the missing portion. But it is immaterial for our present purpose. The one quotation which has been traced in our present *Vṛtti* is quite adequate to show that for Puṇyarāja, it was the work of the author of the kārikās, namely Bhartṛhari.

31. *Vāk.* b. II, p. 76.
32. *Ibid.*, II, p. 5.
33. *Ibid*, II, p. 50.

G. Non-grammatical writers also considered the *Vṛtti* as part of the *Vākyapadīyam*. Mammaṭa (11th cent. A.D.) says in his Kāvyaprakāśa.[34]

> *"Uktaṃ ca Vākyapadīye: na hi gauḥ svarūpeṇa gaur nāpyagauḥ, gotvābhisambandhāt tu gaur iti".*

The passage quoted is in prose and so it must be from the *Vṛtti* which has been identified with the *Vākyapadīya* by Mammaṭa.

H. Jayantabhaṭṭa (9th cent. A.D.) the author of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, does the same. After having quoted I. 1.

> *Anādinidhanaṃ brahma śabdatattvaṃ yadakṣaram,*
> *Vivartate'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ.*

he asks:

> *Yattu nityaṃ vā kiñcit tac chabdatattvam ityatra kā yuktiḥ* = "Whatever may be eternal, what reason is there for considering it to be the word—principle?" And then says—

> *"Āha-śabdopagrāhyatayā ca śabdatattvam".*[35]

This phrase, as the word 'āha' indicates, is a quotation and it is a quotation from the *Vṛtti* on I. 1. From the way in which he says *'āha'*, it is clear that Jayantabhaṭṭa considered the authors of the Kā. quoted (I. 1.) and the phrase quoted were the same, namely, Bhartṛhari.

I. As for Vṛṣabhadeva who has commented upon the Kārikās as well as the *Vṛtti*, there is no doubt at all that they together constituted a single work called 'Vākyapadīya' on which he proposed to write a commentary—

> *"Kriyate paddhatir eṣā vākyapadīyodadheḥ sugamā".*[36]

34. *Kāvyaprakāśa*, II, Ullāsa.
35. Jayantabhaṭṭa—*Nyāyamañjarī.*
36. *Vāk.* I. p. 1, 1. 9.

If there is any doubt on this point, he makes it clear in the course of the commentary. While explaining the last sentence of the *Vṛtti* on I. 43—

> "*Idam ācāryaiḥ śabdānuśāsanaṃ prakrāntam anugamyate*[37] = this science of the formation of words set forth by the great teachers is being followed,
>
> he adds: *tan* mayā *anugamyate iti*[38] = it is being *followed by me.* The *mayā* here naturally refers to the author of the *Vṛtti.* Introducing his commentary on the next verse, Vṛṣabha says—*Tadanugamaṃ kurvan prathamataḥ śabdasya svarūpam āha*".[39] = *In following it,* he first declares the nature of the word.

It is quite clear that Vṛṣabha identifies the author of the *Vṛtti* with that of the Kārikās.

The date of Vṛṣabha is not yet known but he must be counted among the older writers. Though the *Vṛtti* cannot be later than Maṇḍana Miśra, we may yet come across older writers who knew it. If knowledge of a quotation in the *Vṛtti* can be taken as evidence of a knowledge of the *Vṛtti*, then Diṅnāga must have known it, because he has paraphrased not only the Kārikās of the Sambandhasamuddeśa of Vāk. III in his Traikālyaparīkṣā, but also two verses quoted in the *Vṛtti* on I. 1. as pointed out by Abhyankar and Limaye on p. 352 of Appendix III of their edition of the Vākyapadīya (University of Poona Sanskrit and Prakrit Series II). As there is a possibility of Diṅnāga and the *Vṛtti* quoting from an unknown common source, this is not as good evidence as the borrowing of a prose passage of the *Vṛtti* itself would be.

This conclusion to which we are led by a consideration of colophons of manuscripts and references in later literature is further strengthened by the presence of some parallel passages in our *Vṛtti* and the available fragment of the com-

37. *Vāk.* b. I. 43, p. 55.
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Ibid.*

mentary of Bhartṛhari on the Mahābhāṣya. Two such parallel passages have been pointed out by MR. SWAMINATHAN, the editor of the fragment[40] and a third one by Pt. Yudhisthir MIMAMSIKA.[41] Adding a few parallel passages which I have myself noticed, I give them all below for the opinion of scholars—

(i) *Evam idam ūhyam idam anūhyam iti nyāyādavasthite liṅgavacanavibhaktīnāṃ samyag viniyoge vyākaraṇasya vyāpāraḥ.*[42]

This may be compared with the following from the *Vṛtti*—

*"Idam ūhyam idam anūhyam iti nyāyād avasthite 'samyag vipariṇatau liṅgavacanādīnāṃ vyākaraṇam nibandhanam iti".*[43]

(ii) *"sphoṭaḥ śabdo dhvanis tasya vyāyāmād upajāyaṭe".*[44]

to which may be compared the following from the *Vṛtti*:—

*"Sphoṭaḥ śabdo dhvanis tasya vyāyāma upajāyate".*[45]

The interesting point here is that in both the commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* and the *Vṛtti,* this is given as a quotation either from the Vārttika or the *M. Bhā.*, but it is not found there, especially the striking word *vyāyāma.* That they should agree in having this sentence containing this par-

40. V. SWAMINATHAN—Bhartṛhari's authorship of the commentary on the Mahābhāṣya (*The Adyar Library Bulletin,* Vol. XXVII, pts. 1-4 (p. 59 ff).

41. Yudhiṣthira MIMAMSAKA—*Vyākaraṇa Śāstra ka itihāsa,* Bhag 1, p. 347 (Ajmer, Vi. S. 2020). This work in two volumes is a collection and arrangement of an enormous number of valuable data on the history of Sanskrit Grammar.

42. ABHYANKAR and LIMAYE—Mahābhāṣyadīpikā—*ABORI,* 1962, p. 1, l. 7-8.

43. *Vāk.* b. I. p. 22.

44. *ABORI,* 1962, Mahābhāṣyadīpikā, p. 4, l. 22.

45. *Vāk.* b. I. p. 35.

ticular word, not found in the existing Vārttikas or *Mahābhāṣya* is thought-provoking.

(iii) *"Yadi tu goṇīśabdo'pi nimittāntarāt sāsnādimati prayujyeta goṇīva goṇīti sādhur eva syāt. Aśve vāsvaśabdaṃ dhanābhāvadvārakaṃ prayuñjīta sa sādhur eva"*.[46]

To this corresponds the following *Vṛtti* passage:—

*"Goṇīveyaṃ goṇīti bahukṣīradhāraṇādiviṣayād āvapanatvasāmānyād abhidhīyate. Tathāvidyamānaṃ svam asya so'yam asva iti"*.[47]

(iv) *"Sa ca nādaḥ śrotṛasyānugrahe vartate. Tadanugṛhītaṃ śrotraṃ śabdopalabdhau samarthaṃ bhavati yathākṣṇor añjanam ityeke"*.[48]

This is very similar to the following *Vṛtti* passage:—

*"Dhvanir utpadyamānaḥ śrotraṃ saṃskaroti; tacca saṃskriyamāṇaṃ śabdopalabdhau dvāratāṃ pratipadyate"*.[49] *"Tathāñjanādidravyaṃ cakṣur eva saṃskaroti"*.[50]

(v) *"Yathā prokṣaṇaṃ pṛthivyā eva na ghrāṇasya"*.[51]

This is akin to the *Vṛtti* statement:—

*"Pṛthivyāścodakena gandhapratipattikāle dṛṣṭo na ghrāṇendriyasya"*.[52]

The *Vṛtti* on Kāṇḍa II has also such parallel passages. For example:—

(vi) *"Yathiva gataṃ gotvam evam iṅgitādayo'pyarthataḥ mahiṣādiṣu dṛṣṭaṃ vyutpattyāpi karmaṇyāśrīya-*

46. *ABORI*, 1962, Mahābhāṣyadīpikā, p. 11, l. 10-11.
47. *Vāk.* b. I. 148, p. 135.
48. *ABORI*, 1962, Mahābhāṣyadīpikā, p. 20, l. 16-17.
49. *Vāk.* b. I. 79, p. 80.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 81.
51. *ABORI*, 1962, Mahābhāṣyadīpikā, p. 20, l. 17.
52. *Vāk.* b. I. 79, p. 81.

*māṇe gamivat viśeṣaṇaṃ durākhyānam upādadāno gacchati, garjati, gadati vā gaur iti*".[53]

Of the above, the following *Vṛtti* passage is an echo:—

"*Yathaiva hi gamikriyā jātyantaraikārthasamavāyinībhyo gamikriyābhyo'tyantabhinnā tulyarūpatvavidhau tvantareṇaiva gamim abhidhīyamānā gauritiśabdavyutpatti karmaṇi nimittatvenāśrīyate tathaiva girati garjati gadati ityevamādayaḥ sādhāraṇāḥ sāmānyaśabdanibandhanāḥ kriyāviśeṣās tais tair ācāryair gośabdavyutpādanakriyāyāṃ parigṛhītāḥ*".[54]

Sometimes the idea is the same even though the words of the two passages may be different as in the following:—

"*Yas tvādhyātmika indriyākhyaḥ prakāśaḥ sa ātmānam aprakāśayan bāhyam artham prakāśayati*".[55]

This expresses the same idea as the following *Vṛtti* sentence:—

"*Indriyāṇi tu śeṣibhāvamātrāsaṃsparśenāsaṃsṛṣṭānyaparicchinnatvalakṣaṇāni viṣayopalabdhau śeṣabhāvam upagacchanti*".[56]

Such, in the main, are the arguments which have been brought forward in favour of the view that the *Vṛtti* which we have is actually the work of Bhartṛhari whose authorship of the Kārikās has not been questioned by anybody.

*The Kārikās and the Vṛtti are not by the same author.*

Now follows another set of considerations leading to the the opposite conclusion, namely, that the two were not written by the same author.

53. *ABORI*, 1962, Mahābhāṣyadīpikā, p. 3, l. 1-3.
54. *Vāk.* b. II. 175.
55. *ABORI*, 1962, Mahābhāṣyadīpikā, p. 4, l. 6.
56. *Vāk.* b. I. 57.

A. As pointed out before, the *Vṛtti* on both the first and the second Kāṇḍas records the opinions of others, introduced in general terms such as 'apara āha', apara āhuḥ, apare tu, kecit tu and so on. The problems regarding the word and the meaning were already old ones in Bhartṛhari's time and there was a great diversity of views on them and it is but natural that he should think it appropriate to mention some of them in his work. Opinions of others are recorded not only in the *Vṛtti* but also in the Kārikās, right through the three Kaṇḍas. Most of the passages of the *Vṛtti* where the opinions of others are recorded are not of much significance for our present problem. Where, on the otherhand, the *Vṛtti* gives a different way in which the words of the kārikā are explained by others, one begins to have doubts about the identity of authorship of the kārikās and the *Vṛtti.* For example, the *Vṛtti* first explains the word 'arthapravṛttitattvānām' in I. 13, as 'arthasya pravṛttitattvaṃ vivakṣā, na tu vastusvarūpatayā sattvam asattvaṃ vā."[57] Later, it goes on to say:

> "*Apara āha: arthasya pravṛttau tattvaṃ vyavahāre yannimittam.*"[58]

This looks like the statement of the explanation of the word 'arthapravṛttitattvam' by somebody else, especially because of 'apara āha'. This is not the statement of another view on the subject. It is another explanation of a word. If this way of looking at it is correct, it means that the Kārikās existed before the *Vṛtti* and had been explained by others. In other words, they were not written by the same person. Of course, it is still possible to hold that Bhartṛhari's Kārikās had already been commented on by others before he himself undertook to explain them. But this seems rather far-fetched. The more probable explanation is that the author of the *Vṛtti*, Harivṛṣabha, let us say, is explaining the Kārikās of Bhartṛhari which had already been explained by others. But then the theory of identity of authorship goes

57. *Vāk.* b. I. 13, p. 25.
58. *Ibid.*

under. A similar doubt arises in one's mind when one reads the explanation of the word 'jñānasaṃskārahetavaḥ' in I. 10. After having first explained this compound word as: 'samyagjñānahetavaḥ puruṣasaṃskārahetavaśca', the *Vṛtti* adds: 'jñānātmakatvād vā puruṣasyaiva saṃskārahetavaḥ.' In other words, in the former explanation, the compound word is split up as: 'jñānasya saṃskārasya ca hetavaḥ' whereas in the latter one, it has been split up as jñānasya 'saṃskārahetavaḥ'. If the author of both was the same, why this alternative explanation? The author must have known what he wanted to say and could have said it in one single explanation. Of course, it is open to a writer to want to express more than one meaning through the same word and that would require two different ways of splitting it. Nor is there, as in the previous example, the word 'aparaāha' or some such word to show that the second explanation is by another. The second example may, theerfore, be considered rather weak, as compared with the first one.

B. There is, however, another passage in the *Vṛtti* which is more detrimental to the view that the Kārikās and the *Vṛtti* were written by the same person. *Vāk*. II. 42 says that the extra meaning which is understood when the individual words of a sentence are put together is the meaning of the sentence. This extra meaning sometimes plays a part in fixing the correct form of the individual word and sometimes it does not. The *Vṛtti* further says that this difference is explained in the Mahābhāṣya itself. And then adds—

> "*Ataśca tatrabhavānāha: yathikapadagataḥ prātipadike 'ntaḥpadaṃ saṃṣkārahetur artho vacanaṃ prati........ bhavati tathaikapadagataḥ padasaṃskārahetur eva vibhaktiyogaṃ praty ahetur bhavati. Grāmo grāmo ramaṇīya iti. Anekapadasaṃśrayas tu vākyārthaḥ pratinighātādivyavasthārthahetur ākhyāyate*" *iti*.

It is a pity that there is a gap in the words of Tatrabhavān quoted here. The following may be considered an approximate translation of the passage—

'That is why Tatrabhavān has said: Just as an extra meaning understood from a single word becomes the cause of the addition of a particular case—affix and thus the inner cause of the formation of the correct form of the word, in the same way, such an extra-meaning understood from a word, while becoming the cause of the correct formation of the word, is not necessarily the cause of the addition of a particular affix. A sentence-meaning depending upon many words, becomes the cause of the regulation of the loss of acute accent etc."

It was pointed out before that the expression Tatrabhavān, not followed by any name, stands for Bhartṛhari. Abhinavagupta uses it in that way very frequently. Sometimes, as though to leave no room for doubt, he gives the name Bhartṛhari immediately after. But it is noteworthy that he never uses the mere name. Tatrabhavad, in some case form or other, is always there and even when not followed by the name, means Bhartṛhari. If Tatrabhavān in the *Vṛtti* on II. 42 also means Bhartṛhari—and I have a strong feeling that it does—it means that the author of the *Vṛtti* looks upon him as another person and has quoted a passage from his work. He does not say from which work the quotation has been taken. Have we here a quotation from the real *Vṛtti* of Bhartṛhari or is it from some other work of Tatrabhavān. We cannot say. In the meantime, the mention of Tatrabhavān as somebody different from the author of the *Vṛtti* is a little intriguing.

C. Now we come to another set of arguments against Bhartṛhari's authorship of the *Vṛtti,* advanced by Dr. M. BIARDEAU in her Introduction to her translation into French of Kāṇḍa I together with the *Vṛtti.*[59] The arguments given so far, in favour or against Bhartṛhari's authorship of the *Vṛtti,* were mostly based on references in later literature.

59. M. BIARDEAU—Bhartṛhari-Vākyapadīya-Brahmakāṇḍa avec la Vṛtti de Harivṛṣabha, Traduction, Introduction et notes (Paris, Editions De Boccard, 1964).

Dr. Biardeau presents arguments of a quite different nature, based on difference of ideas between the Kārikās and the Vṛtti. They may be summarised as follows:—

(i) Vāk. I. 8 says that monists and dualists have evolved different doctrines on the basis of the explanatory gloss of the Veda (*arthavādārūpāṇi*). The *Vṛtti* gives a forced explanation of 'arthavādarūpāṇi' by saying 'arthavādān arthavāda-prakārāṇi śrutivākyāni = explanatory *gloss and similar Scriptural passages*. The author of the Kārikā only meant explanatory gloss. Similar scriptural passages which can only mean mantra or vidhi is an addition of the *Vṛtti*. Later, however, while giving examples, doctrines which grew out of explanatory gloss are mentioned but none that evolved on the basis of Mantra or Vidhi is given. This shows that the explanation was artificial and not in accordance with the wish of the author of the Kārikā.

(ii) I. 142. mentions only three stages of Vāk, namely, Vaikharī, Madhyamā and Pasyantī. After explaining these three, the *Vṛtti* adds:[60]

"*Saiṣā trayī vāk caitanyagranthivivartavad anākhyeyaparimāṇā turīyeṇa manuṣyeṣu pratyavabhāsate.*"

This is an attempt on the part of the *Vṛtti*, under the influence of a later tradition, to introduce a fourth stage of Vāk from below. This is another discrepancy in doctrine between the Kārika and the *Vṛtti*.

(iii) There is greater precision in the use of technical terms in the *Vṛtti* compared to the Kārikās, especially in the use of the words *vivarta* and *pariṇāma*. In I. 120. Bhartṛhari uses the word 'vyavartata' in the sense of pariṇāma. In I. 47 and 117, *vi-vṛt* means the manifestation of the word at the level of the places and organs of articulation. In I. 18, it means mere manifestation. In I. 1. '*vivartate*' is obscure.

60. *Vāk*, b. I. 142, p. 130.

(iv) There is nothing in the Kārikās which supports the view that Bhartṛhari looked upon the manifestations as unreal. But, in the *Vṛtti,* they are unreal, *vivarta,* which is defined so at the very beginning.

(v) Bhartṛhari never uses the word *avidyā* in a technical sense. In II. 233, it has only an ordinary meaning. *Vṛtti,* on the other hand, uses the word in a technical sense. Also the expression pratyavabhāsa.

(vi) In the Kārikās, there is no vivartavāda as far as the relation between Brahman and the cosmos is concerned. But dhvanis are the vivarta of sphoṭa and words and phonemes, abstracted by grammar from the sentences, are unreal. The *Vṛtti* transfers this scheme to the relation between Brahman and the cosmos.

(vii) In the Kā., the word vikalpa is used in the sense of option (I. 8, 96), differentiation by thought. The *Vṛtti* has the expression 'avikalpajñāna.' The idea of 'nirvikalpajñāna' occurs for the first time in the Ślokavārttika of Kumārila, whereas Bhartṛhari is prior to him. *Vṛtti* shows knowledge of the Ślokavārttika and is, therefore, posterior to Kumārila.

(viii) Lastly, the Vṛtti on I. 144, knows the two schools of Mīmāṃsā, Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara, another proof that it is a much later work than the Kārikās.

On the grounds mentioned above, Dr. BIARDEAU comes to the conclusion that Harivṛṣabha, the author of the *Vṛtti* is a later writer than Bhartṛhari and has not faithfully interpreted him. He has made him a 'vivartavādin' which he was not. She considers the testimony of the colophons to be unreliable as they so frequently contain errors. She also considers the testimony of the literary references pointing to an identity of authorship as based on an early confusion of the two writers ("de bonne heure, les deux auteurs ont été confondus", (Int. p. 4.) or due to the well-known Indian indifference to chronology. If it is due to the mixing up of the two writers, it must have taken place between Bhartṛ-

hari (5th cent. A.D.) and Maṇḍana Miśra (7th-8th cent. A.D.) It is, however, not clear (i) why and how such a confusion took place so early, so soon after the author's own time, considering that such confusions usually take place when distance in time has wiped off all memories, (2) how it was not noticed by anybody when the works in question were being much studied soon after the author passed away or during the long centuries which have elapsed since then. In matters of this kind, no piece of evidence taken by itself is conclusive. It is the cumulative effect of many considerations which usually leads to an acceptable conclusion. If it is possible to doubt the value of the arguments in favour of identity of authorship, it is equally possible to doubt the arguments and make little of the considerations pointing to diversity of authorship. What looks like two different ways of explaining the same text may be nothing more than the recording of the opinion of another on the the subject, unconnected with the text. The fact that the word 'vivarta' as a noun does not occur in the Kārikās may be only a coincidence. After all, the verb 'vivartate' does occur. The tradition of explaining Bhartṛhari as a 'vivartavādin' is more than one thousand years old as it is recorded in the Tattvasaṅgraha and the Pañjikā, and is associated with great names like Somānanda, Utpalācārya and Abhinavagupta who were, themselves, not 'vivartavādins' and had, therefore, no particular interest in making out Bhartṛhari to be one. To say that the *Vṛtti* on I. 142. has brought in a fourth stage of Vāk from below ('par le bas' Int. p. 6.) seems to be totally unwarranted, especially as Dr. BIARDEAU herself thinks that the *Vṛtti* on I. 14. has added a fourth stage from above ('un quatrième stade de la parole par le haut' Int. p. 6). Surely, it is not meant that the Vṛtti has recognised five stages of Vāk! If the *Vṛtti* on I. 144 seems to know the two distinct positions of the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras, that does not prove that the *Vṛtti* is referring to the works of Kumārila and Prabhākara. After, all there is no citation from their works. The two positions for which they stand may well be much older and so received by them from

tradition. Dr. BIARDEAU herself realises this possibility when she says that one cannot deny the probable relation between the tendency attributed to Bādari (earlier than Śabara) and the Prābhākara school and the relation between Kumārila's position and Mī.Sū. 3.1. 4-6. The word avidyā occurs twice in the Kārikās: in II. 233 and III-Kāla. 62 and in both it means the principle which causes, the One to appear as many, a technical Vedāntic meaning. In both verses, the word vidyā also occurs. We must also make allowance for the transmission of ideas through oral tradition long before they were committed to writing. Vivartavāda is associated with Śaṅkara but can we be sure that it was unknown before him? The fact is that there are far too many gaps in our knowledge of the history of Indian thought and in the absence of a single quotation from Kumārila or Prabhākara in the Vṛtti which otherwise abounds in quotations, all from ancient texts one has to be cautious in drawing conclusions relating to that history.

The mention of Tatrabhavān in the *Vṛtti* on II. 42 is certainly intriguing. If the expression refers to Bhartṛhari, then diversity of authorship of the Kārikās and the *Vṛtti* is proved. But even this is not free from doubt. It is not theoretically impossible that the author of the *Vṛtti* meant somebody else. The text of the *Vṛtti* on Kāṇḍa II is available only in a single manuscript, with many errors and gaps and has not yet been critically established. Only a single reference to Tatrabhavān has been found so far.

The question, therefore, is: Are the considerations which have been put forward sufficient to upset a tradition which is atleast 1200 years old that the Kārikās and the *Vṛtti* were written by the same author? We should of course, be ready to discard the tradition, no matter how old, if there is contrary evidence. But it seems to me that there is not enough evidence to do so. We should wait till atleast the *Vṛtti* on Kāṇḍa II is available in full and the commentary of Bhartṛhari on the Mahābhāṣya is also fully published as far as it is available. For the present, we have no alternative but to

go on accepting the tradition of identity of authorship. A firm decision on this problem is most desireable, because on that depends a firm and reliable interpretation of the Vākyapadīyam.

A draft of this translation had been lying with me for sometime. When Dr. S. M. Katre, the Director of the Deccan College Post-Graduate and Research Institute suggested that he would like to have it published as one of the Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Monograph Series, I agreed to it and began to look through it again with a view to publication. While I was doing so, Dr. M. Biardeau was kind enough to let me read in manuscript her own excellent French translation of the same, for which I am thankful to her. During the same period, I had also the occasion to read in manuscript the commentary called Ambākartrī by Pt. Raghunatha Sharma of the Varanasi Sanskrit University, on the *Vākyapadīya* Kāṇḍa I together with the *Vṛtti*. It has been of help to me in understanding some obscure passages and I am thankful to the author for letting me read the manuscript. Needless to say that Vṛṣabhadeva's Paddhati has helped me considerably in my translation. Many of my notes are based on the *Paddhati*. In some of them, I have actually quoted Vṛṣabha's own words. I feel that, atleast for sometime, difference of opinion is bound to persist as to how particular words or sentences, particularly in the *Vṛtti*, should be translated.

For the purpose of this translation, I have used the text of the *Vākyapadīya* Kāṇḍa I, with the *Vṛtti*, edited by Pt. Charudeva Shastri, Lahore 1934. Page references are to that edition. My edition of the same to be published in the Deccan College Monograph Series is still in the press and one does not know when it will be actually published. Between the Lahore edition and my forthcoming edition, the chief difference will be that mine will contain Vṛṣabha's *Paddhati* in full, whereas the Lahore edition gave only extracts from it. Though there will be some minor differences in the text of the Kārikās and the *Vṛtti*

also, and in the numbering of the Kārikās, there will be no difficulty in referring this translation to the corresponding text in my forthcoming edition. Necessary indications will be given to facilitate reference. The numbering in this translation is according to the Lahore edition, subject to the correction of the printing mistakes pointed out by the editor himself on p. 138. It also agrees with that of the text of the Kārikās in the Varanasi Sanskrit University Publication and with that of the text published with Dr. BIARDEAU's French translation. Where printed pages of my edition were available. I have given references in the notes to Vṛṣabha's commentary with indication of the number of the page and of the line. Where they were not available, the citation from Vṛṣabha in the notes must be understood as having been taken from the commentary on the Kārikā and its Vṛtti to the translation of which the note relates.

Finally, I am grateful to Dr. KATRE and the authorities of the Deccan College for including this translation in their "Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Series". I am happy thus to be associated with the good work which is being done by the Deccan College Post-Graduate and Research Institute.

Deccan College,
August 1965.

K. A. SUBRAMANIA IYER

# BIBLIOGRAPHY AND ABBREVIATIONS


| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | Ambākartrī | Ambākartrī, commentary on Vākyapadīya Kāṇḍa I with the Vṛtti, by Pt. Raghunatha Sharma (Varanasi Sanskrit University). |
| 2. | P. | Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini. |
| 3. | V. Swaminathan | Bhartṛhari's authorship of the commentary on the Mahābhāṣya (The Adyar Library Bulletin, XXVII, p. 59 ff). |
| 4. | Bṛ. Sū. | Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa. |
| 5. | Bṛ. Up. | Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. |
| 6. | Ch. UP. | Chāndogya Upaniṣad. |
| 7. | G.Dh.S. | Gautamadharmasūtra. |
| 8. | | A Handful of Popular Maxims—Col. A. Jacob. |
| 9. | He. | Helārāja's commentary on Vāk. III. |
| 10. | | Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī of Abhinavagupta (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies). |
| 11. | | 'I-tsing and Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya' by Dr. Kunhan Raja (Dr. Krishnaswamy Aiyangar Commemoration Volume, p. 285). |
| 12. | Int. | Introduction in No. 43. |
| 13. | Jai. Up. | Jaiminīya Upaniṣad. |
| 14. | J.O.R.M. | Journal of Oriental Research, Madras. |
| 15. | Kā. | Kārikās of the Vākyapadīya. |
| 16. | Kā.Saṃ. | Kāṭhakasaṃhitā. |
| 17. | | Kāvyaprakāśa of Mammaṭa. |
| 18. | M. Bhā. | Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (Kielhorn's edition). |
| 19. | Mai. Up. | Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad. |
| 20. | Manu. | Mānavadharmaśāstra. |
| 21. | Mt. Sū. | Mīmāṃsāsūtras of Jaimini. |
| 22. | Ni. | Nirukta of Yāska. |
| 23. | | Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa. |
| 24. | | The Philosophy of Word and Meaning—G. N. Shastri (Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series, No. V). |
| 25. | Takakusu | A Record of Buddhist Religion as practised in India and the Malay Archipelago, Oxford, 1896. |
| 26. | RV. | Ṛg-Veda. |
| 27. | | Saṃskṛta Vyākaraṇaśāstra ka itihāsa by Yudhisṭhira Mīmāṃsaka, Pt. I. V.S. 2020. Bhā. Prā Pra. Ajmer. |
| 28. | Ś.B. | Śatapathabrāhmaṇa. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 29. | | Śivadṛṣti of Somānanda (Kashmir Series of Texts & Studies). |
| 30. | | Sphoṭasiddhi of Maṇḍana Misra (Madras University Sanskrit Series-6). |
| 31. | ŚYV. | Śuklayajurveda. |
| 32. | Śve. Up. | Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. |
| 33. | Tai. Ā. | Taittirīya Āraṇyaka. |
| 34. | Tai. Saṃ. | Taittirīya Saṃhitā. |
| 35. | | "Über sechs Handschriften des Vākyapadīya" by W. Rau. (Oriens, Vol. 15, pp. 386-388). |
| 36. | Vai. Sū. | Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda. |
| 37. | Vāk. a. | Vākyapadīya (Benares Sanskrit Series 1887 onwards). |
| 38. | Vāk b. | Vākyapadīya I and II (Ram Lal Kapoor Trust, Lahore, 1934 onwards) edited by Pt. Charu Deva SHASTRI). |
| 39. | Vāk. c. | Vākyapadīya with the Prakīrṇakaprakāśa. Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, No. cxvi and University of Travancore Sanskrit Series No. cxlviii). |
| 40. | Vāk. III. pt. 1. | Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the commentary of Helārāja, edited by K. A. Subramania Iyer (Deccan College Monograph Series, 21, 1963). |
| 41. | Vāk. I. | Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari, Kāṇḍa I, with the Vṛtti and the full commentary Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva. (Deccan College Monograph Series (In the press). |
| 42. | | Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari, edited by K. V. ABHYANKAR and V. P. LIMAYE (University of Poona Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, Vol. II). |
| 43. | M. Biardeau | Vākyapadīya-Brahmakāṇḍa, avee la Vṛtti de Harivṛṣabha—Traduction, Introduction, notes. (Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation indienne, Fascicule 24, De Boccard, Paris, 1964). |
| 44. | Vṛ. | Vṛṣabhadeva. |
| 45. | Yā.Smṛ. | Yājñavalkyasmṛti. |
| 46. | Y. Dar. | Yogasūtra of Patañjali. |

## CHAPTER I

1. The Brahman who is without beginning or end, whose very essence is the Word, who is the cause of the manifested phonemes, who appears as the objects, from whom the creation of the world proceeds,

It[1] is solemnly declared here that Brahman is beyond all representation;[2] it is endowed with all powers which are neither identical with it nor different from it; it has two aspects, that of unity (*vidyā*) and that of diversity (*avidyā*); (even in its aspect of *avidyā*), it is really free from all diversity; it is, in all states, unaffected by beginning and end, even though the manifestations appear in wordly transactions[3] in a temporal and spatial sequence. The Brahman is both effect and cause, it is many and one and in all the different systems, the manifestations are not conceived as having nothing before them and nothing after them. Nor is any limit admitted, above below, or sideways, to its spatial differentiation. All its manifestations, though they appear to be distinct from one another, are in the nature of the word (*śabda*), because in all of them, the original material persists. Because, in our cognitions, we identify objects with their words (*śabdopagrāhi*) and our cognitions are intertwined with the words (*śabdopagrāhya*), they are essentially of the nature of the word.[4] All divisions such as the beginning, the sustenance and the end of things can be determined only through words. The Brahman is called phoneme (*akṣara*) because it is the cause of the phonemes.[5] The manifestation of the word which is in everybody as one with the spirit is for the purpose of communicating what is within. It has been said:—

"Some declare that the Word which is really subtle, identical with the meanning, One and identical with the Self when not manifest, appears as something else and differentiated."

What is meant by 'it appears as the objects' is this—what is called appearance (*vivarta*) is the assumption by the One, without losing its one-ness, through apparent diversity, of the unreal forms of others.[6] It is like the appearances in a dream. It has been said—"The spatial and temporal manifestations are no more than the functioning of the powers of Nescience, they are neither identical nor different from the one which is the Truth. The fact of being Nescience consists just in that. What is meant by "from whom the creation of the world proceeds" is this:—The transformations, that is, the Universe proceeds out of Brahman which is the Word, devoid of all inner sequence; from that involution (*saṃvarta*) in which all diversity has merged and is undifferentiated and is inexpressible, all transformations being in a latent stage.[7]

(a)[8] The Self which, though all representations are of it, does not come within their range and which, on the basis of guess, authority and inference, appears in different ways.

(b) The all-embracing, beyond all differentiation and unification, existence and non-existence, sequence and absence of it, truth and falsehood, shines as distinct from everything.

(c) He, the inner Controller of Beings, is seen near and far. He is utterly free and is sought by those who desire liberation.

(d) He is the creator of those objects which are looked upon as ultimate causes, just as the lustre of the seasons is the creator of the masses of clouds at the end of summer.

(e) That one spirit is differentiated in many ways, like the waters of the ocean, which are impregnated with heat at the time of dissolution.

(f) From that spirit which is like a universal and liable to be differentiated, legions of particulars are produced, like rain-laden clouds from special winds.

(g) That supreme light appears first as the three Vedas and is the cause of different views among the followers of different systems.

(h) That aspect of it which is really the truth, full of peace, is, however, always accompanied by Nescience, which is indefinable.[9]

(i) There is no limit to the number of transformations of it (Nescience). When the soul has realised it, it does not exist for him any more.

(j) Just as one having a defect in the eye sees the clear sky as being clouded with many forms, in the same way, the immortal

Brahman, free from all change, is soiled by Nescience and appears to have many forms.

(k) This Brahman creates everything as having the nature of the word; it is the source of the illumination power of the word. This universe emerges out of the word aspect of Brahman and merges, into it.

[1. Sometimes, where the text consists of a long sentence, the translation is in the form of short phrases. It is hoped that it will be clear to the reader of which part of the long sentence each short phrase is a translation.

2. The word so translated is *parikalpa*. An attempt will be made to use the same English word for translating a Sanskrit word occurring in different contexts; but in some cases, other more suitable English words will be found to have been used.

3. *Vyavahāra*. This word occurs frequently. Here it has been translated as 'worldly transactions'. Often it means the use of words to communicate one's thoughts, verbal usage, or exchange of ideas. As Helārāja puts it—*pratipādyapratipādakayor hi parasparābhiprāyasaṅkrāntir vyavahāraḥ* (He. on Vāk. III. Saṃ. 32). On another occasion, he says—*Jñānasyaiva parasparasaṅkrāntir vyavahāraḥ* (He. on Vāk. III. Saṃ. 2), *prakhyopākhyātmakatvācca vyavahārasya...* (He. on Vāk. III. Dra. 14).

4. *vikārāṇāṃ prakṛtyanvayitvāc chabdopagrāhyatayā śabdopagrāhitayā ca śabdatattvam*. This is one of the important arguments in the chain of reasoning meant to prove śabdādvaita, the doctrine that the ultimate reality from which everything comes is in the nature of word. The argument is used in the different systems of philosophy also.

5. *akṣara* ordinarily means 'imperishable', but the Vṛtti gives a special meaning to the word.

6. The Vṛtti gives here a defination of the important word *vivarta*, in connection with the explanation of the word *vivartate*. According to the Vṛtti, the word, though a verb, also conveys the same idea.

7. *pūrvaṃ vikāragranthirūpatvenāvyapadeśyāt* (Vṛ). Even with the help of the Paddhati, the meaning is not clear. The word *granthi* occurs several times in the text, both in the Kārikā and in the Vṛtti:—Vāk. I. 115; Vṛtti on Vāk. I, 4, 5, 142; 145. Usually it has the meaning of transformation (*vikāra*) but here it comes in the same compound with the word *vikāra* and so it must have a different meaning. As Vṛṣabha puts it—*granthiśabdo' nyatra yadyapi vikāravacanaḥ tathāpi vikāraśabdena saha pryujyamāno' pekṣitapravṛttinimitto draṣṭavyaḥ* (Vṛ. on Vāk. I. 1. (p. 10, 1. 14). Here the whole expression in question qualifies *brahmaṇaḥ*. The translation is very tentative.

8. This and the following verses are called *āgama* by Vṛṣabha and, according to him, they elaborate the idea of the Kārikā which is being

explained. As he puts it—*idānīṃ sarvasyaiva kārikārthasyāgamenānugamaṃ darśayati.* (Vṛ. on Vāk. I.1. (p. 10, l. 17).

9. *śāntavidyātmakam* etc. The construction of this verse is defective. In view of *aṃśaḥ*, one would expect *ātmakaḥ* and *grastaḥ*, but all the mss of the Vṛtti and the Paddhati have the neuter form).

2. Who has been taught as the One appearing as many due to the multiplicity of his powers, who, though not different from his powers, seems to be so,[1]

It has been revealed that the diversity of the transformations and the unity of what is transformed do not go beyond the unity of the Ultimate (*prakṛtyekatva*).[2] As has been said—'It is like Water, the Seer, One without a second.'[3] Similarly: 'O gentle One!, in the beginning, Being alone was, One without a second'.[4] Then again—'The one Praṇava was divided into three'. Similarly, 'In the beginning, there was non-being. What was that non-being? It is the Ṛṣis who were non-being at the beginning, the Ṛṣis who were the *prāṇas*.''[5] What is meant by 'due to the multiplicity of his powers' is—Appearing as many, the powers which are mutually opposed and are identical with Brahman accumulate in it which is essentially the Word. In a cognition in which many objects figure, the different objects which figure such as earth, people, etc., do not affect the unity of the cognition. There is no contradiction between the multiplicity of the things like trees which are cognised and the unity of the cognition. The form of the cognition does not really differ from that of the object, because different forms of the objects are not beyond the unity of the cognitions. Similarly, the powers which appear to be different from one another are not really so. The text 'though not different from his powers' means: the powers are not different from Brahman as the universal and the particular are from each other. But it appears to be different when it assumes the form of the different objects which figure in it.[6]

[1. *Bhinnaṃ śaktivyapāśrayāt*' would perhaps be a better reading but all the mss and the Paddhati have the text as printed.

2. *prakṛtyekatvānatikrameṇa.* By 'oneness' of Brahman, only absence of all differentiation is meant and not association with the number

one. As Vṛṣabha says—*na tvekatvasaṃkhyāyogena.* 'Oneness' due to association with the number one belongs to manifestations and not to the ultimate. There are two kinds of oneness, says Vṛṣabha: *dvidhaṃ ekatvaṃ prākṛtaṃ vaikṛtaṃ ca* (Vṛ on Vāk. I. 1. (p. 15, l. 2).

3. Cf. Bṛ. Up. 4.3.32 where the text is—*salila eko draṣṭā' dvaito bhavati.*

4. Ch. Up. 6.2.1.

5. Ś. Br. 6.1.1.1.

6. The word *śakti* is used twice in this verse. Vṛṣabha explains it—*ghaṭādayaḥ padārthāḥ yogyatāvā* (Vāk. I. 2. (p. 14, l. 20). In other words, both the power to bring about appearances and the appearances themselves can be called *śakti*].

3. Depending on whose Time-power to which (though one) differentiation is attributed, the six transformations, birth etc. become the cause of all variety in Being.

All powers[1] depending on their causes and having a starting point are governed by the creative power (*svātantrya*) called Time; they follow the modes of this Time-power. Because of the regulation of the immense diversity of each object by means of prevention and permission, its appearances seem to have a sequence. Time, by allowing them to come to be, is the secondary cause of all transformations which depend on their own other causes also and whose production had been delayed.[2] Its causal power being thus differentiated by the manifestations which have a sequence, the differentiation which exists in the manifestations is attributed to it. It is like attributing to the balance the divisions marked by lines on it at the time of the balancing of the weight of the material which is in contact with it.[3] Thus when sequence is attributed to something which is neither prior nor posterior in the form 'it was' or 'it was not,' the six transformations birth etc., become the source of the modifications, the changes in Being. Transformation of action will be dealt with in detail in the section devoted to 'Being' under the subject of universal.

[1. Vṛṣabha explains *śaktayaḥ* as *padārthāḥ* by identifying cause and effect.

2. *pratibaddhajanmanām.* Though all the mss of the Vṛtti have *pratibandha,°* the text adopted is probably the genuine one. The explanation of Vṛṣabha—*yeṣāmevānena prathamata utpattau pratibandhaḥ kṛtaḥ te pratibaddhajanmānaḥ*' also supports the emendation.

3. While explaining the analogy of the balance, Vṛṣabha uses the terms *tulāsūtra, tulādaṇḍa, tulāpaṭala* and *daṇḍalekhā.* The rod type of balance seems to be referred to. The thing to be weighed is placed on a pan (*tulāpaṭala*) which hangs from one end of the rod (*tulādaṇḍa*) which is held by a string (*tulāsūtra*) at one of the points marked by a line on the rod (*daṇḍalekhā*) according to the weight of the thing weighed].

4. Of which one that is the seed of all, there is this state of multiplicity, that of the enjoyer, the enjoyed and enjoyment.[1]

The One Brahman is the substratum of powers which cannot be defined as identical or different from it, as existent or non-existent and are not opposed to one another;[2] it is differentiated into unreal forms which, like the beings appearing in a dream, have no external reality, are different from one another and are knots of the nature of enjoyer, enjoyed and enjoyment. When the predispositions towards differentiation mature, this worldly arrangement with its multiplicity comes into being.[3]

[1. The main purpose of this verse is to point out that nothing is different from Brahman and that, yet, all appearance of differentiation is due to it.

2. Even though the powers produce opposite effects and are, in that sense, opposed to one another, yet they are said to be not so, because they all exist in the same substratum at the same time. (*ekasminn ādhāne yaugapadyena vṛtteḥ*—Vṛ.).

3. *tasya granthyantarasamatikrameṇa vivṛttagranthiparicchedasya.* This is rather obscure. The word *granthi* comes twice. See note, 7 on verse 1. The commentary 'Ambākartrī' explains *granthi* as *vāsanā,* the predispositions leading to differentiation, whereas Vṛsabha takes it to mean the differentiated objects themselves. Something which appears as a differentiation within something which has no differentiation is a

granthi. As Vṛ. puts it, *ata eva paramātmano vikāratvād granthayaḥ*. I have used the word 'knot' suggesting a distortion of reality. The translation is very tentative].

5. A means of attainment and a symbol of that One is the Veda, which though one, has been handed down as though in many recensions by the sages.

The attainment of Brahman is nothing more than going beyond the knot[1] of the ego-sense in the form of 'I' and 'Mine'. Others say that it is the resolution of the effects into the original cause,[2] the cessation of the activity of the senses,[3] satisfaction without the aid of external means, one's own self,[4] the yearning for the supreme Self, the absence of craving for any adventitious object, the fact of possessing complete power,[5] escape from the influence of the functions of Time,[6] the complete cessation of the self.[7] Such are the alternative ways of conceiving the attainment of Brahman. The means of attainment is the collection of the Vedas. Just as making gifts, performing austerities and practising continence are means of attaining heaven. It has been said: When, by practising the Vedas, the vast darkness is removed, that supreme, bright, imperishable light comes into being in this very birth. By the word symbol (*anukāra*) the idea contained in the following ancient saying (*purākalpa*) is meant: The Ṛṣis the seers of the mantras, those who have realised the truth (*dharma*) see that subtle, inaudible Word and, wishing to communicate it to those who have not realised the truth, teach the symbol of it which is like a dream[8] in their desire to tell what they have seen, heard and experienced. It has, indeed, been said:— The Ṛṣis realised that truth (*dharma*); they taught the mantras to those who had not realised the truth; these others, also anxious to teach, proclaimed the Vedas and the Vedāṅgas, in order that the symbol of Brahman may be understood (*bilmagrahaṇāya*). Bilma is bhilma which means something which illuminates (*bhāsanam*).[9] By the words 'The Veda, though One, has been handed down in many ways by the Ṛṣis,' what is meant is this: The object

called Veda, as seen by the Ṛṣis in their vision, is One. As the One cannot be communicated through the many, the Ṛṣis first transferred it to the Word to which diversity is attributed because of the diversity of the manifesting agents (i.e., the *dhvanis*). The Word, then, without giving up its unity. assumes different forms such as *Saṃhitā, Pada, Krama* etc. It is handed down by the Ṛṣis in different branches, established for the sake of convenience of study. Another view is: The Word varies in the different regions and has, therefore, many forms; but it does not deviate from its purpose of conveying the same thing everywhere. In its different forms, it becomes the cause of regional and other diversity. In the same way, the words of the Vedas, though handed down in different branches, do not deviate from the fact that everywhere they convey the same thing. The diversity in the branches is based on the diversity of forms. Others are of this view: In the old days, the Āyurveda, with its eight sections,[10] was one. In the Kali era, due to the reduced capacity of men, it has been divided into sections. In the same way, the Veda, the collection of Brahman, includes an infinite number of ways and powers.

[1. *Granthi.* See n. 7 on verse 1 and n. 3 on verse 4.

2. Aṃbākartrī understands this as the Sāṅkhya view.

3. Aṃbākartrī sees here the yoga view. The word *vikaraṇabhāva* occurs in Yog. Dar. 3.48 in connection with the attainment of supernatural powers.

4. *ātmatattva.* While explaining this, Vṛ. gives reference to Br. Up. 4.3.21. where the text, in a slightly modified form, is as follows: *tad yathā priyayā striyā saṃpariṣvakto na bāhyaṃ kiñcana veda.* The idea is that when Brahman is attained one is aware of nothing else.

5. *paripūrṇaśaktitvam.* Vṛ. explains *śakti* in the sense of the eight supernatural powers attained through yoga. They are: *aṇimā, mahimā, garimā, laghimā, prāpti, prākāmya, īśitvam, vaśitvam.* See Y. Dar. 3.45.

6. *Kālavṛtti.* The two functions of time, prevention (*pratibandha*) and permission (*abhyanujñā*) by virtue of which only certain effects appear at certain times and not others.

7. *sarvātmanā nairātmyam.* Vṛ. understands this as referring to the extreme indefinability of Brahman: *naiḥsvābhāvyam, brahmasvabhāvasya nirūpayituṃ vaktuṃ cāśakyatvāt.* Some scholars, however, take it as referring to the Bauddha view.

8. *Svapnavṛttam iva.* Just as one's experience in a dream is a kind of reflection of our experience in the wakeful state, in the same way, the Vedas are a kind of reflection of what the Ṛṣis saw in their vision.

9. Ni. 1.20.2.

10. The eight sections of Āyurveda, as given by Vṛ. are: *śalyacikitsā, śālākyam, kāyacikitsā, bhūtacikitsā, kaumārabhṛtyam, agadatantram, vājīkaraṇatantram, rasāyanatantram*].

6. Its divisions follow many recensions, but they are all subsidiary to the same action. Also a certain fixity in the power of words is seen in these different branches.

Once the Veda has been divided into four, there are the one hundred branches of the adhvaryus (*Yajurveda*), the thousand paths of the Sāmaveda, the twenty-one kinds of Ṛg-Veda or fifteen as some say and the nine kinds of Atharvaṇa veda. Thus every Veda has many paths. What is meant by 'subsidiary to the same action' is: All branches lead to the same ritual. It is like this: all the branches of the physicians ultimately practice one treatment. What is meant by 'fixity in the power of words' is: Words, as, taught for a particular branch, convey their meaning in that branch and also lead to merit. What is meant by 'it is seen in the different branches of Veda' is seen in the following examples "Long *ā* is substituted for the final of *deva* and *sumna* when the suffix *kyac* follows in the Kāṭhaka branch of the Yajurveda." (P. 7, 4, 38.) and 'the final of the word *sima* bears the acute (udātta) accent in the Ātharvaṇa Veda' (Phiṭsūtra 79.) All this is according to the view of those who hold that the division of the Veda into branches takes place again and again and that, before the division, the word invariably exists in an undifferentiated state.[1]

[1. Vṛ. points out that what has been said in the verses 5 and 6 is based on the view that the Veda manifests itself as one from Brahman. Later, due to the reduced capacity of men, it is divided into branches. At the time of dissolution (*pralaya*) it again becomes one. When crea-

tion begins again, it manifests itself as one but it is again divided into branches when the capacity of man diminishes.

The other view is that the Veda manifests itself from the very beginning with divisions. According to this, there is no undifferentiated word. As Vṛ. puts it: *teṣām upasaṃhṛtakramā vāg durlabhā*. (Vāk. I.6. (p. 27, l. 24).]

7. The various Smṛtis, some having visible utility and others invisible utility, have been propounded by the sages, well-versed in the Veda on the basis of this very Veda, with the help of indications.

Some traditions have a written basis while others have no written basis, but are known from the conduct of the cultured. Traditions relating to medical treatment etc., have a visible purpose to serve. Traditions relating to what can be eaten and what not, which woman one can marry, or otherwise, what can be said and what not have an invisible purpose. Where two traditions relating to the same subject go against each other, there is option, provided that there is no visible purpose to be served.[1] Where two traditions relating to the same subject go against each other and there is a visible purpose and disapproval by the cultured, there, the traditions having visible purpose have no authority.[2] Where two traditions relating to the same subject differ from each other and there is visible purpose, but no disapproval by the cultured, there there is option. For example, in the matter of the penance to be observed for killing a frog.[3] What is meant by 'on the basis of this very Veda, with the help of indications,' is that the indications found in the Scripture make us know that the actions taught in the Scripture and the written Tradition have the same agent. Those persons who are entitled to perform the action taught by Scripture, having a visible or invisible purpose, are made known by the Scripture itself as being entitled to perform the actions taught by the written Tradition. For example, the injunction: 'the sacrificer should cook for a guest who has arrived a big bull or a big ram.'[4] Sometimes (i.e., when no indica-

tion is found in the Scripture in a particular case) the indications found elsewhere are enough on the analogy of the rice in the cooking pot,[5] to establish the authority of the traditions which do not go against Scripture.

[1. G.Dh.S. 22, 3 and Manu. 11. 73 prescribe two different penances for one who is guilty of having killed a Brāhmaṇa. As the purpose of the penance is invisible and as both texts are authority, there is option. Another example is G.Dh.S. 23, 8-10 where two penances are taught for one who is guilty of having committed sacrilege with the wife of the Guru.

2. Even where a tradition has a visible purpose to fulfil, if it is disapproved by the cultured, it should not be followed. Drinking of liquor as a medicine has a visible purpose, namely, the curing of the disease and it is, therefore, prescribed by Āyurveda. But drinking liquor is prohibited in the Dharmaśāstra i.e., by the cultured. This prohibition has greater authority than the prescription of Āyurveda. That is why one has to do penance after drinking liquor as a medicine.

3. Yā. Smṛ. 3. 270.

4. Ś. B. 3. 4. 1. 2.

5. See Jacob. *A Handful of Popular Maxims*, I, p. 52].

8. Based on the explanatory comments and similar passages, conflicting views have been set forth by the exponents of Monism and Dualism according to their own taste.

It is generally seen that human speculations are based upon explanatory comments and similar Vedic sentences.[1] Because of the diversity of the human intellect, diversity of speculation takes place. For example, there is the explanatory comment (*arthavāda*): "In the beginning, all this was nothing," meant to praise the place where the fire is to be kindled.[2] On the basis of an imaginary interpretation of it, the following Absolutism is constructed: 'The non-existent is born of the non-existent, the action-less from the action-less, the non-substratum from the non-substratum, the inexpressible from the inexpressible, the essenceless from the essenceless.'

"The One Self is differentiated by means of existence and non-existence, neither of which is prior or posterior. How can the undifferentiated One be both expressible and inexpressible?"

Similarly

"There was no non-existent nor was there the existent."[3]

"In the beginning, all this was only darkness."[4]

"This (the world) is like foam, it is nothing, it is like bubble, it is nothing. It is mere illusion, not easily set aside. So do the learned see it."

"The blind one saw the jewel, the finger-less one threaded it, the neck-less one wore it and the tongue-less one praised it."[5]

The sentence

"In the beginning, all this, was water".[6]

is an explanatory comment relating to the new and full moon sacrifice. From that arises the following speculation:—

"Of these waters, there is the effect (*pāka*) in the form of consciousness and there is the effect in the form of matter. And life (*prāṇa*) is the essence of the waters and that comes back and also does not come back."[7]

Really speaking, it is the one having the form of all knowledge and appears in all this diversity. Dualists also have their views:—

"There are the eternal things and the non-eternal things, the causes of all objects, things which have a form and things which have no form, subtle and gross, in which the

Similarly

"Two birds, companions, united together, occupy the same tree. Of the two, one eats the tasty fig fruit, the other one does not eat, but shines."[8]

"By 'two birds', the senses and the inner Controller, the intelligence and the soul are meant." Others,[9] on the other hand, say:—

"The differentiated and the undifferentiated consciousness, full of seeds, are meant."

"It moves, it does not move, it is far, 'it is near, it is within everything and so is it without."[10]

[1. The Vṛtti explains *arthavādarūpāṇi* in the verse as *arthavādān arthavādaprakārāṇi*. Thus the word *rūpāṇi* is explained as *arthavādaprakārāṇi*. For Vṛ., the word *arthavādarūpāṇi* in the verse is an ekaśeṣa; *arthavādān arthavādarūpāṇi cety arthavādarūpāṇi* on the analogy of the ekaśeṣa in P. 7. 4. 82. *guṇo yaṅlukoḥ* which means: *yaṅi yaṅluki ceti yaṅlukoḥ*.

2. Vṛ. quotes the following prescription—

*Sa vai saptapuruṣo vā*

He adds: *catvāra ātmānaḥ, trayaḥ pakṣapucchānīti. te ca puruṣā prāṇatvena stūyante.* Cf. Ś. Br. 6. 1. 1. 6.

3. RV. 10. 129. 1. Vṛ. calls this passage also an *arthavāda*. The idea is that by giving the place of kindling the fire the same attributes as Brahman, one is praising it.

4. Cf. Mai. Up. 5. 2. where the text is: *Tamo vā idam agra āsīd ekam*.

5. Tai. Ār. 1. 11. 5. runs as follows—

*Sa taṃ maṇim avindat,*
*So' naṅgulir āvayat;*
*So' grīvaḥ pratyamuñcat*
*So' jihvo asaścata.*

6. Ś. B. 14.8.6.1. See also Jai. Up. 1.56.1.

7. Vṛ explains *āvarttī* and *anāvarttī* as 'coming back' in the case of those who have not yet attained '*mokṣa*' and 'not coming back' in the case of those who have attained it.

8. Cf. RV. 1. 164. 20 and Śve. Up. 4.6. where the text is:

*Dvā suparṇā sayujā sakhāyā samānaṃ*
*vṛkṣaṃ pariṣasvajāte.*
*tayor anyaḥ pippalaṃ svādvatti*
*anaśnann anyo' bhicākaśīti.*

9. According to Vṛ, these are again the Monists who hold this view.

10. ŚYV. 40. 5.]

Since there are these different speculations in regard to the one Brahman beyond all differentiation on account of its being endowed with all powers, therefore it is that

9. The true and pure essence has also been taught there, the knowledge capable of being grasped through one word, having the form of Praṇava, and in no way contradicting the different views.

No representation in regard to the one all-embracing Brahman is different from the other representations considered to be opposed to it.[1] Knowers of Brahman have declared: —

"Even a particular manifestation of Brahman, is not beyond its all-comprehensiveness nor is it different from another."[2]

Again

"All vision is complete and is really not different (from the others) but the experiencer looks upon it as different."[3] The mystic syllable (*Praṇava*) allows for all points of view, it is the source of all Scripture,[4] it is the common factor of all original causes, it is the cause of the rise and fall of doctrines, it accepts within itself all mutually contradictory ideas of Brahman or disallows all of them. The object of this allowance and disallowance does not, therefore, vary.

It has been said: —

"It is one and it is not one; it is both and it is not both. Those who are for action speak of diversity (*viṣama*) and those who are for knowledge see unity (*sama*)."

[1. According to Vṛ. as all representations are about the same subject, so they are not opposed to one another: *sarvāsāṃ viṣayamātrāṇāṃ satyatvād brahmaiva viṣaya iti viṣayābhedāt parikalpāntarāṇi na bhidyante.*

2. This is given as a statement of Brahmavidaḥ but it is not found in the old Upaniṣads.

3. Vṛ explains *anyūnam* as follows — *Darśanāntarāṅgīkṛtaiḥ padārthair darśanāntaram api yuktam, sarveṣāṃ sarvarūpatvāt.* The idea seems to be that, as all systems are speculations in regard to Brahman which includes everything, they include one another.

4. *Sarvaśrutirūpaḥ.* Praṇava is the source of all Scripture (śruti) as the Vedas are manifestations of it. *Yataḥ praṇavo Vedarūpeṇa vivṛttaḥ.* (Vṛ.). It is also the source of all words (*śruti*): *sarvaśrutirūpaḥ sarvaśabdasvabhāvaḥ sarvaśabdarūpeṇa tasya vivṛtteḥ* (Vṛ).]

10. All the different sciences which impart knowledge and bring culture to man proceed from the major and minor limbs of that Veda, the creator and organiser of the worlds.

The Veda, as the source and teacher of the world, is the creator in regard to the appearances and organiser in regard to the organisations. Some say that Praṇava is the Veda. It is the source of all words and all things. According to this view, the different sciences, being essentially elaborations of the Praṇava, do not go beyond the Veda.

It has been said: —

"All the words are included in the Veda.
One who does not know the Veda cannot understand Brahman at all."

It has also been said: —

"The injunctions, what is enjoined and the reasoning constitute the Veda."[1]

From the major (*aṅga*) and the minor (*upāṅga*) limbs of the Praṇava, from the Scripture, written Tradition and the final portion of the three-fold Veda are derived the different sciences which are the cause of right knowledge and the culture of man.[2] Or they may be looked upon as the cause of the culture of man because man consists essentially of knowledge (*jñāna*).[3] From the major auxiliary sciences like astronomy-astrology etc., of the well-known Brahman called Veda come the science of omens etc., and from the minor auxiliary sciences of the same Veda proceed dream-lore etc.

[1. To the question: What is the Veda?, two answers are recorded in the Vṛtti: (1) *Praṇava eva veda ityeke,* (2) *Vidhir vidheyas tarkaśca vedaḥ.*

2. *Praṇava, aṅga* and *upāṅga.* The Vṛtti understands these terms as standing for *śruti, smṛti* and *trayyanta,* i.e. the explanatory comments (*arthavāda*), the auxiliary sciences, Grammar etc., and the Upaniṣads. According to another view, *śruti* is *praṇava, smṛti,* is either *aṅga* like Grammar or *upāṅga* like Āyurveda and *trayyanta* is the Upaniṣads. Usually, the word *aṅga* stands for the six auxiliary sciences of the Veda: *Jyotiṣa, Śikṣā, Kalpa, Vyākaraṇa, Nirukta* and *Chandas.* From them, the science of omens (*śakunajñāna*) etc., are derived. The word *upāṅga* stands for *smṛtis, purāṇa,* etc., from which are derived dreamlore, etc.

3. *Jñānasaṃskārahetavaḥ* in the verse is explained in two ways in the Vṛtti: (1) *samyagjñānahetavaḥ puruṣasaṃskārahetavaśca;* (2) *jñānātmakatvād vā puruṣasyaiva saṃskārahetavaḥ.* This is not the only place where the Vṛtti contains alternative explanations of the text of the verse. The questions which this raises will be discussed elsewhere.]

11. The best of all the austerities, the one that is nearest to that Brahman is the discipline called 'Grammar', the first among the auxiliary sciences of the Vedas, so have the sages declared.

That auxiliary science through which the form of the Word—Brahman[1] is determined in order that correctness may be understood is the nearest (to the Vedas) because it helps directly. Proximity is known to depend upon special service rendered. There is also the Scripture to be restored.[2] Once it has been settled by the reasoning (of the Mīmāṃsā) what is to be restored and what not, the science of Grammar is the basis for the correct modification of gender, number etc. It is said to be near because it is through it that the other scripture (which is not available) is understood. What is meant by 'the best of all austerities' is this: Compared to what are considered to be austerities in the world like continence, sleeping on the ground, standing in water and progressive reduction and increase of nourishment according to the course of the moon[3] and compared to what are considered to be the

holiest forms of study, the study of the science of Grammar is the best form of austerity, because it leads to special results, visible and invisible. Concerning which the tradition has declared that a mere knowledge of whose enumeration of phonemes (*akṣarasamāmnāya*) leads to the same holy fruit as the knowledge of the whole of the Veda,[4] that, indeed, is the first auxiliary science of the Vedas, because it is the most important one. It has been said: —

"Of the six auxiliary sciences, the most important one is the Science of Grammar. Effort made in regard to the most important one surely yields fruit."[5]

[1. Vṛ explains *śabdabrahmanaḥ* as: *śabdarūpeṇa vivṛttasya brahmaṇaḥ*.

2. *Ūhyaṃ cāmnāyāntaram asti.* See Mī. Sū. 2.1.34.

3. Cf. *Brahmacaryaṃ satyavacanam savaneṣūdakopasparśana-mārdravastratā-dhaḥśāyitānāśaka iti tapāṃsi*, G.Dh.S. 3.1.15.

4. M.Bhā. I. p. 36.

5. M.Bhā. I. p. 1.]

**12. This discipline is the shortest route to the attainment of that supreme essence of the Word which has assumed differentiation, of the holiest of all lights.**

What is meant by 'Of the word which has assumed differentiation' is: Of the word which has been differentiated into phoneme, word and sentence on the basis of the place of articulation etc., from the undifferentiated sequenceless inner word-essence. Or 'of the word which has assumed different forms like cow etc., as meanings on the basis of the eternal relation between word and meaning. Or it might be said that the divisions of the word assume the form of cow etc. Or rather, cow etc., apparent external divisions, are transformed into words. Some hold that only causality is the relation between word and meaning.[1] It has been said: —

"It is the name which appeared as the form and it is the form which appeared as the name. According to some, they

were one at first and were differentiated later. According to others, the differentiation was already there before.

What is meant by 'the supreme essence of the word' is: the collection of words, the correctness of which has been established, both because of its expressiveness and its capacity to bring about happiness, is spoken of. It has been said: "words devoid of correctness are just the sediment." What is meant by 'the holiest of all lights' is: In this world, there are three lights, three lamps which illuminate themselves and others. They are as follows:—

"What is called *jātavedāḥ* (i.e., fire) the light which is within man, and the light called the Word which illuminates both the sentient and the insentient. In the last one is the whole of this world established, both that which moves and that which does not move."

What is meant by 'the shortest route' is: The Science of Grammar (*lakṣaṇa*), consisting of general and special rules,[2] is the means of learning the whole of the word—Brahman in an easy manner, by means of the main rules and their elaborations. It is the means of inferring that those who, without being taught, are well acquainted with the true word endowed with correctness and free from corruption, are the cultured people.[3] Once it has been inferred who the cultured persons are, the Science of Grammar is the agent for declaring the correctness of words like pṛṣodara on the ground that they are used by the cultured.[4] It has been said:—

"He who does not know the Science of Grammar does not know the word, the meaning, their mutual relation and the occasion for use nor what is correct and what is not, even when the meaning is the same nor who is cultured, inferred from their use of the correct forms of the words."

[1. It is the Word which appears as the objects. The objects are merged in the word, exist in the form of the word. Thus, there is the relation of cause and effect between words and things. The things existing within in the form of the word are the cause and the externalised word is the effect. Or, the inner word is the cause and the externalised objects are the effects. The same idea is set forth in the following verse.

2. *Sāmānyaviśeṣavaddhi lakṣaṇam.* Vṛṣabha explains this as follows — *Utsargāpavāda - vidhipratiṣedha - niptātanātideśasthānyādeśaliṅganiyamaiḥ saptabhiḥ sāmānya-viśeṣaprakāraiḥ.* As ten things are mentioned in the long compound word, but only seven things are meant to be conveyed, one can, according to the Ambākartrī, understand the following: *utsargāpavāda, vidhipratiṣedha, vidhinipātana, vidhyatideśa, sthānyādeśa, liṅge sāmānyaviśeṣarūpa* and *vidhiniyama.*

3. See M.Bhā. on P. 6. 3. 109. where a description of Śiṣṭāḥ, cultured people, is given.

4. P. 6. 3. 109.]

13. The expression of what one wants to say (the principle of the use of things) depends upon words and the truth concerning words cannot be understood except through Grammar.

(a) The basis for the expression of a meaning is that the speaker wants to communicate it, not whether it has an external existence as an object or not. Desire to communicate depends upon the existence of a suitable word. The speaker uses a separate suitable word for every meaning which his desire to communicate brings to the mind. It is like a person applying the right sense when he wants to cognise anything directly.

(b) Another explains differently. What is meant by the truth (*tattva*) in the use (*pravṛtti*) of an object (*artha*) is the ground for the application of a word to that object. When, due to the presence of that ground in an object, a cognition of that object corresponding to that ground arises, then one can bring that object into verbal usage. In the absence of that ground inhering in the object, there cannot be any verbal usage in regard to the bare object. As words acquire their form in relation to the universal (*jāti*) it is the universal (*sāmānya*) which is the basis of words.

(c) Or one can say that interconnection (*saṃsarga*) is the basis (*tattva*) of verbal usage. As the meanings of words

are closely connected with one another, even though they appear to be unconnected, verbal usage depends upon the sentence. When the cognition of interconnection ceases, no verbal usage in regard to the word-meaning is possible.

(d) Another meaning is this: A bare object comes only within the range of *tyad* (that) etc., which just point to things. The basis of its verbal usage is interconnection. That which is connected enters into relation with action in a primary or secondary capacity.

(e) Or activity (*pravṛtti*) means an action like 'being born' conveyed by the verb. The essence (*tattva*) of this thing which is called activity is the fact of being something to be accomplished, its requirement of means, its assuming the form of sequence, its being the cause of suggesting time. The other object is a mere thing which remains the same in all the three times. It is conveyed by the noun and is free from all inner sequence.

(f) Or again, what is the basis (*tattva*) of the verbal usage (*pravṛtti*) of an object (*artha*)? The cognition, having the form of an object, which is projected as an external object. And that depends upon the word.

What is meant by 'the truth concerning words' is its completeness (*avaikalya*) its correct form in which its purity has not gone. That is its complete form. The others, the corrupt forms, used by those who really intended to use the correct ones, are its incomplete forms.

[The main word in this verse is *arthapravṛttitattvānām*. This compound word is analysed in six ways in the Vṛtti.: a. b, c, d; e; f. In a, it is analysed thus: *arthasya pravṛttitattvam*; in b, thus: *arthasya pravṛttau tattvaṃ nimittam;* in c, in the same way as in b; in d, thus: *arthasya pravṛttitattvam;* in e, thus: *arthasya pravṛtteśca tattvam*; in f, thus: *arthasya pravṛttitattvam*. In all the explanations except e, *pravṛtti* means *vyavahāra* = verbal usage. In e, it means action.

The fact that as many as six alternative explanations have been given raises some questions which are discussed in the Introduction.]

14. It (Grammar) is the door to salvation, the remedy for all the impurities of speech, the purifier of all the sciences and shines in every branch of knowledge.

[1]One, who, with a previous knowledge of the correct forms of words, realises the unity of the real word, goes beyond sequence and attains union with it. By acquiring special merit through the use of the correct word, he is united with the great Word and attains freedom from the senses.[2] After having reached the undifferentiated state of the word, he comes to the source of all differentiation: Intuition (*pratibhā*). From that Intuition in which all Being is latent and which, due to the repetition of the union (mentioned above) tends to produce its result, he reaches the Supreme Source in which all differentiation in completely lost. What is meant by 'the remedy for all impurities of speech' *is* that it is like the science of Medicine (Ayurveda) in regard to the defects of the body. One who knows grammar does not use the corrupt forms which are the cause of sin. It has been said that.

"Knowledge (of the correct forms) is his refuge" (M. Bhā. I, p. 2, l. 28.).

What is meant by 'purifier of all the sciences' is that correctness (*saṃskāra*) is known through it. In all the sciences, it is ths (correct) words which convey the meaning. It has been said:—

"Whatever is learnt and not understood but is merely uttered as it is, is like dry fuel without fire; it will never burn."[3]

There is also the following verse cited by those who have not gone astray:—

"On the earth, water is the purest of things; of the (purified) waters, it is the sacred hymns (*mantras*) which are the purifying agents and the sages have declared that it is the science of Grammar which reveals the purity of the sacred hymns, Sāman, Ṛk and Yajus."

What is meant by 'shines in every branch of knowledge' is that everybody follows the science of grammar even for composing a work on his own special subject and is very careful to avoid the use of corrupt forms.

[1. This verse is understood in the Vṛtti as describing the stages through which the grammarian goes in attaining *mokṣa*. Vṛ. says: *etasyā eva bṛahmaprāpteḥ kramam idānīṃ varṇayann āha avyavakīrṇām iti.* Some, however, think that different forms of liberation are set forth here.

One thing to be noted is that Bhartṛhari, in the Vṛtti, speaks about going from *pratibhā* which is understood by Vṛ. as *Paśyantī*, to *Parā Prakṛti*. In other words, there is a stage beyond *Paśyantī* called *Parā Prakṛtiḥ*. *Paśyantī* itself is called *sarvavikārāṇāṃ prakṛtiḥ*. Thus *Paśyantī* is *prakṛti* and after that comes *parā prakṛtiḥ*.

2. *Vaikaraṇyam* = *apagatendriyatām* (Vṛ.). The same word is used in the Vṛtti on verse 5 to describe one of the alternative conception of *mokṣa*.

3. Ni. 1. 18.]

15. Just as all the universals of things depend upon the form of their words for their communication, so is this science the basis of all the other sciences.

[*Śabdākṛtinbandhanāḥ*. By *ākṛti*, it is the *jāti* which is meant here. In other words, the universals of words convey the universals of meanings. (See Vāk. III. Jā. 6).

16. This is the first step in the ladder leading to liberation, this is the straight royal road for all those who desire salvation.

17. Here the Self, being free from errrors and thus fit to study the Vedas, sees the very basis of the Vedas, their pure form.

[*Chandasyaḥ*. This word can be explained according to P. 4. 4. 98: '*Tatra sādhuḥ*'. It would then mean 'fit in regard to the *Chandaś*, i.e.

fit to study it or protect it. Vṛ, however, explains it thus: *Chandasyaḥ iti. Chandasām samūhaḥ, samūhārthe aupasaṃkhyānikaḥ taddhitaḥ.* He has probably in mind P. 4. 2. 42 according to which the suffix *yan* is added to words in the sense of collection.]

18-22 [1]That which[2] is the highest form of undifferentiated speech, the pure Light which appears differentiated only in the midst of all this darkness.

The Light which those worship who have passed beyond the manifested state consisting of the cognition of things and actions and beyond light and darkness.[3]

That in which the manifestors of speech, like the signs of the alphabet appear, through Yoga preceded by the knowledge and use of the correct forms of words, like reflections in a mirror.

That of which the different phonemes[4] of the Atharvans, the Sāmans, the Ṛks and the Yajus are the symbols.

That which, though one, is variously interpreted in the different traditions, that supreme Brahman is attained by a knowledge of Grammar.

[1. No Vṛtti is available on verses 15-22. This naturally raises the problem whether they are integral parts of the Vākyapadīyam or quotations in the Vṛtti on verse 14. Usually, quotations are immediately preceded by some word like *tad yathā* or *evaṃ hyāha* which indicates that what follows is a quotation. There is no such word here. The fact that Vṛ. comments on them settles nothing as he comments on all obvious quotations also. There is, however, one indication that they are integral parts of the work: The word *tatra* occurring in verse 23 refers to the science of Grammar mentioned in verse 22 which shows that the former is a continuation of the latter. As verses 18-22 form a group and constitute one sentence, verse 23 is a continuation, not only of verse 22, but of all of them.

2. Some form of the relative pronoun *yad* occurs in all the verses from 18-22 and it is to be correlated with the word *tad* occurring in

verse 22. What do these words refer to? to Brahman or to Vyākaraṇa? Some of the points mentioned in the description seem to be equally applicable to both. I think, however, that they refer to Brahman. Vṛ. also makes it clear when he says in his commentary on verse 18. *Brahma adhigamyate iti vakṣyati. Tat sarveṣūttaraślokeṣu sambandhanīyam.*

3. *Vaikṛtaṃ mūrtivyāpāradarśanaṃ samatikrāntāḥ.* Vṛ. explains: *Yogina ityarthaḥ.*

4. *Pṛthaksthitiparigrahāḥ: Etad āha. nānājātīyavarṇapratitibimbaparigraheṇa sthitāḥ iti.* (Vṛ.).]

23. There, the great sages who are the authors of the sūtras, vārttikas and the Bhāṣya have declared words, meanings and their relation to one another to be eternal.

The very basis of the science of Grammar is that the word, the meaning and their mutual relation are eternal. In it, by 'word' is meant the universal (*ākṛti*) of the word. It has been said:—

"As the universal is eternal, so is the word eternal."[1] This science proceeds on the basis of the universal. In fact, it has been said:—

> "That is already established, because it is the universal which is taught."[2]

This universal is different from the particular universal called 'wordness'. Wordness is a universal which coexists in the same thing with other (lesser) universals which cannot co-exist in the same thing. Universals of words, like the universal of the word tree, when there is vagueness, are mixed up with the causes of the manifestation of the individual word and when manifested by the individual word, are called words.[3] Just as, in a pot, the facts of being substance, earth and pot can co-inhere, in the same way, in the word 'tree', universals like those of being an attribute, a word and the word tree can co-inhere without mutual opposition.

(Objection) In the case of objects like the pot, the parts of which exist at the same time, one can see that the whole (*avayavī*) is the cause of the manifestation of the particular universal (pot-ness). But the parts of a particular word cannot co-exist, they are not produced at the same time, they do not exist at the same time, they are unnameable (*avyapadeśya*) and so they cannot produce the whole word, the many material parts of which do not co-exist and where the universal can inhere. The universal word-ness exists in each part. If, similarly, it is maintained that the universal of the particular word tree also exists in each part, then the cognition having the form of the word tree would occur even after the first part is uttered, i.e., when parts like 'v' are uttered in isolation (and that does not happen).

This is not a valid objection. It is as in the case of actions like lifting, revolving, pouring etc., which are produced and perish and whose parts do not produce another action corresponding to the whole (*avayavī*). Nor is the inherence, in the parts, of universals like the fact of being lifting etc., distinct from the fact of being action, not accepted.[4] Nor do cognitions having the form of particular actions like lifting arise when only a part is seen. 'These parts of actions are due to special efforts and each of them is the substratum of universals like the fact of being lifting etc., but as this particularity is difficult to grasp, they do not produce a cognition having a particular universal as its object. All the manifesting factors of that particular cognition have not yet come into being. Therefore, there cannot be any verbal usage based on it. But when these actions, involving contacts and separations, determined by a particular direction, are perceived in succession, then verbal usage, characterised by a particular universal, becomes possible. In the same way, in the case of words like *'vṛkṣa'*, distinct parts like *'v'* are produced by special effort, but their distinction is difficult to grasp and even though they, at the time of the utterance of each part, suggest the universals of particular words, one cannot perform any verbal usage with them, because universals do not, at that time, have many elements to suggest them. But when a

succession of the parts is gradually perceived, verbal usage based on particular universals becomes possible.

Grammarians do not necessarily accept the view current in other śāstras regarding the mode of suggestion of the universals.[5] Suggestors do not necessarily suggest what inheres in them. Even though the universal of a word may not inhere in the word, when the mind is prepared by the successive impressions left by the cognition of the previous phonemes of a word, the universal of the word, previously not cognised or indistinctly cognised, is perceived through the cognition of the last phoneme.[6] One infers the existence of the universal of a particular word from the recognition which one makes in the form 'This is the same as that' when words like '*vṛkṣa*' are uttered by parrots, *sārikās,* men etc.

Even those who do not accept the existence of such a universal declare that there is one eternal word which is suggested by the many sounds of a word.[7] Others still accept divisions in the form of phonemes within the word.[8] Some others hold that the word is one, whether it be a phoneme, a word or a sentence, but appears to have parts produced in a sequence. Others still hold that, due to the continuity of tradition, there is constant usage and the speakers are not aware of the beginning of words which are eternal because of uninterrupted usage.[9]

The eternality of meanings is also accepted by some on the basis of the eternality of universals. It has been asked:—

"According to what conception of word-meaning would the analysis "siddhe śabde arthe saṃbandhe" be proper? And the answer is:—

"That it is the universal."[10]

In this Bhāṣya passage, the eternity of meanings has been variously explained, according to all the views. It has to be understood according to the Bhāṣya.

The relation is also eternal. What is meant in this: where there is the idea of mutual appurtenance, the relation between word and meaning in the form 'It is this' is. since meaning

cannot be assigned (by grammar)[11], eternal, self-existing and not something not known before and made for the first time by some speaker for the benefit of some listener. Therefore the relation between word and meaning is beginningless and unbroken. Or, it may be stated that the relation between word and meaning is that of the illuminator and the illuminated (*prakāśyaprakāśakabhāva*), based upon convention (*samayopādhiḥ*) a kind of fitness, like that between the senses and their objects. Or it may be said that the relation between word and meaning is causality based on unbroken tradition, considering that the cognition (arising from words) having the form of external objects, thought of as external and accepted as having a mental as well as an external object, just as the letters of the script are thought of as the phonemess of the alphabet, because they bring the latter to the minds. It has been said (in order to show that the meaning is essentially mental):—

"They, while explaining their deeds from birth to death, make them present to the mind, objects of the mind."[12]

What is meant by 'taught there by the great sages', is: by the authors of the sūtras etc. Those who have composed the sūtras etc. of the science of Grammar are referred to. The very fact that the sūtras have been composed shows that they considered the words to be eternal. There would be no purpose in composing the science of Grammar if the words were not eternal. Because they would be a matter of mere usage and great cultured persons would not take the trouble of expounding them. Therefore, the science of Grammar proceeds only when the correct forms of words are well established. Others bring forward sūtras like

*Tadaśiṣyaṃ saṃjñāpramāṇatvāt.*

"This, (the concord of gender and number taught in P. 1, 2, 51.) need not be taught because names are to be accepted as they are (*pramāṇa*)."[13]

as proof that the words are eternal. In the vārttikas also, there are the following statements which show the eternality of the word.

"On the basis that the word, the meaning and their relation are eternal."[14]

"That is already proved because the word is eternal."[15]

"It is *sphoṭa* which is the word, the sound is only the product of effort"[16] (*vyāyāma*).

"The whole word takes the place of the whole word."[17]

In the Bhāṣya also, it has, indeed, been said:—

"This matter has been specifically considered in the Saṅgraha, namely whether the word is eternal."[18]

It has also been said in a Bhāṣya passage.

"Word being eternal, the phonemes also should be eternal and changeless."[19]

Even if eternality is taken as something merely practical (the teaching of augments and substitutes does not violate it). As has been said:—

"(As) both Khadira and Barbura have fine leaves and yellow stalks, (when one says) 'the Khadira has thorns', (what happens is not that the statement adds thorns which were not there, but that the idea of Khadira which might have extended to both is now restricted to Khadira only.)[20] Similarly, when one, after having said:—

"To the east of the village are the mango-trees" (one adds), "the banyan trees have milk, downward growths and wide leaves".

(all that happens is that the idea of mango-trees which might have been wrongly extended to the banyan trees also now disappears and, in its place, the idea of banyan tree comes).

Or (it might be said) those very sages who have realised the truth and have, in the course of their different teachings, composed Sūtras, Anutantrâ (vārttikas) and Bhāṣya, have, in the science of Grammar also, declared that the word, the meaning and their mutual relation are eternal. And their authority in the world is established.

[1. Though the idea is found expressed in the M.Bhā, the actual words are not traceable.

2. M. Bhā I, p. 13.

3. *Śabdākṛtiviśeṣā hi* etc. This sentence is somewhat obscure. The previous sentences told us that the word stands for the universal and that the universal of a word can co-inhere in it with other lesser universals. If the word stands for the universal, why do we say 'word' instead of saying 'wordness'? This sentence is apparently an answer to that question. The main part of the sentence is *vṛkṣaśabdatvādayaḥ śabdā ityapadiśyante* = The universals of words like *Vṛkṣaśabdatva* are merely referred to as the words. That is because they are identified (*sarūpatām āpannāḥ*) with the cause of their manifestation (*nimitta*), namely, the individual words. This manifestation is necessary. Otherwise there would be extreme vagueness (*sati vastusampramohe*) and there would be no verbal usage at all.

4. *Karmatvasāmānyādanye utkṣepaṇatvādayasteṣu karmakṣaṇeṣu samavetā abhyupagamyanta eva vaiśeṣikaiḥ*—Vṛ.

5. *Na cāvaśyaṃ śāstrāntare pariḍṛṣṭā jātyabhivyaktiprakriyā vaiyākaraṇaiḥ parigṛhyate.* The usual view connected particularly with the Vaiśeṣikas, is that the universal (*jāti*) inheres in the particular which, therefore, reveals it. Though the universal is eternal according to them, it exists in the particular and it can be perceived only as existing in the particular. The latter, therefore, is said to reveal it (*abhivyañjaka*). When such a process is described, universals like *ghaṭatva*, existing in *ghaṭa*, are kept in mind. The universal *vṛkṣaśabdatva* does not exist in the word *vṛkṣa* exactly as *ghaṭatva* exists in the *ghaṭa* and its perception is also a different process which is described in greater detail in the course of the work. For the present, it may be noted that when light and the senses reveal objects, they reveal things which do not inhere in them, but are external to them.

6. There are two views on this question: (1) cognition of the last phoneme, accompanied by the impressions left by the cognitions of the previous phonemes, cause the cognition of the universal, (2) the cognition of the last phoneme, together with those of the previous phonemes, leave impressions which cause the cognition of the universal.

7. *Yair apyākṛtivyavahāro nābhyupagamyate* etc. The same word, uttered by different persons, at different times or even by parrots etc, is recognised as the same word. But this recognition of identity must not be confused with the universal. If it were the universal it should rest on a particular word as *ghaṭatva* rests on a particular *ghaṭa*. But it seems to be somewhat independent of it. So it is conceived by some as an eternal independent entity and not as a universal. The fact that it is suggested by the impressions left by the different phonemes of a word also points to the same conclusion.

8. Vṛ. remarks: *parasparavyāvṛttā varṇāstatreti bhāgavantaṃ sphoṭaṃ manyante.*

9. *Vyavahāranityatayā nityāḥ śabdā iti. Vyavahāranityatā, vyavasthānityatā, pravāhanityatā*, all mean continuity as distinguished from *Kūṭasthanityatā*, absolute eternaliity or changelessness.

10. M.Bhā. I, p. 7, l. 8.

11. *Arthānādeśanāt. tacca laghvartham. ko hi samartho dhātuprātipadikapratyayanipātānām arthān ādeṣṭum.* (M.Bhā. I, p. 363).

12. M.Bhā. on P. 3.1.26.

13. P. 1.2.53.

14. M.Bhā. I.1.

15. Not traceable.

16. Not found in the Vārttikas nor in the M.Bhā.

17. M.Bhā on P. 1.1.20 (I, p. 75).

18. M.Bhā. I. p. 6. l. 12.

19. M.Bhā. I. p. 18. l. 14-15.

20. M.Bhā. I. p. 113. l. 12.]

24.-26. The meanings which have been obtained by abstraction, those which are of a fixed character, the forms which have to be grammatically analysed and those which are used as means for this purpose, the relations consisting in causality and fitness which lead to merit and understanding of meaning in the case of correct forms and to the understanding of meaning only in the case of incorrect ones, these have been described in this śāstra through indications and direct statements. These are only some which have been dealt with here according to tradition, in order that they may be fixed in memory.

These three verses give the whole of the subject-matter to be dealt with. The abstracted word-meaning is that which was closely connected, but being freed from that connection by an inferred postulated form, it is now abstracted. The form of that separated thing is beyond the range of usage. It is generally established on the basis of postulation, by

following tradition, according to one's understanding and through repeated practice. Similarly, the essence of the word being indivisible, in order that the work of Grammar may proceed, by adopting the method of positive and negative reasoning and postulating their recurrence, the words are separated from the whole and the separated word-meaning is looked upon as what is expressed by them. This separated word-meaning serves the usage of the science of Grammar and also worldly usage based on difference and is similar to usage in Grammar. When this separated meaning rests on one single word, it cannot be determined as true or false. When the mere word tree (*vṛkṣa*) or fig-tree (*plakṣa*) is uttered and it is not completed by the addition of a verb, the meanings conveyed by the words cannot be clearly defined. As long as specific actions which keep out others do not set aside the act of mere existence which is the cause of the very use of a word,[1] the verb 'it is' (*asti*), in the third person, denoting existence, though not used, is brought to the mind by the words tree etc., and is understood. These words, looking like single words, when completed by some word or other, are called sentences. Similarly, such divisions as the meaning of the first word (of a compound) the meaning of the second word, the meaning of an outside word, the meaning of the stem, the meaning of the root, the meaning of the suffix etc., are abstracted somehow in many ways from a single word by some scholars without any clear line of demarcation.[2] The meaning with a fixed character is that which is conveyed by the sentence, it has fictitious divisions, it is specific, one, of the nature of action. It is conveyed by means of the cognitions of the separated word-meanings. Even though the separated elements are cognised, the meanings understood from *namasyati,* (he pays homage) *saṅgrāmayate* (he offers battle) *muṇḍayati* (he shaves the head) *kuṭṭayati* (he powders) *carvayati* (he masticates) etc., at the time of the comprehension of the whole, is not complex.[3] That is why it has been said:—

"Or it is not necessary, because it is the (complete) word which is used to convey the meaning."[4]

'Word' here stands for that in which an action is merged. Or one might say that it is only the apparent persistence of the cognition (*sampratyaya*) (of the separated elements) which is referred to here. Accepting the use of the indivisible) word to convey the (indivisible meaning, the Bhāṣyakāra) again says:—

"It is the word which ends in a primary or secondary suffix which has a meaning and not the bare primary and secondary suffixes."[5]

What is meant by 'forms to be grammatically analysed' is this: According to some, it is the individual word which is the limit of grammatical analysis, while according to others, it is the sentence which is the limit.[6] According to the view that it is the word which is so, when, because of the identity of sounds, the same form of the word is taken, words which have acquired their correct form on the basis of the universal, even when the particulars come on the scene because of connection with other words, would continue to have the form based on the universal, which is an inner factor. The result would be that a word like *śukla* (white), in the singular number and neuter gender, would be connected with other words expressive of the substratum, having some other gender and number. In order that this may not happen, the rule,

"Of the adjectives also, except the universal".[7]

lays down that when words expressive of the substrata which are external factors are to follow, words expressive of quality, should take the gender and number of the words expressive of the substrata. According to the view that grammatical analysis has the sentence as the limit, considering that a quality always exists in something, it is not possible to separate it from its substratum and so, being fully determined, it does not denote the general idea at all. On this point, it has been said:—

"That is natural."[8]

Similarly, it is according to the view that each word in a 'dvandva' compound gets its correct form separately that the vārttika

"In a dvandva compound, the gotra suffix must be elided even in the numbers other than plural?"[9]

has been taught. On the view that it is the whole which gets the correct form, it has been said:—

"Or it may not be taught, as, in a dvandva compound, every word is in the plural number."[10]

Similarly, all the sūtras beginning with

"A qualifying word ending in a case-affix, is variously combined with a qualified word ending in a case-affix"[11] and

"Words expressive of the standard of comparison and ending in a case-suffix are combined with words expressive of the common property ending in a case-affix,"[12]

are to be understood as having been composed on the view that the word is the limit of grammatical analysis. It is after accepting that it is the word which has to be grammatically analysed that such divisions as *bhū ti, bhū ati,* leading to the understanding of groups of other words (than the sentence) have been postulated and accepted as means (*pratipādaka*).

What is meant by 'causality' is this: when the cognition which has parts of the appearances of the object and is superimposed on the object is taken as the object, then, of that object, the word is the cause. Since the relation of identity between the word and the meaning in the form 'It is this' is established, that cognition of the meaning is the cause of the application of the word which is within and which is manifested by the sounds. Because of the relation of illuminator and illuminated between particular words and particular meanings, as in the case of the senses and their objects, there is an eternal fitness, not created by anybody, of the expressive words possessing unvarying and well-established correctness in regard to the meanings expressed by them.[13] In the case of words whose relation with their meanings is not established at the time of their first application, the fitness depends upon convention.

The relation of the correct word with its meaning becomes auxiliary to the understanding of the meaning and when it is used with a knowledge of Grammar,[14] it becomes auxiliary to the manifestation of merit. In the production of special knowledge of the meaning, it brings about a condition similar to perception. Corrupt forms, on the other hand, become, like winking etc., auxiliary to the production of special knowledge in the manner of inference, by their connection with what is connected with the meaning.

What is meant by "These have been described through indications" is this:—When, in order to carry on the work of Grammar, the analysis of some unified meaning is made, there can be difference of opinion among men regarding the different limits of the (analysed) meanings. How is it to be known whether the suffix 'ṇic' is to be added to the root when the causative is to be expressed or whether it is to be added to the root of which it is the meaning?[15] Similarly, in regard to the sūtra

"When the idea of the feminine is to be expressed"[16] the doubt arises whether the suffixes 'ṭāp' etc., are to be added to a nominal stem when the idea of the feminine gender is to be expressed or to a stem which includes the feminine gender in its own meaning. Similarly, the doubt arises: the meaning of which element is important in a compound-word formed according to the rule.

"The negative particle *'na'* may be compounded with a word connected with it in meaning and the resulting compound word is to be called tatpuruṣa."[17]

These options do not exist in the world, because the worldly meaning is the whole and in regard to that, there is no deviation. The alternatives adopted by men being thus indefinite, that option is accepted by which the decisions of the Science of Grammar are not affected. Similarly, that the meanings of the inflectional suffixes are the numbers one etc., or the accessories to the actions like the object, that the meaning of a nominal stem is the group of five or of four or of three, such alternative views are due to the variations in human intelligence.[18] Action, accessary to action

and time are also analysed as the expressed meanings in different ways by different people. It has been said:

"The root stands for the accessories, action and time, person and number, that is the verb; gender and number, accessories to action, this is what the nominal stem stands for."[19]

That the ātmanepada suffix comes after a root which expresses mere action or the object of action, that the parasmaipada suffix is added to a root which expresses the agent has been said on the basis of an imaginary separation. The statement

"After conveying its own meaning (the universal) which inheres (in its substratum) the word, (though) free from any further requirement, denotes the substance"

is nothing more than the following of the order in which the understanding takes place.[20] A word does not convey its own meaning and others by pausing again and again, because it is uttered only once. Nor is it ever separated from its meaning. Nor is there any fixed sequence in the understanding of the meaning by the hearer or the speaker.[21] The object, qualified by all the attributes, a bundle of all the parts which are closely linked, comes at one and the same time within the range of a single cognition and later, one deliberately analyses it into different cognitions. But, since an intuition leading to purposeful activity cannot take place without the reunification of what has been divided, one again understands the connected form. The sequence of the cognitions of the speaker or the hearer who understands the parts separately, through considerations of proximity, width of scope, abundance of the causes of manifestation, the desire to know and the tendency to awaken the seed of another cognition[22] is not fixed in regard to the parts which are to be understood. For it has been said:—

"The one object is divided in many ways on the basis of difference of powers, by following the different forms of cognition, by those who know the nature of knowledge."

The meaning with a fixed character in the Science of Grammar is either the word-meaning or the sentence-meaning. For it has been said:—

"Or no, for it is the word which is used to convey the meaning."[23] and

"What is extra, that is the meaning of the sentence."[24] In the Saṅgraha also, it has been said:—

"What is called the word is not fixed in its form. The form and the meaning of a word are born from the meaning of a sentence."

Even though the form of the word to be explained is determined, according to the view that the sentence is the limit of analysis, there is no fixity in the form to be accepted when it comes to division into stem and suffix, of words like *marutta, indrāṇī, aikāgārika, giriśa, śrotriya, kṣattriya* etc.[25] It has been said:—

"The word with its meaning comes from the meaning (of the sentence). It is through the word that the meaning of a sentence is determined. The sentence is born of a collcetion of words and the word is born of a collection of phonemes."

At the time of derivation, it is stated that the word exists in the sentence and that the word is born of a collection of phonemes.

The relation has also been shown as that of cause and effect. For example:—

"They, describing their fortunes from birth to death, reveal them as existing, as figuring in the mind."[26]

Here and there, the relation has also been described as fitness. For example:—

"Expression, on the other hand, is natural."[27] While the colour remains the same, the words *śoṇa, karka* and *hema* are applied to a horse and not to a cow and others.[28]

Similarly, it has been said:—

"Among those who work and study equally, some are rewarded with understanding while others are not"[29]
and so on.

"Such roots having the circumflex accent and *ñ* as indicatory letter have been taught by the Teacher which are both, i.e., the fruit of whose action is meant for the agent and not meant for the agent."[30]

The author of the Saṅgraha says:—

"When the word and the meaning are separated, there is division in usage. Because (really speaking) the unity of the word and the meaning is established."

Again he says:—

"Neither in the world nor in the Veda is there any person who creates the relation. How can the relation of words (with meanings) be created through words?"

[1. *Yeyam aupacārikī sattā sā sarvaśabdapravṛttikāraṇam* (Vṛ.).

2. It is not merely the indivisible meaning of the sentence which is artificially divided but the meaning of a single word can also be so divided. The addition of the verb *asti* to the single word *vṛkṣa* shows that even sentences consisting of single words are artificially divided.

3. *Namasyati* etc. Even though *namasyati* is explained as *namaḥ karoti*, 'he pays homage' as involving an agent' an object and an action, what is understood from it in the end does not involve such differentiation, but is a unified whole. The separation of the elements at the time of the explanation is artificial. When grammar speaks about primary and secondary suffixes and their meanings, it is all artificial. It is the whole word ending in one of these suffixes which has a meaning. See P. 3.1.17, 19, 21; 25.

4. Vā. 19 on P. 1.2.64. (M.Bhā. I. p. 237).

5. M.Bhā. I. p. 319, l. 6.

6. *Padāvadhikam anvākhyānam.* The word *śukla* ordinarily denotes the quality white. When one wants the word to denote, not the quality, but the thing which has that quality, the suffix *matup* has to be added to the word according to P. 5.2.94. But the elision of this suffix after words expressive of quality has also been taught. Thus when the word means 'a white thing' the form would still be *śukla*. Thus the word *śukla* denotes two different things: the quality white and the thing having that quality. The fact of being white

(*śuklatva*) exists in both and, on that basis, the word gets its form; namely, its singular number and neuter gender: *śuklam*. Even when a word expressive of the thing or things in which the quality resides is used like *paṭāḥ*, the word *śuklam* which has already acquired its form according to the view that the word is the limit of grammatical analysis, would retain it and we would get the expression: *śuklaṁ paṭāḥ*. But as the expression is wrong, Pāṇini, in order to prevent its occurrence; says: *Viśeṣaṇānām cājāteḥ* (P. 1.2.52). According to this rule, adjectives take the gender and number of the words which they qualify. The very fact that he makes such a sūtra shows that he considers the word to be the limit of grammatical analysis.

*Vākyāvadhikam anvākhyānam*. According to this view, a quality always resides in its substratum. It cannot be thought of in isolation. The gender and number of the word expressive of the substratum would inevitably belong to the word expressive of the quality. Therefore words like *śukla* never express the quality white, in isolation. So it would never have the singular number and neuter gender in isolation. It would have the gender and number of the word expressive of the substratum where it resides. Therefore, no special sūtra is necessary to bring it about. That is why it has been declared unnecessary in the sūtra *Tad aśiṣyaṃ saṃjñāpramāṇatvāt* (P. 1.2.53).

7. P. 1.2.52.

8. M.Bhā. I. p. 430, l. 11.

9. Vā. 5. on P. 2.4.62. (M.Bhā. I. p. 490).

10. Vā. 8. on P. 2.4.62. (M.Bhā. I. p. 491).

11. P. 2.1.57.

12. P. 2.1.55.

13. See the Vṛtti on Kā 23.

14. *Sabdapūrvake vā prayoge*. See Vā. 9, Paspaśāhnika and the M. Bhā thereon. But *śabdapūrvaka prayoga* which leads to *dharma* and *abhyudaya* must be distinguished from *śabdapurva yoga* which is mentioned in several places in the Vṛtti. See the Vṛtti on Kā 14, 131, 142. It must also be distinguished from *Vāgyoga* which is already mentioned in the M. Bhā, Paspaśāhnika and here in the Vṛtti on I. 130.

15. P. 3. 1. 26.

16. P. 4.1.3.

17. P. 2.2.6.

18. There are different views current among grammarians as to the number of meanings which a bare stem (*prātipadika*) can convey. Some hold that it can denote five things (*pñcaka*): *svārtha* (the universal), *dravya* (the particular) *liṅga* (gender), *saṃkhyā* (number) and accesory to action (*kāraka*). For example, in the sentence *dadhy ānaya*, the word *dadhi* denotes all the five things, even though, in form,

it is no more than the bare stem. Others think that the accessory to action is conveyed by the suffix and so attribute only four (*catuṣka*) to the bare stem. Others think that number also is the meaning of the suffix, in which case only three (*trika*) remain for the bare stem. If the feminine gender is considered to be the meaning of the feminine suffix, the bare stem would convey only two ideas (*dvika*).

19. According to Vṛṣabha, this is a sūtra belonging to the Kāśakṛtsna school. He is also our sole authority for the meanings of the technical words used in the sūtra. From his explanation it follows that, according to Kāśakṛtsna, the suffixes do not express any meaning apart from what the root or the nominal stem expresses. As Vṛ. puts it: *pratyayānāmavyatiriktārthābhidhānāt.* It is also to be noted that, in the supposed sūtra of Kāśakṛtsna, which verbal element expresses which meaning is directly stated, so that one does not have to depend on indications.

20. *Pratipattikramaniyamānugamamātram—Na śabdagato' abhidhānakramo' pi tu pratipattyapratipattikramaḥ* (Vṛ.).

21. *Pratipattikramo hy ayaṃ śrotur abhidhātur vā na vyavasthitaḥ.* The idea is that there is no sequence at all. The following sentence makes it clear.

22. In understanding the parts abstracted from the unified whole, the speaker or the hearer is guided by the following factors, as explained by Vṛṣabha:—1. *Pratyāsatti*=proximity. It is the universal which exists in a particular that helps one to distinguish the latter from other kinds of particulars. So that universal is proximate to the particular and, therefore, it is understood first. But the universal cannot be understood except through the particular in which it inheres nor can gender be understood except through the particular in which it resides. So, through the desire to cognise the universal and proximity to gender, the particular is grasped. Gender is understood before number and accessory because it does not depend upon any other particular for its comprehension and it also helps to distinguish the particular in which it exists from other particulars; 2. Width of scope (*mahāviṣayatva*) can be seen in the universal which inheres in all the particulars. Compared to gender, the particular has a wider scope, because all the genders can exist in the particular. One gender excludes the others and so it has a narrower scope. Gender is wider in scope than number, because the same gender can cover all numbers, whereas one number excludes the other numbers. As all the particulars can manifest the universal, the latter has abundant causes of manifestation; 3. (*abhivyaktinimittopavyañjanaprakarṣa*). The universal has more manifestors compared to the particular which is manifested by its own parts only; 4. The desire to know (*upalipsā*) is also a factor: what is desired to be known first is known first. Finally, all cognitions have inner dispositions (*bīja*) among their causes. They are awakened (*vṛttilābha*) before the cognitions take place. The cog-

nition of the universal tends to awaken the predisposition to cognise the particular while that of the latter tends to awaken the predisposition to cognise gender etc. This is what is called; 5. *bījavṛttilābhānuguṇyam*.

23. Vā. 19, on P. 1.2.64. (M.Bhā. I. p. 237).
24. M.Bhā on Vā. 2. on P. 2.3.49. (M.Bhā. I. p. 462).
25. These words can be analysed in different ways —

*Marutta*: *Marut* + *tap* (*Vā.* 10 on P. 5.2.122) or *Marut* + *dā* + *kta*, in the sense of *marudbhir dattaḥ*, the root *dā* being elided.

*Indrāṇī*: *Indra* + *ānuk* + *ṅīṣ* or *Indra* + *ān* (causative of *an*) + *aṇ* + *ṅīp*.

*Aikāgārika*: *Ekāgāra* + *ṭhañṭ* or *Ekāgāra* + *ṭhañ*.

*Giriśa*: *Giri* + *śī* + *ḍa* (*auṇādika*) or *Giri* + *śa* (matvarthīya).

*Śrotriya*: *nipāta* according to P. 5.2.84. or *Chandas* = *śrotra* + *ghan* (adhīte ityarthe).

*Kṣatriya*: *Kṣatra* + *gha* or *Kṣatra* + *iya*.

26. M. Bhā on Vā. 15 on P. 3.1.26.
27. Vā. 15 on P. 2.2.29. (Vol. I. p. 433).
28. Cf. M.Bhā. Vol. I. p. 433. It is there pointed out that the words *śoṇa*, *hema* and *karka* which mean red, black and white respectively, can be applied only to a horse of that colour and not to other animals of the same colour.
29. M.Bhā. on P. 2.2.29. (Vol. I. p. 430, l. 12).
30. M.Bha. on P. 1.3.72. (Vol. I. p. 292, l. 22).

27. The correct words, acquired from the cultured through tradition, are the means of obtaining merit. The incorrect words, while not differing from them as far as conveying of the meaning is concerned, are of an opposite character.

Just as other means of attaining merit, received through uninterrupted tradition consisting of successive teaching of the cultured, or just as prohibited things like injury to others, telling lies, stealing etc., or things neither allowed nor prohibited like hicup, breathing, scratching etc., are well established and are not to be doubted, in the same way, the distinction between what is correct and what is not is based on unbroken tradition and is not to be doubted, but is to be accepted according to tradition.

28. Whether words be eternal or otherwise, their beginning is not known. As in the case of living beings, there is what is called continuity (*vyavasthā-nityatā*).

[1]Whether one accepts the view that the words are eternal and manifested or the view that they exist beforehand and undergo modifications like birth etc., or the view that they do not exist beforehand but are made audible and become inaudible again (*sopākhyanirupākhyatvam*), in any case, there was no first stage in which verbal usage did not exist nor will there be a future stage when it will not exist. For those who declare that God, Time, the Puruṣas,[2] knowledge, the individual soul (*kṣetrajña*) to be different (from the effects and their causes), for those who declare this (universe) to be without God, Time, the Puruṣas, knowledge or the individual soul but entirely based on nescience, for those who maintain that the universe, without a before and after and without going beyond the unity of the ultimate, consists of the manifestation of the different forms due to the combined, mutually opposed and indefinable powers, for all of them, there was no first period of time when there was no activity of the living. This is what is called continuity, without a beginning and without an end. It has been said—

"That is also eternal, in which the identity is not destroyed."[3]

[1. According to Vṛṣabha, two views are here expressed in regard to words: (1) that they are eternal and, therefore, already existent and manifested at the time of use, (2) that they are produced at the time of use and disappear again. The first view is associated with the Sāṅkhyas, especially Vārṣagaṇya. The second view seems to be that of the Naiyāyikas. In regard to the universe, the view that it is without God etc., but based entirely on nescience is attributed by Vṛ. to Brahmavādinaḥ. Some, however, attribute it to the Buddhists and the view expressed in the latter part of the sentence to the Advaitins.

2. Puruṣa — *Puruṣa iti kecit pṛthivyādisaṃghātam āhuḥ* (Vṛ.).

3. M.Bhā. I. p. 7, l. 22.]

29. Nobody would establish this system of rules without a purpose. Therefore, this tradition relating to correctness is being composed by the cultured.

Which cultured person, even if he has a confused mind (*saṃbhinnabuddhiḥ*) and no sympathy towards the world,[1] would undertake the regulation of the accent and other signs of correctness of the words of the Veda and of the world which are so difficult to know and to learn and which are the very purpose of Grammar? And such a regulation would not be useless. (If it were) such a regulation made by the cultured would be unacceptable to the others. And it would not be authority in the world for scholars. Therefore, this tradition (relating to words) beginningless, handed down from teacher to pupil, the means of inferring who the cultured persons are, infallible, consisting of general rules and their elaborations, is being composed in different ways, through direct statements and by implication.

[1. *Saṃbhinnabuddhir api lokaṃ pratyanabhiniviṣṭaḥ*. The reasoning behind this expression is not clear. The purpose of this verse is to justify the composition of the science of grammar. Four reasons are put forward justifying its composition: (1) that it is eternal, (2) that it has been handed down from teacher to pupil, (3) that it helps us to infer who is cultured and who is not, (4) that it gives an infallible knowledge of correctness. Those who are confused as to what is right and what is wrong (*saṃbhinnabuddhiḥ*) and have no sympathy for the world (*lokaṃ pratyanabhiniviṣṭaḥ*) would not be able to undertake the composition of the science of grammar. Vṛ. seems to have had the reading: *lokaṃ pratyabhiniviṣṭaḥ* which can mean, according to him, "*api nāmāyaṃ lokaḥ khedāyāsābhyāṃ yujyeta iti vyutthitabuddhir abhiniviṣṭaḥ* = one who would like the world to be troubled by pain and fatigue. But Vṛ. considers the former reading easier to explain.]

30. Dharma cannot be determined by reasoning alone, without the help of tradition. Even the knowledge of the Seers is due to their previous observance of the tradition.

All thinkers, when they reach the extreme, have recourse to the own nature of things. The determination of the own nature of actions having invisible fruits can be made only with the help of tradition. How can one trust human reasoning in which the similarities and differences of things are never certain and which is, therefore, always doubtful? Even in the case of those individuals who have adopted a particular mode of intellectual and spiritual life and are known to have acquired qualities which reasoning cannot explain, it is said that, because of their adherence to the injunctions of the Āgama (Tradition), their souls are purified and a divine knowledge is manifested in them.[1] To assume that such knowledge is natural to them would be to condemn all special effort[2] as fruitless and obstacles to such knowledge would also arise naturally.

[1. Sage Kapila is usually given as the example of one, who possessed divine knowledge capable of seeing the past, the present and the future, the subtle (*sūkṣma*), the distant (*viprakṛṣṭa*) and the hidden (*vyavahita*).

2. The effort made by persons to acquire the kind of knowledge that Kapila had is meant here. *Vṛ*. says: *yatna ity abhyāsādikaḥ*.]

31. Nobody can violate, on the basis of reasoning, those paths of Dharma which have come down without a break, because they are accepted in the world.

In spite of many variations in the doctrines of the cultured, there are well-known beneficial modes of conduct, common to all; to go against them would not be liked by the people. They have never been refuted by mere reasoning. It may be that some do, on the basis of some passage in the tradition itself,[1] resort to a reprehensible mode of conduct, opposed to what is accepted in the world.

[1. *Te'pi hi vedāntadarśanam anyathā parikalpya pravṛttāḥ*—Vṛ. According to this, it is some passage of the Vedānta, i.e., the Upaniṣads, which is misunderstood by some people and made the basis of reprehensible conduct. Could it be such a passage as *na kāñcana pariharet* (Chā. Up. 2.13.)]

32. It is extremely difficult to establish by reasoning the nature of objects, because their properties differ according to difference in circumstances, place and time.

The inference, after seeing what is connected and considered invariably concommittant or something similar to it, of another thing which is not visible, does not lead to any certainty in regard to that invisible thing. One sees that the nature of things of proved strength and quality in certain circumstances, varies, in other circumstances, visible or invisible to ordinary persons. Even the properties of external things like seeds and plants are suspended in certain circumstances. Similarly, properties of things change with change of place. Waters of the Himalayas are very cold to the touch. But similar waters found in clouds, a water-boiler and the like are warm to the touch. The ordinary man (*arvāgdarśana*), misled by external resemblance, is unable to see the difference and can see it only with the help of tradition. Similarly, properties of things change with time. The temperature of the waters of a well and the like, is very different in summer and winter. Which intelligent man would try to demonstrate, by mere reasoning, this subtle difference in nature, imperceptible to the ordinary man, unascertainable by inference and incomprehensible except through knowledge derived from tradition?

33. The known power of an object to produce different effects is inoperative when it comes into contact with particular objects or factors.

The proved power of fire etc., to bring about destruction in wood etc., is inoperative in regard to such things as masses of clouds. Similarly, due to the action of magical formulae, special herbs or chemical products, the power (of fire) to burn even inflammable objects is suspended. Substances whose powers are proved in some cases are of doubtful effectiveness in other cases.

34. Whatever is inferred with great effort by clever reasoners is explained otherwise by cleverer ones.[1]

Substance is different from quality because the latter qualifies the former. It is like this. Even though there would be the difference of qualifier and qualified in both cases, the word 'king' can qualify the word 'kingdom' (as in the phrase 'the king's kingdom' = *rājño rāṣṭram*) but not the word 'hermit'. The word sandal can qualify the word 'smell', but not the word colour. Therefore, substance is different from quality. Even though the separate identity of substance is thus established, it has been said that the argument is not sound. The fact is that words sometimes convey the general and sometimes the particular. To qualify the word smell or the like with the word sandal which stands for something having a particular colour, shape etc., has a purpose. To qualify it with the mere word colour would be useless, because colour is a general word and as much as it conveys was already known. When the question 'whose man is this' is asked the answer 'the king's' is given in order to exclude other possible masters. Nobody would answer 'of some person', because that much was already known. Others give another example: Even though a word and a stanza have this much in common that both are parts of a hymn (which is a collection of words), a stanza can qualify a word (as in the expression 'the word of a stanza' = *ṛcaḥ padam*) but not vice-versa (one would not say: the stanza of the word). Another argues differently: It is on the assumption of identity that the word sandal qualifies the word smell and the word colour does not. So the reason given: 'because the latter qualifies the former' to prove difference (between substance and quality) should prove the opposite. The problem arises because of particular meanings which figure or do not figure in the mind when words are uttered. Therefore, the inference of something which is invisible from what is visible is alright if it is not opposed to tradition. It is a fact that minor acts, closely connected with particular major acts like

cooking and ordinarily leading to their inference, may be performed by some for deceiving others.[2]

[1. Cf. *Tathā hi kaiścid abhiyuktair yatnenotpreksitāstarkā abhiyuktāntarairanyairābhāsyamānā dṛśyante*—Śaṅk. Bhā. on Bṛ. Sū II. 1. 11.

2. The purpose of this kārikā is to show that reasoning, unsupported by tradition, is unreliable and that the reasoning of one may be upset by another. The argument of the Naiyāyika to prove that substance is different from quality is taken as an example. His argument, briefly, is: Substance is different from quality because the latter can qualify the former. Against this, others point out that the argument is weak because both what is different and what is not different from another can qualify it in some cases and cannot qualify it in other cases. A king and a kingdom are different from each other and we can say: the king's kingdom (*rājño rāṣṭram*). Here 'king' qualifies 'kingdom'. But, on this analogy, we cannot say: the hermit's kingdom, even though the hermit and the kingdom are also different from each other. Similarly, we can say 'the smell of sandal', but we cannot say 'the smell of something having colour', even though in both cases, there is difference between the two things. To come to cases where there is no difference, we can say: *āmrāṇāṃ vanam* = a grove of mango-trees. Here mango-trees qualify grove, though the grove is not different from the trees. That which qualifies must keep out something. When we say, the smell of sandal, the word sandal keeps out other things having smell like flowers. When we say, the king's man, the word 'king's' keeps out other possible masters. It is not, therefore, the fact of being different which enables qualifiers to qualify a substance. Sometimes, the whole qualifies a part as in '*ṛcaḥ padam*' = the word of a stanza or *gṛhasya dvāraśālā* = the parlour of the house. Here the house qualifies the parlour, because parlour is part of the house. In other words, the relation of qualifier and qualified cannot prove that two things are different from each other.]

35. The experts' knowledge of the genuineness of precious stones and coins, uncommunicable to others, is born of practice and not of reasoning.

Expert examiners of coins, goldsmiths etc., even after having found out the subtle reasons for deciding the genuineness of coins like a *kārṣāpaṇa*, are not able to communicate them to others, because these reasons have no words to express them. Even experts, full of concentration, do not understand, without long practice, the distinction between

*ṣaḍja, ṛṣabha, gāndhāra, dhaivata* etc., even though, it comes within the range of perception.[1]

[1. The purpose of this verse seems to be to point out that, in order to understand certain things, it is necessary, not only to make use of perception, inference and tradition, but a fourth thing called, *abhyāsa*, practice. The knowledge which the expert acquires about the genuineness of precious stones is something which he cannot communicate to others nor has it been communicated to him by others. That is why it is said to be different from tradition which can be communicated to others.]

36. The extraordinary powers of the Pitṛs, the demons and the goblins, going beyond perception and inference, are the results of their previous deeds.

In all circles of thought, it is admitted that deaf people and others hear sounds in their dreams and that some persons can see minute things inside houses through thick walls, without breaking them. When the question arises as to the means by which this is done, one cannot think of anything else than the indefinable power of *adṛṣṭa*, the result of deeds done in previous births.[1]

[1. Vṛ. points out that those who become deaf after birth may hear sounds in dreams because of the impressions of sounds heard before becoming deaf. But those who are born deaf also hear sounds in dreams. And then there are the manes, demons and goblins who can see the past, the distant and the hidden. All this is due to the effect of deeds done in previous birth. This faculty is called *adṛṣṭa* which must be distinguished from perception, inference, tradition and practice.]

37. The knowledge of the past and the future of those whose insight has manifested itself and whose mind is in no way tainted differs in no way from perception.

According to the view that the effect is a totally new product (*asatkāryavāda*) it is, before its creation, without

a basis, without a form, without an essence, something in regard to which the causal power of something cannot be determined nor specified. How then can it be understood? According to the other view (*satkāryavāda*) its specific form (before creation) is not manifest, it is unknown for the purpose of worldly transactions, it is as good as totally non-existent. But cultured persons, whose impurities have been burnt away by austerities, whose cognitions are free from all limitations, see everything vividly reflected in their cognitions.[1]

[1. Vṛ. points out that the purpose of this Kārikā is to state that in addition to ordinary perception, there exists another. Only those whose impurities have been washed away have it. It is the result of their good deeds in previous births. Through that, they can see the past and the present.

While explaining the expression: *adṛṣṭāpratiniyatakāraṇaśakti-parigraham*, Vṛ. points out that the different kinds of inference: *pūrvavat, śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, cannot enable us to determine what has causal power in regard to which effect, no matter what view of causality we adopt, whether it be *asatkāryavāda* or *satkāryavāda*.]

38. The words of those who, with their divine vision, see things which are beyond the senses and unknowable, cannot be set aside by reasoning.

The supreme inner Controller, the atoms which are the abode of the initial cause of creation, the unmanifested Word—Absolute which is the substratum of its powers, the gods,[1] the residual forces[2] generated by action, leading to particular results and not to others, in their maturity, the divine otherworldly body,[3] and other such things known in all scholarly circles, imperceptible to the senses like colour and beyond the range of inner experience like happiness are undoubtedly perceived by the sages with their extraordinary eye. The words of these sages, dealing with matters beyond the range of inference, cannot be upset by reasoning which is so liable to err.[4] People born blind cognise colour and as they had never seen colour before, it cannot be a case of inference.

[1. Those who have a visible or concrete form and those who have not—Vṛ.

2. *Anubandha-pariṇāma-śaktivaikalyāni.* The residual force of action is *anubandha;* when under favourable circumstances, the force yields the result of the action in question, it is *pariṇāma;* its inability to yield any other result is *śaktivaikalya.*

3. *Sūkṣmamātivāhikaṃ śarīram.* Vṛ. says that this refers to the intermediary body which the dead person acquires before he gets his next body. It is called intermediary, because it enables the person to cross over.

4. *Vyabhicāribhir anumānaiḥ*—This is a reference to the point already made in Kā. 32 and 34 that all reasoning is unreliable and liable to be upset by other reasoning.]

39. How can one who does not question the authority of such persons any more than his own experience and has, therefore, taken his stand on direct vision, be set aside by others (who follow reasoning)?

There are in every branch (of the Veda) and for everybody, some trustworthy persons. Their words are not scrutinised and are not to be doubted any more than one's own perception. Whose actions, like making stones float on water, though not actually seen, can be believed on the authority of trustworthy persons who follow them. It is like this. That actions done in this world lead to desirable or undesirable fruit after death is accepted in the world on the authority of trustworthy persons and even without such teaching in the Scripture, all persons usually accept it.

40. In order to decide what is good and what is bad, all men, including the lowest, have very little use for scripture;[1]

Therefore, direct perception and extra-sensory cognition (of the sages) set aside reasoning even when there is contradiction between the two.

[1. This verse is found in the Śl. Vār. (verse 3, p. 209. (Chowkhambha edition). It is there given as that of Pārāśarya, i.e., Vyāsa. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, in his Nyāyamañjarī, also gives it as a quotation from Vyāsa. Here, however, it is not given as a quotation, but as an integral part of the Vākyapadīya itself.]

41. One who has recourse to Tradition which shines uninterruptedly like the 'I' consciousness cannot be diverted therefrom by mere reasoning.[1]

The spontaneous and eternal consciousness which is attested by our sense of 'I am' and the like, is not set aside even by the teaching of authoritative persons that there is neither 'I' nor 'mine' even in the case of liberated souls as far as worldly life is concerned. Such is the case with Tradition in the form of Scripture and written tradition accepted by all cultured people. It is not violated in the matter of what should be done and what should not be done, what can be eaten and what cannot be eaten, which woman one can marry and which woman one cannot marry by the followers of different doctrines. One who closely follows such a tradition observed by the elders cannot deviate from the right path by accepting the reasoning of logicians. Thus, he remains irreproachable in the eyes of the world.

[1. Mere reasoning such as that the word, the meaning and their mutual relation being eternal and known from the world, it is not necessary to compose the science of Grammar.]

42. Fall is not unlikely in the case of one who relies on reasoning, as in the case of a blind man who walks along a difficult path by groping with the hands.

Just as one, who, after seeing a sample, accepts the rest according to the maxim of the rice in the cooking pot (*sthālīpulākanyāya*)[1] is like a blind man who goes hurriedly on a difficult hilly path without the help of one who can see,

understands a part of the path by groping with his hands, traverses it, and, on that basis, takes the rest of the path also to be similar and comes to grief, in the same way, one who, without the help of the eye of Tradition, relies on reasoning and, after having attained confidence in some matters through inference only, proceeds, without the help of tradition, to perform acts having visible and invisible results, inevitably incurs great sin.

[1. *Sthālīpulākanyāya.* See JACOB—*A Handful of Popular Maxims*—1, p. 53.]

43. Therefore, on the basis of eternal Scripture and authoritative tradition, the cultured have composed this science of the explanation of the words.

Therefore, teachers have composed this science of the explanation of words (Grammar) after having taken as authority the tradition which is not connected with any person, not to be doubted and calculated to teach man what is good for him, after having accepted, as in the case of words like *pṛṣodara*[1] the uninterrupted practice of their own schools, acceptable to the cultured, in regard to the use of the correct forms of words and after having taken as authority, the works of earlier sages in which option is allowed where there is contradiction between two teachings, in which there are main rules and their exceptions and in which there is great variation, according to time, in the manner of presentation of the forms of words.[2]

[1. *Pṛṣodara.* See P. 6.3.109—*Pṛṣodarāṇi yathopadiṣṭam.*

2. *Pratikālaṃ dṛṣṭaśabdasvarūpavyabhicārāṇi* Vṛṣabha understands this in two ways: (1) during periods when men are intellectually strong, everything is taught in great detail; at other times, briefly. This is one variation according to time. (2) At one time, one form of a word is taught as leading to happiness (merit) and another form at another time. At one time, *nyāṅkavam* was correct but now *naiyaṅkavam* is correct.]

√44. In the words which are expressive the learned discern two elements: one is the cause of the real word which, the other, is used to convey the meaning.

That is called the expressive word which takes over the meaning, imposes it on its own form, makes it identical with itself, as it were. It has been said in the Saṅgraha.

"According to the view that it is the undivided word which conveys the meaning,[1] the expressive word has its own form (which is the basis of its usage and grammatical explanation). According to the view that the word can be divided into meaningful parts,[2] the basis of the formation of the word is the element delimited by meaning. Others are of the view that the word which conveys the meaning (does not express it but only) suggests it, because in that way, the use of the relation of the identity of the word and the meaning in the form 'It is this' would be possible.[3]" Or the word *upādāna* may be taken to mean the whole which is to be accepted (for the operation of the rule). It is like this: where a word stands for its own form, its parts are not taken into consideration and no division is, therefore, cognised.[4] What is meant by 'one is the cause of the real word' is: the cause of that, standing on which or resting on which or based on which the sounds convey the meaning. What is meant by 'the other is used to convey the meaning' is—By the activity of the articulatory organs, it attains modification, becomes audible, depends, as the illuminator, always on the illuminated[5] and is used to convey the meaning. According to others, that in which there is no inner sequence is the cause, that which has acquired sequence conveys the meaning. They proclaim that even that conveys the meaning when it enters the mind of the listener with all sequence suppressed. Another maintains that what has sequence is the cause of what has none. In the sequenceless word are merged both the expressive power (*śrutiśakti*) and the power of being expressed (*arthaśakti*). It has been said—

"From the differentiated, the undifferentiated word is born and it expresses the meaning. The word assumes the form of the meaning and enters into relation with it."

[1. *Avyutpattipakṣa.* When a word cannot be divided into meaningful parts, the whole of it is associated with a meaning which is not related to the meanings of its parts, because there are no parts.

2. *Vyutpattipakṣa.* Where a word can be divided into meaningful parts, the meaning of the whole is sought to be connected with the meaning of the parts.

3. *Dyotaka.* Those who hold that the word is suggestive (and not expressive = *vācaka*) seem to mean that the relation of expressive and expressed presupposes difference between word and meaning. But there is *abheda* between the two. Therefore, the word cannot be *vācaka*, it can only be *dyoṭaka*.

4. Sometimes, a word stands for its own form and not for a meaning different from the form. That is mostly the case in grammatical rules. P. 4.2.33 "*agner ḍhak*" says that the suffix *ḍhak* (= *eya*) is to be added to *agni*. Here *agni* naturally stands for its own form and not for what it means. Therefore, it cannot be divided into parts. The suffix can be added only to the word as a whole and not to any part of it. Agni is *svarūpapadārthaka.*

5. *Pratyāyyaparatantra.* '*Tadākāropagrahenopasthānāt*'—Vr. The word as *prakāśaka*, naturally depends upon the meaning which is *prakāśya* or *pratyāyya*. It is supposed always to carry the reflection of the meaning.]

45. That there is an essential difference between them is the view of some followers of tradition. Others, on the other hand, think that they are one but appear to be different owing to difference in the point of view.

When the word 'essential difference' is the object of the verb *brū* (*āhuḥ*), it takes the second case-affix (*dvitīyā*) but when the whole sentence as uttered by the followers of tradition is imitated, it takes the first case-affix (*prathamā*). According to the view that the effect is different from the cause, the difference between the two (kinds of words mentioned in the previous verse) is clear. According to the other view (that the effect is not different from the cause)

one and the same thing is thought of as two on the basis of difference in point of view resulting from its two powers. Or the difference of opinion among ancient thinkers may be based on their difference of opinion regarding the identity or difference of the universal and the particular of words.[1] This matter will be discussed in detail later.

[1. *śabdākṛtivyaktibhedābheda*—"*Tatra keṣāṃcic chabdākṛtir nimittaṃ śabdavyaktir vācikā. Apareṣām etad eva viparītam. Tayoś ca kecid bhedam abhedaṃ cāpare pratipannāḥ.* (Vṛ.)]

46. Just as the fire which is within the churn-sticks is the cause of the other fire (which is kindled), similarly, the word which is in the mind (of the speaker) becomes the cause of the different expressive words.

Just as one sees that, both according to the doctrine of identity and that of difference,[1] the fire, at first in the form of seed and unmanifested is later kindled into a flame and its capacity to illuminate itself and others, previously imperceptible, becomes later perceptible, in the same way, the word in the mind which has the seeds of differentiation in it, comes near to manifestation when the seeds become mature and is manifested by the movements of the articulatory organs and due to differentiation in the manifesting sounds, appears to have divisions and is perceived as having inner sequence and illuminates its own form and others.[2]

[1. *Ekatvapakṣa* and *nānātvapakṣa* stand for *satkāryavāda* and *asatkāryavāda* respectively.

2. The word exists in the mind of the speaker as a unity. When he utters it and produces the different sounds by the movements of the articulatory organs, it appears to have differentiation. But the listener ultimately perceives it as a unity and it is then that it conveys the meaning. In this verse, the word which exists in the speaker's mind as a unity is described as the *nimitta*. As Vṛ. puts it: *Sa eva vaktṛbuddhistho'nabhivyakto nimittam.*]

47. First conceived in the mind and applied to some meaning or other, the word is suggested by the sounds whch are produced by the articulatory organs.

When the relation of identity between the word and the meaning in the form 'It is this' (*so'yam*) is analysed, the word which is sought to be superimposed on the meaning and into which the meaning enters as a kind of reflection (*upayogenānupraveśaṃ labhate*) is, before its utterance, visualised by the mind, applied to a meaning according to the intention of the speaker, seems to change its form into that of another and projects it (on the meaning). What is meant by 'produced by the articulatory organs' is that the word whose nature it is not to change, appears to change, following the manifesting sound whose nature it is to change. The word which is entirely without change appears to change in terms of the gross *nāda*, perceptible like a mass of clouds, brought into being when the subtle all-pervasive sounds (*dhvani*) are amassed (*pracīyamāne*) by the movements of the articulatory organs[1].

[1. Three words are used in the Vṛtti-*śabda, dhvani* and *nāda*. The first stands for the word which conveys the meaning. The *dhvanis* are conceived of as something atomic, all-pervasive and imperceptible. When amassed by the movements of the articulatory organs, they become gross and perceptible and are then called *nāda*. It is they which suggest the word. The word is first conceived as a unity in the mind of the speaker. In order to utter it, he makes movements of his articulatory organs which have the effect of progressively collecting the subtle, atomic, all-pervading *dhvanis* and bringing into being the *nādas* which are gross and audible. These have divisions and sequence and so the word, suggested by them, though changeless and sequenceless, also seems to have them. The process of accumulation of the atomic *dhvanis*. resembling the accumulation of clouds (*abhrasaṅghātavad*) is referred to in verse 111—"*abhrāṇīva pracīyante śabdākhyāḥ paramāṇavaḥ*".]

48. Because the gross sound (*nāda*) is produced in a sequence, the word which is neither prior nor posterior nor has any sequence, is manifested as having sequence and parts.

The gross sound (*nāda*) which is in the form of an accumulation on account of the sequential activity (of the articulatory organs) suggests the word (*sphoṭa*) by means of the functions of prevention and permission.[1] Though the word (*sphoṭa*) is one, it appears to have different parts. It has neither sequence nor simultaneity, both being opposed to its one-ness and eternality. Therefore without giving up its oneness, it appears to have differentiation which is a property of the gross sound associated with it. Such is the nature of what is associated with it. It is like the whole (*avayavī*) which is an absolute unity appearing to be differentiated because of the differentiation of its parts.

[1. *Sapratibandhābhyanujñayā vṛttyā*. *Pratibandha* (prevention) and *abhyanujñā* (permission) are usually given as the two functions of time, by virtue of which everything happens at its proper time, neither before nor later. Growth, for instance, means that at any of its stages, the later stages cannot appear. Similarly, when a word is uttered, the manifesting sounds can only appear in a sequence. When one appears, the later ones cannot. This is *abhyanujñā* for what appears and *pratibandha* for what does not.]

49. Just as a reflection, found elsewhere (as in water) seems to have movement because of the movement of water, such is the relation between *sphoṭa* and *nāda*.

According to the view that the reflection is identical with what reflects it or according to the opposite view (*anyatvapakṣe*), the reflection of an object like the moon appears to be connected with and to have the properties of its substratum, but it is not really so. Though it has no movements of its own, it takes on the property called movement of water, wave etc., and appears to have the various movements of water etc. Similarly, the word (*sphoṭa*) takes on the properties of the primary sound (*prākṛtadhvani*) when it is looked upon as short, long, or protracted and those of the secondary sound (*vaikṛtadhvani*) when it is looked upon as having quick, medium or slow speed.[1]

[1. There are different views about the nature of a reflection: (1) In the presence of the original, a luminous object like water is affected and seems to reflect the original, but it is only a change in the water. There is no reflection apart from the water. (2) The reflection exists in the water apart from it and has the original as its material cause. (3) The rays of the eye, turned back by luminous surfaces like those of a mirror, water etc., see the original and that seeing is the reflection. According to the first view (*tattvapakṣa*) the reflection appears to be in the water and to have its movements, but it is only the water which one sees in that condition. In the second and third views (*anyatvapakṣa*), the reflection is something different from the water. There is no contact between the wind and the reflection and so there cannot be any movement in the reflection itself. Because the reflection is in contact with water and the latter with the wind, the movement in the water appears to exist in the reflection. According to all the three views, the reflection by itself is without movement, but appears to have it because of the water. Similarly, the word (*sphoṭa*) appears to be short, long or protracted because the sounds which manifest it (*prākṛtadhvani*) are either short, long or protracted or it appears to be of quick, medium or slow speed, because the secondary sounds (*vaikṛtadhvani*) are such.]

50. Just as, in knowledge, its own form and that of the known are cognised, in the same way, in verbal cognition, the form of the object and that of the word are cognised.

Knowledge is dependent on the object because it is there to illuminate it. Though it is not meant to show its form also, still it does show it separately as another knowledge would.[1] That is how a previous knowledge, not cognised by another knowledge, becomes the object of remembrance. In the same way, the word, in so far as it is secondary to the meaning, is dependent upon it and assumes its form. It also conveys its own form, as a primary thing. Though it is present, it is not resorted to in the world, because it cannot have any relation with actions like eating. In Grammar, on the other hand, the external object is opposed to (grammatical) operations and the own form of the word appears as the meaning of a word and, therefore, there is no opposition between it and action.

[1. Knowledge becomes known in two ways, according to the Vṛtti. It can become the object of another knowledge as in the *anuvyavasāya* of the Naiyāyikas which takes a form like: *ghaṭam ahaṃ jānāmi* = I have the knowledge of the pot. But even in ordinary forms of knowledge, when an outside object is illuminated, the knowledge itself is also revealed without its becoming the object of another knowledge. That is why we can remember a previous knowledge. Only that which had become the object of a previous knowledge can be remembered.]

51. The energy (*Kratu*) called the word, existing within, as the yolk in the pea-hen's egg, has an action-like function and assumes the sequence of its parts.

The external (audible) word, employed in verbal usage, is merged in the mind after suppressing all assumption of differentiation, without, however, abandoning the residual force of the differentiation, as in the case of the yolk in the egg of the pea-hen.[1] Just as one single word can merge, so can passages consisting of as many as ten parts.[2] The word, thus merged, with all differentiation suppressed, again assumes differentiation and sequence, when, through the speaker's desire to say something, the inner word is awakened and it becomes the sentence or the word, each with its divisions. It is this merging and emerging of the word which is looked upon as its activity.

[1. *Mayūrāṇḍarasavat*—a comparison usually brought in to explain how what looks one and simple may actually contain all the potentialities of multiplicity and complexity. See K. A. Subramania Iyer—Some more Nyāyas (*JOR.*, Madras, Vol. 6, p. 342).

2. *Dāśataya.* This word occurs in the Vṛtti on verse 82 also. In both the passages, Vṛ. says that it means *Catuḥṣaṣtiḥ*. See He.'s commentary on Vāk. C. Kā, 66, where the word occurs: *Daśa avayavā yeṣām te daśatayāḥ samudāyāḥ ṛgātmānaḥ. Teṣāṃ ṣamūhasya daśatayasya catuḥśaṣṭyātmakasya* etc.]

52. Just as the unified image of an original figure is drawn on cloth (in three stages), so does one see the three stages in the case of the word also.

When a painter wishes to paint a figure having parts like that of a man, he first sees it gradually in a sequence, then as the object of a single cognition and then paints it on cloth or on a wall in a sequence. In the same way, the word in verbal usage is first perceived in a sequence, then cognised as a unity with the sequence suppressed. This partless and sequenceless mental form is superimposed, i.e., identified with the previous appearance having sequence and seeming to be separate. It again enters into verbal usage by displaying the characteristic of the sounds, namely, differentiation and sequence, produced by the movements of the articulatory organs. In the same way, the word goes again and again through three stages and does not fail to become both the illuminator and the illuminated.[1]

[1. It has been said in verse 44 that there are two kinds of words, of which one is the *nimitta* and the other, the expressive one. As to which is the *nimitta* and which the expressive one, is a question of point of view. Different points of view have been indicated in the Vṛtti on verse 44. Of the two kinds of word, one is a unity, with no differentiation and inner sequence and the other has differentiation and sequence. Either of the two can be looked upon as the *nimitta*, but only the word which is a unity and has no differentiation can be expressive.

The three stages metioned in the verse and the Vṛtti are described as follows by Vṛṣabha—*Prathamataḥ śravaṇe kramavān, tato'lpabhūtaḥ kramaḥ, tataḥ parapratipādanāya kramavān iti.*]

53. Just as the mind of the speaker first turns towards the words, in the same way, the attention of the hearers also is first directed towards them.

Just as the speaker, wishing to make an effort to utter a particular word, concentrates his mind on it, isolating it, as it were, in each case, from all the other words around it,[1] in the same way, the hearer also, knowing that the understanding of the meaning depends upon a clear grasp of the form of the word, ascertains it as associated with all its attributes.[2] This stage consisting in grasping the form of the word, is

not thought of as a separate thing because of one's habit of concentrating on the understanding of the meaning.[3] Therefore, all words capable of conveying all meaning, first attain supreme importance (*śeṣibhāvakāṣṭhām*) and then become secondary to the conveying of the meaning.

[1. *Pratiśabdaṃ paritaḥ paricchinnān śabdātmanaḥ saṃspṛśanniva* – When one wants to utter a particular word, one has to grasp its form clearly, i.e., one has to separate it, as it were, from the other words which are also lying dormant in one's mind. But the other words cannot all come up in his mind at that time. His mind does not touch them at that time (*saṃspṛś*). That is why the word *iva* is used: *saṃspṛsann iva*. At the most, the speaker would think of the other words in the sentence which he is about to utter, but not to the same extent as the word which he is actually pronouncing. In either case, the word *iva* is significant.

2. *Taṃ śabdaṃ sarvaiḥ saṃbandhibhir viśeṣaṇair āśritasaṃsargānugraham.* What the author means is: *taṃ śabdam āśritasarvasaṃbandhiviśeṣaṇasaṃsargānugraham.*

3. *Arthapratipattibhāvanābhyāsāt.* According to Vṛ. this means: on account of one's habit of understanding the meaning and acting accordingly. *Bhāvanā kriyānuṣṭhānam.*]

54. Being meant for something else, the world does not pay attention to the forms of the words which, being primary in some cases only, are ordinarily secondary to the meaning.

Just as, in an expression like 'this is a white one (*ayaṃ śuklaḥ*) where something having a quality is understood, connection of the quality with a particular action takes place only sometimes as taught elsewhere, in the same way, when the identification with the form of the word takes place as in the expression: 'this thing which is the word *gauḥ*' and when action is meant to be connected with it, its purpose is fulfilled and when, therefore, it becomes secondary to the object, people do not connect it with action as they do connect the object with it.[1]

[1. In order to show that the form of the word becomes connected with action only sometimes, the analogy of action is given. Statements

present a quality as connected with action only sometimes. There is a difference between *śuklāṃ gāṃ paśya* and *śuklāṃ gāṃ bhojaya*. The former sentence presents the quality white also as connected with the action of seeing. *śuklām* is a *viśeṣaṇa* of *gām*. But in the latter sentence, it is the object cow which is to be fed. It happens to be white, so the white cow is fed. But the quality 'white' is not connected with the action of feeding. It is only *upalakṣaṇa* and not *viśeṣaṇa*. Similarly, where actions are performed on objects conveyed by words, as usually happens in the world, the form of the word is not so connected. But a word conveys its form also and it must also have its scope for being connected with action. It is in the science of Grammar that the form of a word finds its full scope for being connected with action. Where the form is secondary to the object which it coveys, people do not connect it with action.]

55. Just as light has two powers, that of being revealed and that of being the revealer, similarly, all words have two distinct powers.

Pots and other such things are always the cognised and, therefore, at the time of their cognition, they do not bestow the slightest benefit, either on the sense or on the object, as an aid to their cognition.[1] In the same way, all the senses become the cause of the cognition of the object without themselves being cognised. Light, on the other hand, being endowed with a form opposed to that of darkness, becomes the cause of cognition, as a helper, when its own form is cognised. In the same way, the word, grasped in its form[2] which is distinct from that of other things and other words, with its special form which is fully cognised, illuminates the object to be cognised. These two powers of the words, that of being the revealer and that of being the revealed, are always identical (*ātmabhūte*) but appear to be different.

[1. *Grāhyatvenaiva*—The object is always the thing to be cognised (*grāhya*) in the process of its cognition and never the *grāhaka*. It is always the *karma*, the object, in the process of cognition. Though in Grammar, the *karma* is a Kāraka, that does not make it a *grāhaka*, it is always *grāhya*. The object which is cognised does not bring about the cognition. It does not cause the *utpatti* of the cognition, even though it is the *grāhya*.

2. *Svarūpeṇāvadhriyamāṇabhedaḥ* and *parigṛhītaviśeṣaśabdasvarūpaḥ* mean the same thing. Vṛ. points out that the former expression emphasises the distinction from other things and words while the latter stresses its character as the conveyor of the meaning.]

That being so,

56. No meaning is conveyed by words which have not themselves become the objects of knowledge. By their mere existence, even though not understood, they do not convey the meaning.

If words could, without becoming primary as the thing to be conveyed, become secondary to the conveyance of the meaning, then, they would, by the mere fact of their presence, whether cognised or not, without becoming the object of a cognition, convey their respective meanings. But they do not do so. Therefore, in the process of the words becoming secondary to the meaning, their assuming the form of the primary, is a necessary part.

57. Therefore, when the own form of the word is not understood, one asks the speaker 'what did you say?' When an object is to be revealed, the form of the senses is not similarly perceived.

People in the world, knowing that the understanding of the meaning is dependent upon the understanding of the form of the word, ask: what did you say? in order to understand the form of the words when, after the words have been uttered, their form is not grasped. The senses, on the other hand, become secondary to the understanding of the meaning, without being connected, even slightly, with the state of being primary, without their own form being cognised.[1]

[1. *Śeṣibhāvamātrāsaṃsparśenāsaṃsṛṣṭāni*. Here *mātrā* seems to have the meaning of 'slight', 'little'. Ordinarily, in the Vṛtti, it means 'a part'. The word occurs frequently in the Vṛtti and has several shades of meaning.

*Aparicchinnasvalakṣaṇāni.* Here *svalakṣaṇa* means the same thing as *svarūpa.* Ordinarily, in the philosophical literature, *svalakṣaṇa,* the particular, as used as opposed to *sāmānyalakṣaṇa,* the universal.]

58. These two abstracted powers of words, treated as different, become, without opposition, the cause of operations depending upon difference.

Just as, both in the world and in the Science of Grammar, we perform, in regard to things within which difference has been artificially made by the mind on the basis of difference in point of view (*nimitta*) all the operations which depend on real difference, in the same way, in regard to words also, when one separates by abstraction (*apoddhāra*) their powers of being revealer and revealed all the operations such as the application of names like 'designation' (*saṃjñā*) and 'designated' (*saṃjñin*) have been taught in the science of Grammar!

[1. In the world, when we say 'a gold ring', we are applying the words 'gold' and 'ring' to the same thing. When we think of the material with which it is made, we call it gold, when we think of its shape, we call it ring. This is what is called *vyapadeśivadbhāva.* On account of this difference in point of view, we san say: *suvarṇasya aṅgulīyakam,* ie. we can use the sixth case-affix (*ṣaṣṭhī*) which we ordinarily do only when there is real difference as in *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ.* The sūtra *svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasyāśabdasaṃjñā* (P. 1.1.68) tells us that, in the Science of Grammar, grammatical operations are ordinarily on the basis of this difference by artificial abstraction.]

59. Just as words like *Vṛddhi,* having conveyed their own forms enter into relation with their named, the phonemes conveyed by the contractions *āt, aic,*

*In rules like*

"*Yaṇ* comes in place of *ik* when a vowel follows"[1] where the names are different (from the named) it is not the verbal element *ik* which is the original nor the verbal element *Yaṇ*

the substitute. It is between the named having a different form conveyed by these verbal elements that the relations of original and substitute is taught in the Science of Grammar.[2] Even where the named have the same form as the names, it is clear that such a relationship is understood. Just as words like *Vṛddhi,* standing for their own form, meaningful with their meanings, wanting to convey other sounds with their form, enter into relation with *ā* etc., varied by accent, nasalisation etc., conveyed by *āt, aic* etc., in the same way (the name conveys the named) even when the difference between the two is not easily perceived.

[1. P. 6.1.77.

2. *Rūpāntarayuktānāṃ saṃjñānām.* If *ik* and *yaṇ* are names (*saṃjñā*) the sounds conveyed by them would be the named, *saṃjñin.* Therefore, one would expect in the text *saṃjñinām* and not *saṃjñānām.*]

60. In the same way, the word *agni* (in the sūtra P. 4.2.33) having first conveyed its own form *agni*, enters into the relation (of name and named) with the word *agni* (used in speech) and conveyed by the word *agni* (in the sūtra).

*In the sūtra*[1]

"The own form of a word" etc. (*svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasya*), the name and the named are separately mentioned. There, there are two words which are heard and which are meant to convey another, and the words which are to be conveyed are also two in number and they stand to each other in the relation (of name and named) and are (therefore) the object of grammatical teaching. Therefore, (the sūtra in question), makes that word agni which has as its meaning the other word agni having the same form, the name of the other word agni conveyed by it having the same form.[2]

[1. P. 1.1.68.

2. The construction of the last sentence in the *vṛtti* is rather awkward and contains repetitions. The sūtra *svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasya* etc. teaches the relation of *saṃjñā* and *saṃjñin* between a word mentioned in a sūtra of Pāṇini and the same word, having the same form, coming in actual usage. Though the *saṃjñā* and the *saṃjñin* have the same form, they are mentioned as different from each other. The sūtra in question refers to a word which may come in any sūtra of Paṇini as the *saṃjñā* and the same word, as it may come in actual usage, as the *saṃjñin*. These two are called *pratipādaka* in the Vṛtti. The word which actually comes in a sūtra (as *agni* in *agner ḍhak*) and the same word when it comes in actual usage, are called *pratīyamāna*. The sūtra in question tells us that the word which actually comes in a sūtrā is the name (*saṃjñā*) of the same word actually occurring in usage.]

61. Whatever word is uttered does not necessarily become the object of grammatical operation. Its power to bring another similar word to the mind is not taken away.

The reason for the statement which has been made will be given in the next verse. The word which conveys (*pratyāyaka*) is uttered for the sake of another and it connects that other word for which it is uttered with grammatical operations, causes them to be performed on it. When the word which is conveyed (*pratyāyya*) and exists in the mind (of the hearer) is uttered for the sake of illustration, its power to convey another similar word is not hampered. This is the nature of all words that are uttered[1]

[1. The point in this verse is that all words, when uttered, have the power to bring another similar word to the mind and the grammatical operation in question is done to the one that comes to the mind. That which is uttered is *pratyāyaka*, something which conveys another and that which is conveyed is *pratyāyya*. The latter can also be uttered in its turn and it would then convey another similar word.]

62. When a word is uttered to convey a meaning, it is secondary to the latter and, so, is not connected with action. It is, with the meanings conveyed by the words that actions are connected,

Just as words like 'bring the cow' or 'eat the curds' are secondary to the conveying of the meaning and do not become auxiliaries of the action in question, so are words secondary to other words, as there is no difference as far as dependence is concerned. From this one understands that all things which are conveyed by words, whether they are perceived by the eyes or the ears, become auxiliaries to the action.

63. When, whatever is considered as the common property between the standard and the object of comparison, itself figures in acts of comparison, some other common property, different from it, is adopted.

The standard of comparison, the object of comparison and the common property, this triad is well-established. In the sentence "the kṣattriya studies like the brāhmaṇa", the common property is mentioned in regard to the standard of comparison also. When the statement is 'the study of the kṣattriya is similar to that of the brāhmaṇa, the two students are mentioned as connected with the standard and objects of comparison and then, excellence etc., are understood as common properties of the two ways of studying, different from each other, because they exist in different substrata. Completion (*pariniṣpatti*) etc. would be understood as common properties of excellence etc. connected with study. In this way, there is no limit to the process of difference (by abstraction).[1].

[1. There are different grades in the process of comparison, we can say: (1) *Brāhmaṇavad adhīte kṣattriyaḥ* (2) *Brāhmaṇādhyayanena tulyaṁ kṣattriyādhyayanam* (3) *Brāhmaṇādhyayanasauṣṭhavena tulyaṁ kṣattriyādhyayanasauṣṭhavam.*

In No. 1, the common point is that both the brāhmaṇa and the kṣattriya study; in No. 2, the common point is that their studies have excellence; in No. 3, the common point is that their studies lead to completion. What was a common point in the previous comparison becomes the standard and the object of comparison in the succeeding one. Study, excellence and completion are really one, but are looked upon as different by abstraction.]

64. When an attribute which is the cause of degree is presented as an independent thing, degree in it can be known only through another attribute present in it.

Whatever is presented as the main thing in the form 'this' or 'that' is substance. There cannot be a greater or lesser degree of it; therefore, when degree is sought to be expressed in an object, it is done through attributes (*nimitta*) which exist in it, differentiate it, are dependent upon it, are physically attached to it and are active in bringing about degree. In the sentence: 'this is an excellent white thing (*prakṛṣṭaḥ śuklaḥ*) even though the colour white distinguishes the thing, it is also active in bringing about degree and, therefore, that thing which has that quality and would otherwise have no degree, now attains degree. In the sentence: 'the colour of this is white' where colour is presented as a substance, degree is brought about by an attribute (*nimitta*) present in the colour. The universal 'whiteness' which inheres in white is one and cannot be a cause of differentiation and so differentiation in the one having shades of difference within (*avāntarasya*) is brought about by an attribute present in the colour. Or it can be put in this way: As there is no word expressive of such attributes (in *śuklataram rūpam asya*) and as they cannot be conveyed by the abstract suffix (*bhāvapratyaya*) they are understood from the word, like whiteness itself, and are understood as the cause of degree. As long as it is sought to bring about degree in anything which is presented as the main thing, in the form 'this' or 'that', so long would there be no end to this process of abstracting some attribute or other.[1]

[1. Verse 61 makes the statement that a grammatical operation is not done on a word which is actually mentioned in a sūtra but on a similar word occurring in worldly usage. The two words are different but are looked upon as the same because of resemblance. Verse 62 gives the reason for the statement made in 61: what is mentioned is subordinate to something else and so is not subject to grammatical operations. Verses 63 and 64 give illustrations. The former tells us that what was the common point in the previous comparison becomes

the standard and the object of comparison in the succeeding one by a process of abstraction while the latter tells us that by the same process, what is presented as a guṇa in one statement can be presented as a dravya in another.

When a quality which is the cause of degree in a substance is presented independently, i.e., as a substance, it is only by another quality present in it that degree can be understood. In '*śuklatarah paṭaḥ*', *paṭa* is the substance and degree in it is expressed by *śuklatara* which denotes the quality of being whiter. But in *śuklataraṃ rūpam asya*, colour itself is presented as a substance and not as a quality of cloth. But it is presented as having degree and this degree comes through some other quality like *bhāsvaratva*, brightness present in the white. For grammarians, whatever a word presents as the main thing to be qualified is substance (*dravya*). They do not follow the Vaiśeṣika definition of *dravya* (Vai. Sū. 1.1.15.). Even what is called quality can be so presented by words in which case it will have to be qualified by some other quality. In order that a quality may bring about degree in a substance it must be: (1) *bhedahetu*, (2) *āśrita*, (3) *saṃsṛṣṭa*, (4) *prakarṣe savyāpāra*. Due to the absence of one or more of these conditions in the sentence *puruṣasya svāmī*, *puruṣa* cannot bring about degree in *svāmī*. For the same reason, *jāti* or the universal, cannot bring about degree.]

That being so, in an utterance.

65. When the word considered to be the meaning is itself uttered, it assumes a form quite different from the one (which it had as a meaning).

After having given a reason (verse 62) and examples (verses 63, 64). For establishing difference, the consideration of the topic under discussion, i.e., the form of the word, is now being concluded. Whenever the word which is the meaning is uttered for the sake of illustration, on every such occasion, another form of it, the cause or the basis of it, would be distinguished, for such is the nature of anything that is uttered. According to some, it is the same word which is repeated as the conveyor—form (*abhidhāna*) without its losing its character as the form-conveyed (*abhidheyatva*). It has been said in the *Saṅgraha*—

"The form of the word (as the conveyed) never comes under the organs of articulation (*karaṇa*) anymore than

objects like a cow (which are also conveyed by words); it is always the conveyed; when the conveyor-form comes under the organs of articulation, the conveyed which has the same form appears to be uttered, even though it does not come under the organs of articulation.[1]

[1. The point which is emphasised from verse 61 onwards is that the same word can be looked upon both as *pratyāyaka* and *pratyāyya*. The difference would then be due to an abstraction made by the mind. Ordinarily, it is outside objects which are conveyed (*pratyāyya*) by a word. Sometimes, as in Grammar, the word itself is the *pratyāyya*. The word which is *pratyāyaka* is uttered, but not the one which is *pratyāyya*. As soon as the latter is uttered for the sake of illustration, it becomes *pratyāyaka* in relation to another similar word which would then become the *pratyāyya*.]

66. Before the name becomes connected with the named, the name is connected with its own form as the meaning (the named). That is how it becomes the occasion for the use of the genitive and the nominative cases.

Even though a word may not have any other thing to be conveyed, it is not without its own form (as the conveyed). On the basis of its own form (*svarūpādhiṣṭhānam*) and after making it secondary, the word conveys some other meaning. As long as the name is not connected with the named, the latter is not its meaning and if it has no other meaning, it would not get the name of stem (*prātipadika*) and so no case-affix could be added to it. As words are expressive (*vācaka*) because of their difference (in regard to the expressed), in the present case, the meaning of the stem would not be different from the stem itself.[1]

[1. In the sūtra *Vṛddhir ād aic* (P. 1.1.1.) the word *Vṛddhi* is the name and the vowels *āt* and *aic* are the named. Even before *ādaic* was written, the word *Vṛddhi* had already got the first case-affix. It must, therefore, have been a stem (*prātipadika*). But nothing can be a stem if it has no meaning and *Vṛddhi* gets its meaning only after it is connected with *ādaic*. How then did it become *prātipadika*? The

answer is that its own form was already there as the meaning. So it became *prātīpadika* and the first case-affix was added to it.]

67. Because it has its own form as the meaning, the nominative case comes after the name. When it has an outside object as the meaning, difference comes in and is conveyed by the genitive case in the form *'asya'*.

When the form of the word is sought to be imposed on external objects, then they are meaningful with their own form which is their basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and the first case-affix is taught after them. When one says: "This is so and so", the relation (of the name) with the named is specified, its expressive power is determined. As when one says: "This *Vāhīka* is a cow" or "This lad is a lion". The cause of the addition of the sixth case-affix to the named, namely, the absence of the meaning of the stem, is brought about by the connection of the name which stands for its form with the words which are the named. It has been said—

"Since, whether in the form 'that is so and so' or in the form 'this is the name of so and so', it is with a meaningful name and not with a meaningless one that connection takes place; therefore, the relation between word and meaning is eternal."

68-69. According to some, in the sūtra—*"svam-rūpam"* etc., the particular form of the word (*vyakti*) is taught as the name (*saṃjñā*) of the form in general (*jāti*). The general form as existing in a particular one undergoes grammatical operations.

Others, on the other hand, look, upon the particular form to be understood as the named in this sūtra; in particular places, the particular form conveyed by

the general form, comes up (for grammatical operations).

(While explaining the sūtra *svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasya* etc., P. 1.1.68.) some commentators say:—"the own form of a word is the expressor, the illuminator, the conveyor of the word," while others say—'the own form of a word is the expressed, the illuminated, the conveyed.' These two views have been set forth by these two verses. In regard to the universal, there are two views current among thinkers.[1] Some maintain that the individuals have their special forms. The form of the individuals is not something unknowable, unnameable and non-existent. It is the individual cow which is the cow and not cowness. It is the individual blue which is the blue and not the universal blue. The universal is the cause of the uniformity of cognition. It is the same thing in regard to the different individuals in which there is no inherence (of the universals). It is this (uniform cognition) which is the cause of the inference of the existence of the universal.

Others, however, are of the opinion: words attain their form in regard to the universal as identical with the otherwise inexpressible individual. Everywhere, from a thing in which the cause (*nimitta*) exists, a cognition corresponding to that cause arises. In such cases, those causes which have their own expressive words and those which have not,[2] bring about the same cognition and the application of the same word, on the basis of a partial or complete resemblance. That being so, in the sūtra in question, the words 'own form' (*svaṃ rūpaṃ*) stand, according to some, for the universal (*jāti*) and in the expression 'of the word' (*śabdasya*) 'word' stands for the individual. According to others, it is just the opposite. Either the individual is the name of the universal or the universal is the name of the individual. This universal, (of the word) uttered in the different contexts, conveys the individual as connected with the relevant action (i.e. grammatical operation). The universal is never uttered as unconnected with the individual. Nor is the individual ever

brought into use unconnected with the universal. The speakers' intention differs according to his purpose. One of the two is the main thing and the other comes inevitably with it. That it is the universal on which the action is to be done according to the Science of Grammar or that it is the individual that is so is only a difference in the statement (in particular cases).

In regard to the sūtra *svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasya* (P. 1.1.68.) the tradition of the circles of Grammarians is very varied. It may be stated as follows—The mere form which is a part of that meaningful combination of form and meaning, possessed of the powers of the universal, particular etc. and referred to as the word (*śabdasya*) is the name. Or the meaningful combination including the form, characterised by the powers inherent in it, is the name. The fact is that what is called the word is a combination of parts. Form etc. are its parts. One does speak of a whole and its parts as different from each other as when we say 'the branch of a tree'.

Another declares: Even though an object remains the same, the meaning of the word (which refers to it) varies. A word makes a choice between the different powers relating to the same object.[3] For example, in the expression 'this stick' the pronoun presents the object as something existing before one's eyes, not as something having the universal 'stickness' even though that is also perceived. The pronoun cannot express the connection with the universal stickness. The power of the word 'stick' which expresses a particular universal is debarred, even though it is visible, from presenting it as present before the eyes. In the same way, in the expression 'the own form' (*svaṃ rūpaṃ*), the words '*agni*' etc., even though they have the universal in them, are presented as the words *agni* etc, not as universals of the words. By word in 'of the word', what is conveyed is the connection with the universal (of the word *agni*) and not its aspect as being the word *agni*. All this is just an illustration of the principle that a word, in one of its aspects, considered as a name, can convey the same word in another of its aspects as the named:[4] All the different views relating to the sūtra *svaṃ rūpaṃ* etc,

have not been set forth in order to avoid prolixity resulting from one thing leading to another.

[1. So far, the sūtra *svaṃ rūpaṃ* was explained on the basis of the view that the own form of a word that may occur in a sūtra is the name and the external object which it denotes is the named. The present two verses set forth two other views in regard to the name and the named. They are—(1) that the individual aspect of a word is the name (*saṃjñā*) and its universal aspect, the named (*saṃjñin*), (2) that it is vice-versa. As this involves the concept of the universals, the author refers to two views in regard to universals current among thinkers of his day. The first view is that the existence of the universal is inferred from our uniformity of cognition in regard to the individuals. The individuals themselves can be perceived and spoken about without the universal existing in them being directly perceived. There are other distinguishing features in the individuals which enable us to perceive them without the help of the universal. That there is uniformity in our cognition of the individuals does not mean that we cognise directly the universal existing in them. We only infer its existence on the basis of the uniformity of cognition. The second view is that words primarily convey the universal. They convey the individual also as identical with the universal and, therefore, nameable. The universal existing in the individual is what enables us to cognise the individual as such: it is the 'nimitta' and our cognition of the individual takes the form of this nimitta according to the principle: *sarvatraiva hi nimittānnimittavatyarthe nimitta—svarūpaḥ pratyaya utpadyate.* It is this *nimitta* which causes uniformity of cognition in regard to the individuals and the application of the same word to them.

2. *Dṛṣṭābhidhānāni adṛṣṭābhidhānāni ca nimittāni. Nimitta* is of two kinds: *kāraka* and *jñāpaka.* It is the latter which is subdivided into *dṛṣṭābhidhāna* and *adṛṣṭābhidhāna. Gōtva* is a *jñāpakanimitta* which exists in the cow. It is *dṛṣtābhidhāna,* because it has a recognised word to express it. When we see different individuals having *gotva* in them, we see the same *gotva* (*jāti*) in all of them, our cognition (*pratyaya*) of all of them is uniform and we apply the same word to all of them. As Vṛ. puts it, three things persist. *Dṛṣṭabhidhāneṣu trayam anuvartate jātiḥ śabdaḥ pratyaya iti. utpalagandha* is given as an example of *adṛṣṭābhidhāna,* because the word does not denote any universal, but only two things connected by a relation. In this case, therefore, only two things persist: the word and the cognition. As though not satisfied with this example, Vṛ. gives that of *rājapuruṣa.*

3. *Śabdo hyekavastuviṣayāṇāmapi śaktīnām avacchedenopagrahe vartate.* Any given thing has many aspects. Words have the power

to convey them. But a given word, on a given occasion, conveys one of them to the exclusion of others. In *ayaṃ daṇḍaḥ* = this stick, *ayam* conveys the aspect of the stick being present before the eyes to the exclusion of the universal which is also present in the stick.

4. *Tatra śabdāntarārthaḥ śabdāntarārthasya prasiddhabhedaṣya saṃjñātvenopādīyamānasya saṃjñibhāvaṃ pratipadyate.* What is meant is that *śabdavyakti* is *saṃjñā* and *śabdajāti* is *saṃjñin*. To refer to both of them as *śabdāntarārthaḥ* is using rather peculiar language, a general characteristic of the Vṛtti. It seems to be a bahuvrīhi compound the analysis of which would be: *śabdāntaram (vyaktirūpaṃ) jātirūpaṃ vā artho yasya sa śabdaḥ śabdāntarārthaḥ.*]

70. Some consider the word to be one whether it is accepted as transitory or eternal; others consider it as many, whether it is accepted as transitory or eternal.

According to those who believe that the word is one, there cannot be this distinction between the universal and the individuals (because that presupposes difference between the individuals); that is why this new point (the unity or the plurality of the word) has been taken up after expounding the point about the universal. According to the view that the word is eternal, its unity is the main doctrine. According to the view that the word is an effect (and so not eternal), the invariable cognition of sameness which arises when a phoneme or a word, once uttered, is uttered again, leads to the postulation that it is one. It is on the basis of the view that it is one that it has been said in the Vārttika—

"That is already settled, because the phoneme '*a*' is one".[1] It is between the cognitions of the same phoneme that there is an interval of time or of other phonemes and not that the phoneme itself is different. That one hears the same word at different places is like the cognition of Being (*sattā*) or the universal at different places or the form (of moon etc.) in water etc. Even according to the view that the word is different and that it is an effect, one must necessarily accept a kind of secondary one-ness when a word is uttered again and again. Whether the word be eternal or an effect, those

who are for plurality believe that a word having many meanings and phonemes found in different words is not at all the same unit.[2]

[1. Vā 5 on the sūtra *'a-i-uṇ'* (M. Bhā. I, p. 16).

2. In regard to the word, there are the three following pairs of alternative views held by different thinkers: (1) that it stands for the universal or for the individual, (2) that it remains the same even when it has another meaning or that it is a different word for every new meaning (3) that it is eternal or that it is an effect. These pairs of views are related to one another. The concept of the word as a universal presupposes the existence of individual words in each of which the universal inheres. So, according to the view that the word is one under all circumstances, the concept of universal and particular cannot arise. There is a very close connection between the view that the word is eternal and that it is one. This is the primary concept of unity. But some kind of unity has to be postulated even according to the view that there are as many words as there are circumstances of its use because, in all these circumstances, we do recognise the word to be the same. This is the secondary kind of unity. Grammarians accept eternality, unity and both the concepts of the universal and the individual.

71. Even when the words where they occur are different, the identity of the phonemes is not affected. Similarly, a word occurring in different sentences is one and the same.

In the different words *aśva, arka, artha,* it is the same phoneme *a* that is used in the world; it is perceived after an interval of time or after the intervention of other phonemes[1] or not perceived at all when the causes of manifestation (*nimitta*) are absent; it appears to be different when the different speakers are at different places and, hence, the manifesting agents (*nimitta*) are different, just as the reflection of the same thing in a shadow or mirror or water. Similarly, a word abstracted from sentences and having different meanings like the word *go* or *akṣi* is really the same word as long as the form is the same.[2] Even though as expressive of two different meanings, a word may be a noun or a verb, still it is looked upon as the same word.

[1. Vā 11 and 12 on the sūtra '*a-i-uṇ*' (M. Bhā., p. 18.)

2. Vṛ. points out that the word *akṣi*, when taken as a verb can be derived from the root *akṣ* or *as* or *ad*. He derives *aśva* as a verb from the root *śvi*. Of course, ordinarily, these words are nouns.]

72. There is no word over and above the phonemes nor is there any sentence over and above the phonemes and words.

The phonemes which are produced in a sequence, which perish as soon as they are uttered, which do not exist at the sametime and have themselves parts, cannot produce the word as distinct (from themselves); therefore, the word is nothing more than the phonemes. As the phonemes have parts and as that process of division can be continued to the point of impracticability (*ā vyavahāravicchedāt*) there resluts something which is the fourth of the fourth, unnameable and beyond practicability (*vyavahārātīta*) but no phoneme or word. And if there is no phoneme or word, there cannot be a sentence as distinct from them. That is why it has been said:

"All this would result in non-eternality,".[1]

As there cannot be a collection (of phonemes or of words) there would be no unit associated with a definite meaning (*upagṛhītārthaḥ*) nor any form fully delimited. (*upagṛhītaḥ*).[2]

[1. Cf. M. Bhā. on Vā. 12 on the sūtra *a-i-uṇ* (M. Bhā. I., p. 18.)

2. It was said in the previous verse that a phoneme occurring in different words is the same phoneme and that a word occurring in different sentences is the same word. This means that there is no sentence over and above the phonemes and words. The phonemes cannot produce the word because they do not co-exist. Secondly, they themselves can be thought of as having parts and if one goes on dividing these parts, one comes to something which is infinitesimal and unnameable, the fourth of a fourth (*turīyaturīya*) as it has been called to show that it is something very minute. Such minute parts cannot produce the phoneme and so the phonemes cannot produce the word. If the phonemes and the words cannot be produced, the sen-

tence, as something over and above them, does not exist, nor can it be produced by them. It would be something eternal and indivisible. It would also be impossible to conceive of words having fully delimited forms or well-defined meanings.]

Another has said—

73. There are no phonemes in the word nor are there parts in the phoneme. There is no absolute difference of the words from the sentence.

As the effort relating to the whole as a collection of phonemes is different and, therefore, the sounds uttered to suggest the word are also different, there takes place, from the different cognitions having the appearance of the cognitions of the real phonemes, a perception of the word caused by means of the perception of parts in the form of phonemes. But it is really without sequence, without before and after, one, eternal, indivisible and it appears as a unit produced by smaller elements, the phonemes. But the further divisions of the phonemes like *a*, indescribable, beyond usage, considered different, are really fictitious. Therefore, their clearly intelligible unity is well-known in the usage of the Science of Grammar. As it is the sentence, whether consisting of one word or of many words, which is used to express the meaning, there arises a perception of the word as means to the perception of the sentence. In regard to the sentence, there arise cognitions having sequence and having the form of phonemes and words, but they are not identified with the sentence. Therefore, phonemes and words have no separate existence from the sentence so defined, unbreakable, indivisible.

74. The practice (of the Grammarians) has been based on these different views. What the main view is to some is, to others, the reverse.

In regard to the supreme, sequenceless, inner principle of the word, scholars, on the basis of different traditions re-

garding every topic (*pratyadhikaraṇam*) have resorted to different doctrines in following the usage of the Science of Grammar. It is as follows—If the audible form is the same, it is the same word, even when the meaning varies; if the meaning varies, even when the audible form is the same, it is a different word. For some, the difference is secondary and one-ness is primary. For others, difference is primary and one-ness is a matter of usage. It has been said—

"The same word has many meanings—For example, *akṣāḥ, pādāḥ, māṣāsḥ*."[1]

Similarly, after having said—

"The word 'village' (*grāma*) has many meanings."[2]
he (the Bhāṣyakāra) concludes specifically by saying—
"That word 'village' is taken which stands for the whole, including forests, boundaries and pasture-land."[3]

[1. M. Bhā on Vā. 9 on P. 1.2.45. (M. Bhā. I, p. 220).
.. *Akṣa* means, among other things, (1) an axle, axis (2) a gambling die (3) an organ of sense; *pāda* means (1) foot, (2) a quarter, (3) a weight; *māṣa* means (1) black gram, (2) a weight, (3) a spot on the skin.

2. M. Bhā. I, p. 59, l. 20.

3. M. Bhā. I, p. 59, l. 23.]

75. Of the *sphoṭa* which has no temporal distinction and which appears to follow the duration of the sounds, distinctions in duration (*vṛtti*) have been declared on the basis of distinctions in the manifesting sounds.

As the principle word-self is eternal, the function of the measure called 'time' does not affect in the slightest degree the duration of *sphoṭa*. Inasmuch as the form of the *sphoṭa* is perceived as mixed up with the sounds, therefore, the duration of the sounds appears to be that of the perception of *sphoṭa*. Through the limiting factor of such a perception of *sphoṭa*, involving difference in time, divisions in the form of quick, medium and slow speeds, each faster than the fol-

lowing one by one third,[1] are associated with the *sphoṭa* (though they belong to the sounds).

[1. *Tribhāgotkarṣeṇa.* It is not clear whether this means 'greater by one third' or 'multiplied by three'.]

If that is so, in the case of the short, long and protracted vowels also, it is the sound which would be the cause of the difference in time. Therefore, just as the long and the protracted vowels would be called by the same name, the sūtra—"A vowel followed by the symbolic letter *t* stands for one of that duration only"[1] would be applicable to them. Similarly, in the case of the different speeds also, it would apply and there would also be the objection contained in the following—

"If the symbolic letter *t* is added after the quick one, it should be added after the medium and the slow ones also, because of difference in time."[2] To this, the following answer is given—

76. According to the view that the word is eternal, the short, the long and the protracted being different in nature, distinctions in time belonging to the primary sound are attributed to the *sphoṭa.*

The sound is of two kinds: primary and secondary. The primary one is that without which the form of the *sphoṭa,* being unmanifested, would remain unperceived. And the secondary one is that by means of which the form of the *sphoṭa* is perceived again and again without interruption. The author of the Saṅgraha says, indeed, as follows—

"The primary sound is the cause of the perception of the word (*sphoṭa*); the secondary one becomes the cause of the difference in the continuity of perception (*sthitibheda*),"

In the same way, out of the sentences uttered by Garga and others, of equal length because of equal number of parts some, on account of their special arrangement (*sanniveśaviśeṣa*) are perceived after a large number of repetitions while others are grasped after a lesser number of repetitions. Similarly,

the short vowel, by its special nature, is perceived by a sound of lesser duration. With so much of manifesting cause, a knowledge which grasps its form is engendered. The long vowel, on the other hand, is manifested by a sound of longer duration. The protracted vowel is perceived by a sound of still longer duration. Because of the non-perception of difference, the duration of the primary sound is attributed to the *sphoṭa* and is looked upon, by courtesy, as the duration of the *sphoṭa* in the Science of Grammar.

[1. P. 1.1.70.

2. Vā 4 on P. 1.1.70.]

77. After the manifestation of the *sphoṭa,* the secondary sounds cause difference in speed of utterance, but the essence of the *sphoṭa* is not affected by them.

Just as light, as soon as it appears, becomes the cause of the perception of a jar etc. and if it continues, becomes the cause of the continued perception of it, in the same way, the sound which continues after the manifestation of the word, causes the continuance of the cognition of the word by adding strength to the manifestation. Therefore, though associated with the secondary sound, the difference of which is clearly perceived,[1] no identity is superimposed on the *sphoṭa* which, therefore, does not cause any usage of difference of time in the Science of Grammar as in the case of short etc.

[1. *upalakṣitavyatirekeṇa vaikṛtena dhvaninā.* Vṛ points out that the primary sound causes the manifestation of the *sphoṭa* and so it has to be produced before the manifestation whereas the secondary sound is produced after the manifestation and so its difference from the *sphoṭa* is clearly perceived by the hearer. There does not, therefore, take place the false attribution of its properties to the *sphoṭa*. The two are clearly distinguished. As the manifestation of the *sphoṭa* itself depends upon the primary sound which has to be produced before, its properties are falsely attributed to it.]

How does the sound become a factor in the cognition of the word?

78. Those who hold that the word is manifested by the sounds conceive of it in three ways—that a certain fitness is brought about in the sense of hearing, that a fitness is produced in the word itself or that a fitness results in both.

In this verse, only the process of the manifestation of the word is stated. Giving illustrations is the topic of the next two verses.

In this matter, some think that the sound, when produced, perfects the sense of hearing and the sense of hearing, thus perfected, becomes the means of the perception of the word.[1] Other upholders of manifestation are of the view that the word, perfected by contact with the sound, becomes the object of the sense of hearing. According to others, the sound brings benefit both to the word and to the sense of hearing. The sense and the object, favoured by a helping factor, cause the perception of the word. Like the benefit conferred by the light of the lamp in regard to things perceived by the sense of vision, (here also) the powers of the causal factors, merely because they require a helping factor, do not go beyond the totality of the causal factors.[2]

[1. Vṛṣabha understands the perfection of the sense of hearing itself in three ways: (1) the sounds impart to the sense of hearing the power of grasping the word which was not there before. (2) the sounds only awaken the power which was already there (3) what is called perfection of the sense means the presence of the sounds in the sense of hearing, favourable to its grasping the word.

2. What is meant here is that the function of the sounds, whether it be the perfection of the sense of hearing or of the word, does not go beyond the totality of the causal factors, but is part of them, just as the light of the lamp is part of the causal factors in the perception of visual objects.

The Vṛtti here may be compared with the following passage:—

*Sa ca nādaḥ śrotrasyānugrahe varttate. Tadanugṛhītaṃ śrotraṃ śabdopalabdhau samarthaṃ bhavati, yathā akṣṇo rañjanam ityeke. Apare śabdasyaiva, yathā prokṣaṇam pṛthivyā eva, na ghrāṇasya. Ubhayor ityapare, yathā vaśyendriyasya prathamataścakṣūraśmīn ghaṭam cānugṛhṇāti.*

(Bhartṛhari's commentary on the Mahābhāṣya, p. 20 (A.B.O.R.I, XLIII).

79. By concentration and by the application of ointment, it is only the visual sense which is perfected. The perfection of the object is for the perception of the smell in it.

Concentration, whether natural or extraordinary, does not bring about any special feature in the essense of the object to be seen. Similarly, substances like ointment perfect the sense of vision and not the external object. Even extraordinary concentration confers benefit on the sense of vision only in the perception of things subtle, hidden and distant. If it conferred a benefit on the object, others also would perceive it, as there would be no difference. Perfection of the object, ie. of oil etc.[1] by sunshine and of the earth etc. by the sprinkling of water, can be seen at the time of the cognition of their smell, but not perception of the sense of smell. If it is the sense of smell which is perfected, there would be no difference as far as the cognition of the smell is concerned, whether the objects be perfected or not, because there would be no difference (in the objects).

[1. *Tailādīnām,* Vṛ explains: *Gandhatailādīnām* = of medicated oil etc.]

80. According to the view that the visual sense reaches out to the object, it is held that both the object and the sense are perfected by light. Such is the process in the case of the (manifesting) sounds.

One who is situated in the dark perceives an object like the jar, illuminated by light. According to those who believe that the sense of vision does not reach out to the object, it is the object which is mostly perfected. If the sense of vision reaches out, the rays of the eye are aided by light which is of the same kind.[1]

[1. There were several views about the sense of vision. Some held that it is nothing more than the physical eye-ball and, therefore, not of the nature of light. Others held that it consists of the eye-ball which, however, is of the nature of light. The Naiyāyikas held that it consists of visual light rays and, therefore, it is *taijasa*. Even here, there were two views: Some held that it does not reach out to the object before perceiving it, that it is *aprāpyakāri*. Others, however, held that it reaches out to the object (*prāpyakāri*) Vṛ describes the process as follows:—The sense of vision which consists of light rays goes out of the eye to the object and, on the way, mixes with the all-pervasive light atoms and engenders a beam of light very wide at the further end (*pṛthvagram*). This beam, on reaching the lighted spot where the object is, mixes with the external light, both being of the same kind. This is what is meant by the perfection of the sense of vision. The fact that the object is illuminated by the external light is its perfection. Thus there takes place perfection of both, according to this view.]

81. According to some, the sound is cognised as identical with the word (*sphoṭa*); others think that the sound is not perceived at all, which others still think that it is perceived as a separate entity.

Those who believe that the word is manifested hold three different views on the subject. The sound which is closely bound up with the word is perceived as one with it, as the colour of the associated object is perceived as one with the crystal. According to others, just as the senses, and their qualities, being themselves unperceived,[1] become the cause of the cognition of the object, in the same way, the sound, its own form remaining unperceived, becomes the cause of the cognition of the word. Others still say: from a distance, even if the form of the word is not perceived, the bare sound is perceived. Others explain that it (the perception of the sound) is similar to that of the word. It is like this: it is seen that in deserts, small things appear to be big. Moon and other objects are perceived as small, trees etc. are vaguely perceived but not that they have bark and holes on them or that they belong to particular species like *Dhava* or *Khadira*.

[1. The Sāṅkhyas consider the senses to be products of *Ahaṅkāra*, but the illustration here is based on the view that the senses are products of the elements. Even if they are products of the combined elements (*pañcīkṛta*), one of the elements is predominant in the combination. The predominant element with its special quality, is itself not perceived when it becomes the cause of the perception of the same quality in the external products. The sense of smell has smell as its quality but that is not perceived when it helps us to perceive the smell of other objects.]

82. Just as a Vedic passage (*anuvāka*) or a verse is well-fixed in the mind[1] after the (last) repetition and is not fully grasped in each repetition,

The sounds relating to the phonemes, words and sentence, produced by special efforts, manifest the *sphoṭa* of the phonemes, words and sentence and superimpose them on the cognitions. If the ultimate parts of the phonemes[2] are perceived gradually, could be no collection of them and the final cognition would be devoid of an object. This point has been discussed in many ways in the commentary[3] on the Bhāṣya on the sūtra which defines connected text (*saṃhitā*). Even when the form of the whole word is manifested, as long as it has no definite form and special features, it is as good as unperceived and no usage can be made of it.

[1. *Soḍhatvam*. This is an unusual word. Vṛ. explains it as becoming the objects of one act of remembrance: *smṛtibuddher ekasyā viṣayabhāvam*. It amounts to becoming well fixed in the mind.

2. *Kramena tu varṇaturīyagrahaṇe*. What is pointed out here is that if it is held that the parts of a *sphoṭa* are gradually manifested, it cannot be manifested at all. Each sound manifests the whole of the *sphoṭa*. Thus it is manifested again and again.

3. *Saṃhitāsūtrabhāṣyavivaraṇe*. The sūtra is P. 1.4.109. The *Vivaraṇa* is obviously a commentary on the Bhāṣya on this sūtra, written probably by Bhartṛhari himself. See p. 9 of Pt. Charu Deva Shastri's Sanskrit Introduction to his edition of Vākyapadīya, Kaṇḍa I.]

83. In the same way, through the previous cognitions, unnameable, but favourable to the final clear

cognition, the form of the word, manifested by the last sound, is perceived.

The many cognitions, produced by the sounds in the course of the manifestation of the word, being conducive to the clear perception of the form of the word, inexpressible and in the nature of means, become the cause of the perception of the word.

The following is the process by which the form of the word is clearly perceived:

84. The word is grasped in the (final) cognition the seeds of which have been sown by the sounds including the final one and which has gradually attained maturity.[1]

The sounds, while they manifest the word, leave impression-seeds[2] progressively clearer and conducive to the clear perception (of the word). Then, the final sound brings to the mind which has now attained maturity or a certain fitness by the awakening of the impressions of the previous cognitions, the form of the word as coloured by itself.[3]

[1. Verses 82, 83 and 84 are quoted in the Sphoṭasiddhi (p. 132), (Madras University Sanskrit Series 6).

2. *Vyaktaparicchedānuguṇasaṃskārabhāvanābījāni. Saṃskāra, bhāvanā* and *bīja* denote the same thing. They stand, according to Vṛ., for three aspects of the same thing. The previous somewhat vague cognitions of the *sphoṭa* leave their impressions in the mind. Vṛ. says that they are called *saṃskāras* because, they, in a way, perfect the mind; they are called *bhāvanā* because they give them the form of consciousness (*bhāvayanti*) and, finally, they are called seeds (*bījāni*) because they are the causes of the later clear cognition.

3. *Upagraheṇa.* Vr. explains this by '*svīkāreṇa*'. This is probably a reference to the fact that the sound colours the *sphoṭa* with its own form.]

85. When one perceives those non-existing elements in the middle as existing, it is due to the incapacity of the perceiver, they are only a means to the cognition of the real word.

When the indivisible, sequenceless and unbreakable phoneme, word or sentence is manifested by the sounds, cognitions appearing to perceive parts of the phoneme and relating to its parts occur in regard to the phoneme; cognitions appearing to perceive phonemes as parts of the word occur in regard to the word and cognitions appearing to perceive words as parts of sentences occur in regard to the sentence. Due to these cognitions, hearers think that these non-existing parts actually exist. It is only the incapacity of the hearers who can only perceive the word as shown by others.[1] Indeed their perception of the word can take place only through such means, such sequence and such phonemes (which appear as parts of something which is partless. (Others, on the other hand) perceive and cause others to perceive the sequenceless word, even a *dāśatāya*,[2] through other means.[3]

[1. *Parapradarśitā.* What is emphasised here is that ordinary persons can perceive the word (*sphoṭā*) only through the sounds and as possessing the attributes of sounds. The next sentence makes this point clear.

2. *Dāśatāyā.* The word occurs also in the Vṛtti on I. 51. There, as here, Vṛṣabha explains it as *catuḥṣaṣtiḥ* = sixty-four.

3. Upāyāntareṇa Vṛṣabha explains it is *ārṣeṇa jñānena.*]

86. The appearance of diversity in knowledge and the Word is surely an illusion. The word is coloured by sequence and knowledge is coloured by the known.

Even though knowledge is undifferentiated and formless, it appears to be differentiated because it takes on the form of all the things which are to be known, as when one says five trees, twenty cows. The inner word in which all the

seeds are merged, appears, at the time of its manifestation, to follow the differentiation and sequence of the manifesting sounds. Therefore, the indivisible word-principle, called Word-Mind, being affected by the appearance of difference belonging to something else, is understood differently from what it is. It has been said:—

"Knowledge, without the thing to be known, does not enter into usage. And nothing can be expressed through the word which has not assumed sequence."

87. Just as the cognition of the earlier (lower) numbers is the means for the understanding of the number in question, though they are different from one another, in the same way, the understanding of the other verbal elements is the means for the understanding of the sentence.

Just as one who wants to cognise the number hundred or thousand which differentiate their substrata, understands as means thereof the numbers one etc. having different effects as parts of the numbers hundred etc.[1] in the same way, the cognitions of the different words *Devadatta* etc. is the means for the perception of the form of the sentence. Hence their acceptance is inevitable.

[1. The illustration of the cognition of numbers is based on the Vaiśeṣika conception. The Vaiśeṣikas believe that from duality onwards up to the highest number *parārdha*, all numbers are produced by *apekṣābuddhi*, ie. the notion that relates to many unities before the next number is produced. When two things are brought before us, we cognise each one separately as 'this is one and that is one'. This is *apekṣābuddhi*. Then arises the notion of two. This is true of all the subsequent numbers. Thus the previous numbers become the means for the production and cognition of the later numbers.]

88. Even though the sounds manifesting the phonemes, words and sentences are entirely different from one another, their powers appear confused.

Separate efforts are made in regard to the phoneme, word and the sentence and the air set in motion by them strikes against the places of articulation. Even though the sounds thus perfected by contact with the different places of articulation are different from one another, the difference between these manifesting agents is difficult to grasp as in the case of the manifesting substratum of the universals of the cow and the gayal or as in the case of the substratum of the actions of turning and pouring. Even though the manifesting powers have separate effects, their essence, possessing some common features, is confused due to some special effect. Hence there is the comprehension of parts in the partless phonemes, of divisions in the form of phonemes in the word and of divisions in the form of words in the sentence!

[1. The Vṛtti explains why the partless phoneme, word and sentence appears to have parts. The sounds which manifest the phoneme '*g*' are different from those which manifest the word '*gauḥ*' and the latter are different from those which manifest the sentence '*gāmabhyāja*.' But they are identified with one another because of their apparent resemblance. They differ from one another in their cause as well as in their effect. So their powers are different. They suggest such different things as phoneme, word and sentence. This is difference in the effect. They are produced by different efforts, such as the effort to manifest the phoneme, the effort to manifest the word and the effort to manifest the sentence. This is difference in the cause. Difference in the effort causes difference in the air which strikes at the different places of articulation. Though these manifesting sounds are different from one another, the difference is not noticed, because, on the basis of imagined resemblance, they are identified with one another. The sounds manifesting 'g' are identified with those manifesting '*g*' in *gauḥ* and these latter with those manifesting '*g*' in the sentence '*gāmabhyāja*'. So the word which is indivisible appears to have parts '*g*' etc. and the sentence which is partless appears to have parts '*gām*' etc. This is what is meant by '*saṅkīrṇa iva śaktayaḥ*', the powers seem to be confused. The appearance of parts in the partless is the result of this confusion. If, for the manifestation of two indivisible words, one has to make similar movements of the vocal organs, the phonemes produced by these movements, appear to be parts of both of these indivisible words.]

89. Just as, from a distance or in the dark, after having mistaken an object in the previous cognitions, one sees it correctly,

It is in accordance with the properties of objects and the senses that people of ordinary vision, perceiving from a distance, only the general shape, mistake trees etc. for elephants etc. Staying in the same place, by steady concentration, gradually, they perceive their special features. Entering suddenly dimly lighted rooms from a well-lighted place and after having mistaken rope etc. for snake etc. they, once their eyesight has become normal, through steady concentration, perceive them as they are.[1]

[1. Cf. Sphoṭāsiddhi, verse 19 and the commentary thereon. It is an echo of this verse and the Vṛtti thereon. This and the following verse are actually quoted there (p. 143.)]

90. In the same way, when the sentence is being manifested by the sounds which are the causes of its manifestation, there is at first a cognition in which parts figure.

Even though the sentence is indivisible, the sounds produced by the efforts intended to manifest it, cause a knowledge consisting of the cognition of parts appearing as phonemes and words, because of resemblance in their powers which, in reality, are different.

91. Just as there is a definite sequence in the transformation of milk or of the seed in the same way, there is a definite sequence in which the cognitions of perceivers take place in regard to the word (sentence).

Just as, according to the creation theory or the manifestation theory, milk, prompted by its transformation clarified butter etc., passes through definite stages like curds, having or not having their special names, preserves, as far as possible, the presence of the properties of the original material and, without violating the fixed sequence of the stages, shows the transformation which prompted it; or rice-seed, prompted by its transformation, the rice-grains, passes through the inevitable stages like stalk, sprout etc. and appears as its main

transformation which prompted it, in the same way, the cognitions of ordinary hearers, prompted by the main result, the understanding of the meaning of the sentence, preceded by the grasping of the form of the sentence, show, when the effect having its fixed means has to be brought about, appearances of parts having fixed sequence and proceed to perceive the *sphoṭas* (the words)[1].

[1. The use of the expressions *prayuktam, prayojikām, prayojakena* and *prayuktānām* is based on the idea, a figurative one, that the effect prompts its own cause to act in such a manner that the effect is produced. Vṛ. puts it in this way: *Pradhānaṃ Kāryasyātmalābhāya Kāraṇāni prayuṅkte* = Primordial matter sets in motion the causes in order that the effect may come to be. The activity of Primordial Matter is attributed to the effect itself. This verse is quoted in Sphoṭa-siddhi, p. 159.]

92. Even if the words are accepted as having parts, the difference in parts is due to the sequence of sounds. And if they are partless, the appearance of parts (due to the sequence of sounds) is the means for their cognition.

According to those upholders of division who are of the opinion that the word *'gauḥ'* is nothing more than the phonemes *g-au-ḥ*, that there is no indivisible word-essence beyond them to be cognised through the cognition of the phonemes and who accept the eternality of the words, when the unnameable minute parts in the form of phonemes are gradually manifested, the form of the word would not be cognised and the final clear cognition of the form would have no object to be cognised. If it is held that all the parts are manifested at the same time, there would be no difference between *vega* and *gave* or *tena* and *nate* as far as the audible side is concerned. If they are looked upon as two divisible words with two different meanings, this difficulty would not arise. According to that view also, their perception as two different words would be due to the difference of sequence of

the manifesting sounds. It is seen that ropes etc., illuminated by a lamp fed with the fat of frogs etc., appear like snakes etc.

How, according to the view that the words are indivisible, the cognitions embracing different powers resulting from the postulation of divisions become the means (of cognising the word) has been explained in the immediately preceding verses.[1]

[1. Three views in regard to the word are referred to in this verse. From *'Ye'pi* to *'nate iti ca'*, the view discussed is that the phonemes themselves constitute the word and that there is no word beyond them. From *'tatra śabdāntāre'* to *'sarpādipratipattibhedaḥ'*, the view mentioned is that the word is eternal and so are its parts. From *'nirbhāgeṣu'* till the end, the view is that the word is indivisible.]

93. Some have declared the universal manifested by the individuals to be the *sphoṭa* and what are called sounds (*dhvanis*) to be the individuals.

Some, proclaiming the eternality of the word because of the eternality of the universals, declare that in statements such as the following

"On both sides, it is only the *sphoṭa* which is shown: in place of the phoneme 'r' comes the phoneme 'l'."[1]

It is the universal of the word which is called the *sphoṭa*, it is different from the universal called 'word-ness' and its fitness to be perceived is brought about gradually by its substrata which are produced in a sequence and do not co-co-exist. The individual sounds which are produced and which make the unnameable *sphoṭa* nameable get the name of sound (*dhvani*).[2]

[1. M. Bhā I. p. 26, l. 1.

2. Before, in verse 69, it was declared that the universal is the name and that the individual is the named. Here, the view that the universal is the *sphoṭá* is set forth.]

94. The sound, modified by its causes, becomes the cause of the cognition of the changeless word, just as the light from a lamp (becomes the cause of the perception of an object).

Others, on the other hand, on account of difference from the process which results in the use of the terms universal and particular, assert that there is only one word which is external, not subject to any change through the sounds modified by their own causes and not residing in the sounds. It is manifested as is done by the light of a lamp when there is no vagueness in the object, with the colouring of the changes in the manifesting sound, as though it has received a new form.[1]

[1. Another view of *sphoṭā* is referred to here. It is not clear who held this view. Vṛ. gives the following quotation expressing this view: *Tasmin nityāṁ śabdaśaktiṁ pratijānate* = they assert that there is one eternal word-power in it (the ether). The main idea here is that the sounds, which differ from one another because of difference in the articulatory movements, cause the cognition of the one changeless word without effecting any change in it, just as the light from a lamp reveals the object without effecting any change in it. This process is said to be different from the one relating to the universal and the individual in wholes like a jar: *ākṛtivyaktivyavahāravaidharmyāt*. The parts of a jar are the substrata of the whole, namely, the jar. The jar itself, which is the individual, is the cause of the cognition of the universal in it and of the application of the word 'jar' to it. This is not the relation between the sounds and the word, because the sounds cannot co-exist. As Vṛ. puts it: *Yaugapadyābhāvāc chabdabhāgānām*.]

95. Manifestation is not necessasily confined to that which is transitory. The manifestation of the eternal universals by their substrata is admitted.[1]

Some put forward the fact of manifestation itself as a reason for concluding that it is non-eternal, as follows—The word is non-eternal, because it is manifested, like a jar. It is seen that non-eternal objects like a jar are manifested by

a lamp etc. The word is manifested by sounds; therefore, it is non-eternal. If it is held that it is not manifested, that would mean that it is produced. That also makes it non-eternal. Now, to those who hold that universals exist and that they are eternal, it is answered; the reason given (in the above syllogism) is not a real reason, because it is seen both ways. Against those who hold nothing to be eternal and, therefore, maintain that the invalidity of the reason is not proved, those who consider the word to be eternal declare even before them that the invalidity is not established. How? Against the opponent (one who does believe in eternality) the reason "because it is manifested" is not a good reason because it is doubtful and would lead to option and as the other incidental properties also would be attributed, the discussion would lead to regressus ad infinitum.[2]

[1. Verses 95 to 101 answer objections to the manifestation theory. The objections are made clear in the Vṛtti.

2. *Prasaṅgo vānuṣaṅgiṇām ityanavasthā syāttarkasya.* If the word is said to be non-eternal, because it is manifested, like a jar by the light of a lamp, why not attribute the other properties of the jar, like visibility also to the word? There would then be no end to the process (*anavasthā*)].

96. It is only material objects which are associated with particular places. Even when difference of place between sound and word is imagined, there is, in fact, no real difference.

Another opposite view is now put forward: The word is not manifested, because of difference in location between the manifestor and the manifested). Jars and other objects are manifested by lamp etc. because they exist in the same locality. The word is found in a place other than where its manifestors, the contacts and separations of the vocal organs take piace.[1] This objection does not really hold good in the case of the sounds. Still, it is argued as follows—How is the word which is in one place manifested by the sounds

which are in different places and very far from one another? This is answered as follows—To be in one place or to be in many places is a property of corporeal things. Even material objects like the sun, while being actually restricted to one place, are perceived as being in many places. Sound and word, both, incorporeal, are beyond the range of such expressions as location and located and, therefore, even though the misconception of difference of location takes place, really speaking, there is no difference between them in this respect.

[1. The opponent's idea is that the manifesting sounds exist in the vocal organs whose contacts and separations produce them, whereas the word exists in ether (ākāśa).]

97. Just as there is an eternal fitness between the senses and the objects, in the same way, there is the relation of manifestor and manifested between particular sounds and the word (*sphoṭa*).

Another opposite view is now put forward: The word is not manifested because the (socalled) manifestators are fixed. In this world, what is to be manifested does not require a fixed manifestor, since all objects like jars are manifested by any one of the following, a precious stone or a lamp or a luminous plant or a planet or a star. In the case of words, on the other hand, it is held that fixed sounds manifest them; the sounds which are the causes of the manifestation of particular phonemes cannot manifest other phonemes. Therefore, words are not manifested. To this, the verse which begins with the words: "between the senses and the objects (*grahaṇa-grāhyayoḥ*) is the answer. Just as the colour which inheres in the sense of vision is the cause of the manifestation of external colour, not other qualities nor other senses, nor the qualities of other senses, in the same way, they (the sounds) become the causes of the manifestation of external objects.[1]

[1. The answer to the present objection consists in pointing out that even in regard to other manifestors, like the senses, there is a certain

fixity and restriction. While the sense of vision, which is of the nature of fire according to the Vaiśeṣikas, can reveal the colour of external objects, it cannot reveal their smell or taste.]

Against the argument that such fixity does not exist where a thing is manifested by a sense having the same attribute as itself, the following answer is given—

98. In the case of smells etc., which are manifested by their similars, it is seen in the world that there is a particular factor in each case which is responsible for it.

Even when things are perceived by senses having the same attributes as themselves, this fixity can be observed. For example, among substances like nail, bitumen etc., only some particular substance in contact can manifest the smell of some particular substance.[1]

[1. When the colour in the sense of vision manifests the jar, it is a case of difference between the manifestor and the manifested, because the jar is a substance and the colour in the sense of vision is a quality. Where there is such difference, the opponent points out, there is no requirement of a fixed manifestor. But where there is similarity between the two, there should be fixity. But in the case of the word being manifested by the sounds, there is similarity, because both are cognised by the sense of hearing and yet there is a fixed manifestor. Against this, it is pointed out that, in other cases also where there is similarity, a fixed manifestor is required. The smell of an object is perceived only by the sense of smell. Thus the manifestor and the manifested are similar to each other. And yet smells are manifested only in contact with a particular substance. The smell of *Kuṅkuma* is manifested only in contact with clarified butter. The only when it comes in contact with boiling barly broth.]

99. The thing that is revealed follows the differences of the revealors. This is evident in the case of reflections in such different reflectors as oil, water etc.

Another opposite view is now put forward—The word is is not manifested because (in its case) increase, decrease

and difference in number of the manifestors are seen in the manifested (the word). When there is increase and decrease of the manifestors, increase and decrease of the manifested are not found. Increase and decrease of (the light of) lamps (the manifestors) do not cause increase and decrease of jars etc. Nor does any variation in the number of lamps cause any change in the original number of jars etc. In the case of the word, on the other hand, one sees variation in number and magnitude following variation in the striking of the vocal organs. Therefore, the word is not manifested.

This argument is answered as follows—one does see that the manifested follow the variations of the manifestors. It is as follows—When the surface of the mirror is sunk, the reflection of the face is raised, when the surface of the mirror is raised, the reflection of the face is sunk. In a dagger, the reflection of the face is long, in mustard oil, it is dark, in a Chinese dagger, Greek crystal etc. it follows the dimensions of the reflector. Thus possibilities of variation are infinite. Difference of number is also seen in the case of the reflections of the sun etc. when there are many mirrors and many waves of water.[2]

[1. It is not clear what specific objects are meant by *cīnaśastra* and *yavanakāca*. Obviously, they could reflect objects.

2. The Vṛtti may be compared with the following passage from the Mahābhāṣyaṭīkā of Bhartṛhari—

"*Yasyāpi śabdavyaktiḥ tasyāpi nityaḥ śabdaḥ. Sa tu nādābhivyaṅgyaḥ. padaniyato nādaḥ. Yathā cakṣurādayo niyatā abhivyañjakā abhivyaṅgyeṣu rūpādiṣu. rūpavṛddhirāsānuvidhāyinaśca. Yathādarśamaṇḍalādiṣu pratibimbāni dīrghāṇi parimaṇḍalāni mahānti anyāni ca dṛśyante evaṃ śabdā api nādabhedena bhidyante. Yathā salile taraṅgabhede naikaś candro' neka upalaghyate, pradīpabhedācca chāyā bhidyate, ādarśabhedācca pratibimbabhedaḥ. Tasmānniyatānādābhivyaṅgyā hrādavṛddhihrāsānuvidhāyino vyaktiśabdā api nityāḥ.*

Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari, p. 20 (A.B.O.R.I, XLIII).

It might be said that the reflection which has entered a mirror etc. is different from its originals like the moon etc. Against this, the answer is—

100. Original objects like mountains cannot possibly enter into reflectors like a diamond and the surface of a mirror which have totally different dimensions.

It is not possible that objects like mountains having different dimensions should enter and be produced inside substrata like a diamond.

101. Therefore, due to the difference in time of the manifesting sounds, their own time and that of the duration of their cognition are attributed to the phoneme (*varṇa*) word (*pada*) and sentence (*vākya*) whcih have no difference in time.

In the continued existence of eternal things, the power of time as an auxiliary cause does not play a part. All the *sphoṭas,* the phonemes, words and sentences, having a greater or lesser magnitude and whose continued existence, during the, according to wordly usage, earlier and later periods, is understood from their cognitions (at the time of their manifestation) do not differ as far as their duration is concerned. When they become objects of cognition, though they have no difference in time, they seem to have the duration of their cognition. What is meant by speed and their own duration is this—the primary sound whose duration is superimposed on the essence of the word, in order that their difference may not be grasped, becomes the cause of the use of the expression short, long and protracted. The secondary sound brings about the external difference of speed, quick etc.

102. Others have declared that whatever is produced by the organs of articulation, through contacts and separations, is the *sphoṭa;* the sounds produced by this initial sound are the *dhvanis.*

According to the view that the word is transitory, the first sound which is produced by the contacts and separations between the points and organs of articulation is the *sphoṭa.* Those which are produced by that first sound and spread in all directions carrying its reflection, are the *dhvanis.* All things are in themselves without parts, but the parts of their main associates are attributed to them. Similarly, ether (which is one) has no parts but division into parts due to relation with objects in contact with it, is attributed to it. That being so, because of proximity in the form of succession of parts and on account of uninterrupted succession of cause and effect, those elements which have progressively diminishing power of reflecting the previous sounds are similar to the forms illuminated by dim light, gradually disappear and cause division in the phoneme, are called sounds. According to the view of eternality, the *sphoṭa* is manifested by sounds produced by contacts and separations. According to some, it is manifested by the resonance[1] produced by the sounds caused by contacts and separations. Sounds, on the other hand, are those which favour the cognition of the *sphoṭa,* have progressively diminishing power of manifestation, cause the distinction of the speeds quick etc. and gradually disappear.

[1. *Dhvani* and *nāda.* Here also, as in the Vṛtti on verse 47, a distinction is made between *dhvani* and *nāda.* The latter is produced by the former. This distinction is mentioned in the course of the exposition of the views of those who held the *sphoṭa* to be the one indivisible word (*śabdavyakti*) as distinct from those who held it to be the Universal. According to Vṛṣabha, the sounds produced by contacts and separations produce a resonance (*nāda*) which manifests the *sphoṭa.* The sounds produced by the first sound are the cause of the continued cognition of the *sphoṭa* or of the speed of utterance which is only another way of looking at the same thing. See note 1 on verse 47.]

103. Whether the sound in question is short or long, the time of the *sphoṭa* is invariable. The series of sounds which follows is susceptible of greater or lesser duration.[1]

Smallness and bigness are attributed to the word[2] on the basis of the common feature consisting of covering a certain amount of space. Or it is due to worldly usage. Everywhere usage is the basis for determining the nature of objects. Determining the nature of objects on the basis of reason and tradition would be unreliable because it would result in different views. As both the sounds which are effects and those which are causes are produced and perish without distinction, there is not the slightest difference between a big and a small sound, as there is none between the cognitions of an elephant and a mosquito. Due to difference in circumstances, however, the power of a sound to produce effects differs. The succession of effects of a sound like the one produced by the impact of the drum and the stick reaches far. Another sound like the one produced by striking on iron or bronze causes a succession of sounds which can be heard only from near, but reverberates without a break.

[1. This verse is meant to describe in greater detail the process of the manifestation of *sphoṭa* according to the view that the first sound produced by contacts and separations is the *sphoṭa* and the later sounds produced by the first one are the *dhvanis*.

2. If one looks upon sound as a quality, one can object to its being described as 'small' or 'big' because smallness or bigness are qualities and they can reside only in substances and not in the sound which is itself a quality. If one looks upon sound as a substance, even then one can object that only material substances can be big or small and not immaterial substances like sound. To meet this objection, it is pointed out that these two expressions are used for sound by courtesy (*upacaryate*).]

104. From a distance only the sound is perceived like the light from a lamp. The difference is clearly visible in the sounds which are produced by bells, etc.

Here some thinkers consider that the *sphoṭa* manifested by the sound which comes into being at the same time and spreads far in all directions like the light of a lamp is associated with the sound from the very moment of its manifesta-

tion just as a substance is endowed with its smell from the very moment it is produced. Just as, in a lamp, there is the burning substance which is the material cause of its closely packed parts (*ghanasanniviṣṭāvayavaṃ pratyupādānam*) and its light is based on it and follows its transformations, in the same way, the *sphoṭa* and the sound, very distinct when a bell is struck, constitute the characteristic of the manifestation of the phonemes. The difference between primary and secondary sounds has been explained in the two preceding verses.[1]

[1. This verse puts forward another view of those who held the *sphoṭa* to be transitory. It is an answer to a possible objection that the sound, apart from the *sphoṭa,* does not exist at all. It is here pointed out that it does exist separately. We can see the difference when we hear from a distance the sounds which a crowd makes but cannot distinguish the words (the *sphoṭas*). Or, it is like seeing the light of a lamp without seeing the lamp itself. The sound produced by the first impact of a bell is the *sphoṭa.* In this verse, it is stated that the sound (*dhvani*) is also produced at the same time whereas in the previous verse it was stated that the sound produced by the impact is the *sphoṭa* and the subsequent sounds produced by the first one are the *dhvanis.* In both the views, the *sphoṭa* is transitory.

In the text of the Vṛtti, *ghaṭasanniviṣṭāvayavam* is a mistake for *ghanasanniviṣṭāvayavam.*]

105. On account of the relative intensity in the contact between the organs and the places of articulation, the long and the protracted also become different. The sounds produced after the cessation of the vibrations bring about variation in the speed of utterance.

Even according to the view that the word is transitory,[1] it is not because of any increase in the manifesting sounds that there is any increase in the long and protracted vowels. How then ? Because of the greater intensity in the contact between the places and the organs of articulation. All that contact can only bring about the form of the long and pro-

tracted vowels. Therefore, till they acquire their form, the vibration, causing mutual contact of the parts of the places and organs of articulation because of their striking against one another and following closely the special movements of the air, continues. When the vibration ceases, the sounds which are produced by the original ones, become the cause of the regulation of speed like quick etc.

[1. I have adopted the reading 'anityapakṣe' as Vṛṣabha has it.]

106. Even after the organs have ceased to vibrate, other sounds are produced from the *sphoṭa* as one flame from another.

Even when the vibrations continue uninterruptedly, whatever sound is produced by the contact (between the places and organs of articulation) never disappears without producing its effect. The sounds which are produced by the vibration and are simultaneous (with the *sphoṭa*) manifest the *sphoṭa*. The sounds which come in between, resemble them, and shine like them, are called secondary sounds (*anuṣaṅga*) It has also been said that each secondary sound among them has its series of effects lasting as long as the vibration lasts and helps in the manifestation of the *sphoṭa*. This production of sounds has been described on the analogy of the continuity of the flames proceeding from burning fuel. Just as from the flames of burning fuel proceed continuously other flames produced by them and manifest objects by their light, so is the continuity of the sounds.

107. Air, atoms, or knowledge is said to be transformed into the word according to some. Thus, in the different doctrines, there is no fixed view on the subject.

Some declare that it is air which becomes the word.

108. The air set in motion by the effort corresponding to the desire of the speaker, strikes at the different places of articulation and is transformed into sounds.

109. By the impact caused by the force of the original cause (the effort) even the solid forms of air which has speed and solidity are diversified.[1]

This and similar views must be understood.

[1. Vṛṣabha understands that the air brings about the contacts and separations of the places and organs of articulation which are solid (*sāravatyaḥ*). The translation connects '*sāravatyo 'pi mūrttayaḥ*' with '*tasya*' = of the air.]

Others have accepted that it is the atoms which become the word. They have declared as follows—

110. Because the different kinds of atoms have all powers, they, in combination or otherwise, transform themselves into shadow, sunlight, darkness and sounds.

111. The atoms called words, when their power is manifested by effort, are set in motion by the same effort and they gather like clouds.

All such views have to be understood. Others expound the transformation of knowledge into the word.

112. This inner knower, at first identical with the subtle word, transforms himself into the gross word, in order to manifest his own form.

113. He, the inner knower, becomes mind after attaining maturity through heat. Then he enters the air called breath which is then emitted.[1]

[1. This verse describes the steps by which the self becomes the gross word. First, the self becomes the mind, capable of cognising objects. Then this capacity attains maturity through the bodily heat. When set in motion by the desire to speak, the mind identifies itself with the breath which is then emitted.]

114. Air becomes the substratum of the mind and becomes coloured by the qualities of the latter and is transformed by the inner heat.[1]

[1. The Self becomes the mind of which the air becomes the substratum. The air becomes impregnated with the attributes of the mind and becomes the word.]

115. The inner air (*prāṇa*), after splitting into parts in the form of sounds and after suggesting the phonemes, is merged into them.

All this and similar views have to be considered. What has been given is only an illustration. There is much diversity in the views of the authors of the Śikṣās and the Bhāṣyas.[1] For example—

"Vital air, prompted upwards by the inner effort, aided by the inner heat, accumulates, through the sound-carrying interstices,[2] fine particles of sound like masses of smoke. When thus accumulated in the places of articulation, it assumes the identical form of the inner word, because of its illuminating aspect". All such views have to be considered. It is as follows[3]—

"The air, prompted by effort from the region of the navel, going upwards, strikes against one of the places like the chest and then sound is produced".

Such diversity of views of the authors of the Śikṣās must be considered. It has been said by the teacher (Pāṇini).

"The Self sees things through the intellect and joins the mind with the desire to speak. The mind strikes at the heat of the body which, in its turn, prompts the vital air."[4]

And so on. Another teacher says—

"The vital air reaches the stomach where the resonance takes place. Reaching the throat, it becomes either breath or sonority".

And so on. Another teacher says—

"The heat of the body, struck by the mind, prompts the vital air. It rises from the navel and strikes against the head and when it comes into contact with another rising wave of air, becomes sounds such as '*k*' or '*kh*'."

Such different views are found in the treatises called Śikṣā attached to each branch of the Vedá and they must be understood in detail.

[1. Vṛṣabha says that by Bhāṣyakāra, the commentators of the Śikṣās are meant.

2. Vṛ. says that the veins (*nāḍīs*) are filled with fine parts of the word and when they are set in motion along the veins by the inner air, they accumulate in the places of articulation, like masses of smoke.

3. Vṛ says—*Tathetyāpiśalīyaśikṣādarśanam.*

4. Pāṇinīyaśikṣā, 6.]

116. The eternal word which, being fine, is not perceived by the ear, becomes perceptible through its own cause, as the air by fanning.

Now another tradition[1] is being recorded. There is subtle sound within and without all embodied objects like masses of fine air. According to some, it is understood as ether. Just as, even though atoms of air exist everywhere, it is only when, due to the impact of the fan,[2] they are dislodged from their place, that they become endowed with action, in the same way, sound, when given a gross modified form by

its manifesting causes, reaches the region of the ear and perfects it.

[1. According to Vṛṣabha, this tradition is also current among the authors of the Śikṣās.

2. Both in the Kārikā and in the Vṛtti, Pt. Charu Deva Shastri's edition has Vyañjana. But the context requires Vyajana and it is actually found in the manuscript 'S', used for our edition of Vākyapadīya Kāṇḍa I. So that reading has been adopted.]

117. The power of it which is in the breath and in the understanding strikes at the different places of articulation and becomes differentiated.

All these are different views. The sound mentioned in the previous verse having the attribute of accumulation is not referred to here. The word, already under discussion, is being explained according to different views. The word rests on the breath as well as on the mind.[1] Being manifested by the powers of the two substrata, the breath and the mind, the word conveys the meaning. The breath is penetrated by the mind. Surging upwards like a flame, following the effort which set it in motion, it strikes against the points of articulation of the phonemes and assumes a form favourable to the comprehension of the eternal word. Having thus attained the state of the effect of the two powers which are within it, the breath assumes different forms, as the earth or the foetus or the banyan seed does[2] and gives to the one essence of the word the mere colouring of difference.

[1. The word has two substrata, the mind and the breath. While explaining this idea, Vṛṣabha adds a third one: the vocal organs. As he puts it—*Sa cāyaṃ tṛtīyaśabdaḥ Karaṇādhiṣṭhānaḥ.*

2. The earth, the foetus and the banyan seed go through certain stages before they attain their final form. Unfortunately, the text of the Paddhati here is corrupt, so that one does not get a clear idea of what Vṛṣabha considered to be the stages.]

118. The power which creates and regulates this universe rests on words. It is through that eye that (ana. 110)

all this diversity of understanding (*bhedarūpaḥ pratibhātmā*) is perceived.

According to some, the universals (of words and meanings) rest on the substratum of the subtle word. They become manifested when the substratum evolves and appear as the expressed meanings and the expressive words. It is like what some others say—"All objects merge into the senses (as potentialities) and all the senses merge into the intellect as potentialities and the intellect merges into the sequenceless word as a potentiality. All this activity which goes on during dreams and the wakeful state and involves distinction into different individuals always exists in the subtle word, the supreme cause (in a potential state). Others have also said as follows—

"It is the word which sees the object, it is the word which speaks, it is the word which reveals the object which was lying hidden, it is on the word that this multiple world rests and it is this very word which enjoys after the differentiation."

119. The difference between '*ṣaḍja*' and others is grasped when conveyed through words; therefore, all kinds of meanings depend upon the powers of words.

Everything depends upon the word which causes its cognition and enters into usage when grasped through remembrance of it as intertwined with its word (*smṛtinirūpaṇā*), as identified with its word through memory (*abhijalpanirūpaṇā*) and as connected with some particular action (*ākāranirūpaṇā*). The distinction between *ṣaḍja, ṛṣabha, gāndhāra, dhaivata, niṣāda, pañcama* and *madhyama*, the words expressive of which are not well-defined nor well-known, cannot be understood without knowing the words on which depend their understanding. Cowherds, shepherds and others invent special words and accompilsh their special purposes in regard to cows and other animals. Therefore, a thing with its distinctive feature, closely linked with general

or special words the meanings of which are clearly grasped or otherwise respectively, is illuminated, embraced and identified with a cognition which is united with the power of the word, intertwined with the word and has the form of the word.[1]

[The purpose of this verse is to show that distinction between things can be known only through words. The distinctive features of some things in this world are easy to see and they have their words to express them. But the distinctive features of some things are not easy to grasp. By merely listening to the musical notes *ṣaḍja* etc., one cannot understand their special characteristics. One can do so only with the help of the technical explanation of the Science of Music. What we cognise can enter into worldly usage only if we can express it in words. The process of cognition has three stages which, as explained by Vṛṣabha, are: (1 to see a thing and to remember it as intertwined with its word (*Smṛtinirūpaṇā*), (2) to cognise the identity between word and meaning (*abhijalpanirūpaṇā*), (3) to see it as connected with some action (*ākāranirūpaṇā*).

The intimate relation in which the word and the meaning figure in the cognition is emphasised in the Vṛtti by the use of several expressions covering different aspects of it: *bhedavānarthaḥ śabdaśakti-saṃsṛṣṭayā śabdānuviddhayā śabdātmikayā buddhyā prakāśyate upagṛhyate svīkriyate.* The meaning is illuminated and embraced by the cognition, it becomes one with it. The word, on the other hand, is also intertwined with the cognition which has the form of the word. The cognition has the form of the word which has the form of the meaning. (*upgṛhītārthākāraśabdarāpā sā buddhiḥ*—Vṛ.)]

120. Knowers of tradition (the *Vedas*) have declared that all this is the transformation of the word. It is from the *chandas* that this universe has evolved.

Just as other thinkers,[1] while explaining causality, saw that the properties of the cause continue in the effects and have declared as the source of everything, either the mass of atoms, free from mutual distinctions, subtle, imperceptible, having the potentialities of all effects, with the tendency to produce them kept in abeyance or Primordial Matter or the collection of Powers rooted in Nescience or something which has no birth nor change (but is merely the substratum) of appearances, in the same way, in the Scripture also, the word

in which the powers of Enjoyer and Enjoyed are submerged has been declared to be the cause of the world in many ways. For example, it has been said: "The Lord Vairāja, is indeed made up of *Ṛk, Yajus* and *Sāman*. The Lord is the world, the Lord is the sacrifice. In it, three oblations are offered, pleasing to the three worlds. These oblations offered in a three-fold manner, are the three worlds."[2] Similarly—"He who created the world is indeed the Lord of the world, made up of hymns, existing at the very beginning, indestructible (or a very bull). From him were born cattle, from cattle all vegetation and from vegetation, fire. That is why it has been said that one should not milk in a wooden vessel. A wooden vessel is, indeed, fire. That is why milking is never done in a wooden vessel."[2]

There is a *ṚK* also on this very subject—

"From the Lord first came knowledge, the food; from it were separated name and form; the name came from life (breath) and the form from knowledge. The one knowledge appears as many."[3]

Again, it has been said—"It is the word which became the worlds; the word became all that is immortal and mortal. It is the word which enjoys, which speaks in many ways. There is nothing beyond the word."[3]

There are also some ancient sayings on the subject—

"The Creator, mentioned in the Scripture, after dividing Himself in many ways, into manifestations of Himself, entered into Himself with all the manifestations."[4]

"Those persons in whom the pure speech is established in a great measure, in them the holy light of the Creator exists eminently."

"The great Light of the Creator which is in the learned as though covered with a lid, becomes merged with its source, when their body dissolves."

"When one is in possession of right knowledge, one is identified with the shining mass of that wonderful light and is merged in it."

[1. The problem here is to decide what *ánye* means. According to Vṛṣabha, it means the Vaiśeṣikas and others. If he is right, then the Vṛtti "*yathaivānye... vyavasthāpayanti*' mentions different things beginning with the mass of atoms (*aṇugrāma*) as the original cause of the world, according to others. For Vaiśeṣikas, it is the mass of atoms, for Sāṅkhyas, it is Primordial Matter (*Pradhāna*), for others, it is the bundle of Powers, rooted in Nescience and for others still, it is something devoid of birth and change and is the substratum of appearances (*vivarta*). The other way of interpreting the passage is to take it as describing only the mass of atoms, linking all the adjectives in the passage with '*aṇugrāmam*'. The former way is more in accordance with our text.

2. The source of these two prose texts is unknown. In the second text, the word '*akṣan*' may be '*ukṣan*.

3. These two verses are given as *ṚK*, but they are not found in the Ṛg-Veda.

4. The idea in this verse is that all differentiation merges into the ultimate at the time of pralaya. That is, it exists in a latent stage, only to become patent at the time of creation. As Vṛ. puts it. *vyaktirūpeṇa bhūtvā śaktirūpeṇāvatiṣṭhate.*]

121. All knowledge of what is to be done in this world depends upon the word. Even the child, with its residual traces from the previous birth, has such knowledge.

Even that which exists is as good as non-existent as long as it does not come within the range of verbal usage. Even a totally non-existent thing like a hare's horn or something which appears and disappears in the sky like a celestial town[1] (*gandharvanagara*), when brought to the mind by words, figures, like something endowed with primary reality,[2] in various usages. In children in whom the germs of the word exist according to their kind, because of the existence in them of the residual traces of their use of words in their former births, there arises cognition based on vague words (*anākhyeyaśabda*) in the course of their various purposeful activities.

[1. Vṛṣabha points out that a celestial city may suddenly appear to us in the sky and it may disappear equally suddenly. But when the word brings the idea of it to our mind, it stays.

2. *Mukhyasattāyuktam iva. Mukhyasattā* (primary reality), the fact of something existing outside our mind is contrasted with *Upacārasattā* which consists in the fact of something figuring in our mind through the agency of words. Words move chiefly in the realm of *Upacārasattā,* as explained in Vāk. III, Saṃbandhasanuddeśa.]

122. The first movement of the vocal organs,[1] the emitting of the air upwards and the striking of the places of articulation are not possible without the residual traces of the speech (in the previous birth).

This residual trace of speech has no beginning and it exists in every one as a seed in the mind. It is not possible that it should be the result of the effort of any person. Movements of the articulatory organs by children are not due to instruction by others but are known through intuition. Who, indeed, can make or make known these human properties as other than residual traces of the word?

[1. Vṛ takes the word *'Karaṇa'* as denoting the vocal organs as well as the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*). Thus, it is due to *śabdabhāvanā* that the child makes, untaught, not only the first movements of the vocal organs, but the very effort to say something. The first movement of the vocal organs may not be necessarily to speak, but to eat or to drink.

2. *Pratibhāgamyāḥ. Pratibhā* seems to be another name for *śabdabhāvanā.* It stands (1) for the residual traces of the exercise of the faculty of speech in the previous birth; (2) for the faculty of speech with which the child is born; (3) for the child's instinct to do something in response to a situation.]

123. There is no cognition in the world in which the word does not figure. All knowledge is, as it were, intertwined with the word.

When, in the word-seed, everything is merged, then no verbal usage can be accomplished with the indeterminate knowledge which takes place in regard to objects. For instance, when one walks quickly and treads on grass and clods of earth, even though knowledge of them takes place (no usage is accomplished thereby). That stage of knowledge is only sometimes reached in which, when the word-seed is awakened and the powers, confined to particular meanings, of expressive, explainable and unexplainable words are manifested, the object is given a shape and accepted by knowledge which is intertwined with the word and follows the power of the word and it comes within the range of clear cognition and can be designated as such and such and is said to be known. Where, due to circumstances, the manifesting causes of the word appear, it becomes a cause of memory. Similarly, according to some, even one who is asleep has a stream of cognitions like one who is awake. The only difference is that the seeds of the word function in a very subtle manner in that condition. That is why that condition has been called one of darkness. Thus consciousness, mixed up with the word, appears and disappears constantly as the cause and effect of the manifested word.

124. If this eternal identity of knowledge and the word were to disappear, knowledge would cease to be knowledge; it is this identity which makes identification possible.

Just as illumination is the nature of fire or consciousness the nature of the Inner Controller, in the same way, all knowledge is intertwined with the word. Even in the state of unconsciousness (sleep), there is the persistence of the association with the subtle word. Also, that first cognition of external objects which does not grasp their special features (*nimittānām*) illuminates them in a vague manner (*avyapadeśyayā vṛttyā*) as mere things, by referring to them as this or that. At the time of remembrance also, when the seeds of such indeterminate cognition are awakened, a mere

outline, consisting of the previous vague cognition, figures in the mind in the form: 'this is some hymn or verse which I have heard before'. If knowledge were not mixed up with the word, the (vague) cognition which arises, not being intertwined with the form of another (the word) does not become an auxiliary in the act of illumination. After the cognition of the bare meaning of the words (in a sentence) which are different from one another, mutually unhelpful and independent of one another (*ātmāntarānātmanām*) has taken place, what takes place afterwards, namely, the mutual determination of their meanings, the definite identification of their meanings as such and such, their cooperation to fulfil one purpose, the connection of the individual sentence-meaning with the expressive power of the words, all this is closely linked with the fact of knowledge being closely intertwined with the word. It is this (*vāgrūpatā*) which brings about the identification and the mutual determination of the word-meanings, a cognition (of the sentence) which is qualified by all the qualifications and causes purposeful activity and yet it does not abandon the appearance of difference within it by a process of abstraction of powers.[2]

[1. *Ātmāntarātmanām.* Vṛṣabha's text seems to have been: '*ātmāntarānātmanām*' because he explains as follows— *ātmāntaram eṣām ātmā na bhavati. Itaretarasya iti. Itarasyetara ātmā na bhavati. Itarasyāpītāro devadattārtho gavārthasyātmetyādi.*

2. From '*bhinnarūpāṇām* to *na vijahāti*, it is explained that the understanding of the sentence-meaning from the word-meaning presupposes that knowledge is of the nature of the word. The stages in the process, as understood by Vṛṣabha, are: (1) the understanding of the word-meanings from the words; (2) the identification of the meanings in a cognition intertwined with the word; (3) the unification of these meanings by their mutual delimitation.]

125. It is this which is the basis of all the sciences, crafts and arts. Whatever is created due to this can be analysed (and communicated).

Human transactions in regard to worldly things and in regard to things taught in the Vedas takes place through the

sciences, crafts and arts. The activity of the rest of the animate and inanimate creation depends upon man. All science is closely bound up with the intellect (thought) which is of the nature of the word. It is on the basis of this fact of knowledge being of the nature of the word that in cases such as the making of a jar, all instruction and effort of the prompter and the prompted respectively, proceed.

126. The consciousness of all beings going through transmigration is in the nature of the word; it exists within and without. The consciousness of all types of beings does not go beyond this essence.

It is because consciousness is of the nature of the word that the distinction between sentient and insentient is made in the world.[1] It has been said—

'It is the word which urges all beings towards purposeful activity. If that were absent, everything would be insentient like a piece of wood or a wall."

The experience of pleasure and pain in the case of those whose consciousness is turned inward is possible only as long as consciousness is of the nature of the word. As for those whose consciousness is external, their transactions in the world are dependent upon that and would, in the absence of that, cease to be. There is no kind of being endowed with consciousness who knows or causes others to know without the association of the word.[2] Therefore, there is no activity of consciousness which is not closely linked with the powers of the word. Others go to the extent of saying that the activity of consciousness is the priniciple of the word itself. For it has been said—

"The word which has been taught in all the Sciences as the ultimate source assumes form through the appearance of differences."

"The divisions of this word, cows and the like, made known through the words,[3] having their source in the word, are not beyond the unity of the ultimate even though they appear to be different."

"They conquer death who know the word which has six doors, six bases, six forms of knowledge and six eternals.[4]"

[1. *Saṃjñā, sasaṃjña, visaṃjña, antaḥsaṃjña, bahiḥsamjna,* these five allied expressions are found in this verse and the Vṛtti thereon. *Visaṃjña* is also found in the verse quoted in the Vṛtti. *Sasaṃjña* and *Visaṃjña* mean sentient and insentient respectively. A piece of wood is given as an example of what is *Visaṃjña*. *Antaḥsaṃjña* and *Bahiḥsaṃjña* seem to stand for different states of beings: when consciousness is withdrawn from external objects it is *antāḥsaṃjñā*, when it is turned outwords, it is *bahiḥsaṃjñā*.

2. *Svaparasaṃbodhaḥ*. Whatever has consciousness is capable of *svasaṃbodha* or both *svasaṃbodha* and *parasaṃbodha*—whatever is *sthāvara*, stationary, like a tree has only *svasaṃbodha*. Men and other animals have both, according to Vṛṣabha: *svasaṃbodhānugama eva sthāvareṣu, ubhayānugamo jaṅgameṣu manuṣyādiṣviti. 'Parasambodha'* can mean both knowledge of others and making others know.

3. *Vāṅnetrāḥ vāṅnibandhanāḥ*. Things consisting of objects and words, are brought to the mind through words (*vacanān nīyante*—Vṛ.). So they are called *vāṅnetrāḥ*. In other words, we see everything through the word.

4. The word is said to have four sets of six things. What they stand for is not clear. Vṛṣabha explains them on the basis of the six kinds of *Pratibhā* mentioned in Vāk. II, 154. due to (1) *svabhāva;* (2) *caraṇa;* (3) *abhyāsa;* (4) *yoga;* (5) *adṛṣṭā;* (6) *viśiṣṭopanatā*. They are the means (*dvāra*) of attaining the ultimate word, the six meanings which figure in them are its basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*), the six kinds of cognitions which result from them lead to it and the six relations with the six meanings are eternal (*avyaya*).]

127. Just as in the wakeful state (*pravibhāge*) it is through the word that the agent acts on the objects of all actions, in the same way, in dream (*avibhāge*), it is the word itself which becomes the object of all actions.

The appearances of the Word-Brahman (in the wakeful state) consist of things to be accomplished and the means of accomplishing them. In the wakeful state, the seeds of the divisions of the word, being of the nature of the word,

attain modifications like birth etc. through production, modification and reaching and act as objects of action. In the undivided states like sleep, on the other hand, the same word, being deprived of (external) objects but being similar to them, becomes the object of the actions of production, modification and reaching.[1] It has been said—

"The Lord of All, the All-Embracing, the Enjoyer, after dividing Himself and after having created many different things, proceeds to sleep."

[1. See Vāk. III, Sā 45.]

128. Whether everything is of the nature of the Self or of the Supreme, as the word presents it, so it is understood; it is through the word that the object is established.

[1]According to some, all transformation is a product of the Self. It exists within in every individual, but appears to be external. That something is internal and something else is external is mere usage, based on rooted previous practice. But this is impossible considering that the source of both is one and incorporeal. According to others, all forms of knowledge and all differentiation is a transformation of the inner consciousness and so on. Such are the views of those who hold that everything is a product of the Self. Others, however, think that the Supreme Self is the source of creation which emerges out of it as oil does from the sesame seed. Others still think that the process is like the production of sparks from fire, of masses of cloud from subtle air, of streams of flowing water from the moon-stone, of sāla trees and the like from the earth, of banyan trees with their downward growth from banyan seeds and so on. Such are the views of those who hold that everything is a product of the Supreme Self. The views of those who are for the Self and these who are for the Supreme have to be understood from the Philosophical commentaries. What is meant by 'as the word presents it' is this — the word which is within is presented as pleasure

or pain in many ways in different beings. Even in such cases as the throwing and falling of stones,[2] it is so presented according to worldly usage and established practice. What is meant by 'it is through the word that the object is established is — It is the word which creates the object and preserves it.

[1. The views expressed in this verse and the Vṛtti are not those of Grammarians. It is intended to show here that many views are just creations of words and do not correspond to reality. There are some who hold that everything is a creation of the individual Self while others hold that everything proceeds from the Supreme Self. They are respectively called *svamātrāvādinaḥ.* and *pāramātrāvādinaḥ.* Among those who hold that the universe is a product of the individual Self, there are those who do not specify whether, by individual Self, they mean the Intellect (*Buddhi*) or the individual consciousness. As Vṛ puts it:—*caitanyam ekam kāraṇam, pūrvatra tvanirūpitō 'ntaḥsanniveśī puruṣa iti viśeṣaḥ.* Among those who declare the Supreme to be the source of everything, those who give the emergence of oil from sesame-seed as example seem to think of gradual creation and those who give the other four examples, of simultaneous creation.

2. *Loṣṭakṣepapātādiṣu.* Vṛṣabha gives reference to the following passage from M. Bhā. I, p. 123, l. 11.

"*Acetaneṣvapi. Tadyathā. Loṣṭḥ kṣipto bāhuvegaṃ gatvā naiva tiryag gacchati, norddhvam ārohati, pṛthivīvikāraḥ pṛthivīmeva gacchatyāntaryataḥ.*"

In the course of the discussion on P. 1.1.50, where we are told that of many possible substitutes, the nearest to the original must be chosen, somebody argues that the word '*antaratama*', in P. 1.1.50 is unnecessary as the nearest would be adopted in any case, that being the practice in the world, not only among living things, but also among insentient things. To illustrate how even insentient things associate with what is nearest to them, the example of a stone thrown upwards is given. After going up to a certain height according to the strength of the thrower, it does not proceed horizontally, nor does it go further upwards, but being a product of the earth, falls and joins the earth below. Here, however, the throwing upwards of a stone seems to be mentioned in another context. The context is the idea that everything is understood by us and affects us as words present it. As Vṛ. puts it:—"*Prāṇidharmeṣvākhyāya bāhyeṣvapi śabdasya vyāpāram āha loṣṭakṣepa iti.*" It is, however, a pity that the text of the Paddhati here has not come down to us faithfully, so that the connection between the Bhāṣya context and the present context, as understood by Vṛṣabha does not become clear.]

129. In the case of a thing like 'a circle of fire' (alātacakra) where the circumstance is totally different, merely by the force of the word, its form clearly figures in the mind.

It is the audible word which shows all meaning as residing in its own form, the word. It seems to create that meaning as it were. It always exists in it as something to be conveyed by it. The word is not concerned as to whether the object in question has real existence outside or not, nor whether there has been a mistake or not. Even in the case of a circle of fire, the presence of a word which bears resemblance to the one which denotes an action consisting of spreading in all directions, creates a meaning for practical words like *alātacakra* (circle of fire). The form of the object so fictitiously created, becomes conventionalised, even in the face of strong inference to the contrary. In the case of objects like a hare's horn, definitely known not to exist, it is the audible word which creates or rather brings the idea thereof to the mind and binds it to its own form. So also in the case of objects which are accessible to the senses (*pratykṣān*). A meaning, whether it has an external basis or not, is always present in the word, as the thing to be expressed by it. (Whether the object exists outside or not) in every individual, following the impressions of his previous experience and according to his knowledge, meanings of different kinds are understood from words.

130. It has been said that the Self, which is within the speaker is the word, the great Bull with whom one desires union.

Here (in the Science of Grammar) the word is of two kinds: it is eternal or it is a product. The product is that which is found in worldly usage and it bears the reflection of the Self[1] which is essentially the word. The eternal one is the source of all usage,[2] it has all sequence suppressed, it

resides within everybody, the source of all transformations, the substratum of all actions, the basis of pleasure and pain, unimpeded anywhere in regard to the production of effects (but) with its field of enjoyment restricted like a lamp covered with a jar, the limitless source of all corporeal objects, manifesting itself as all forms of knowledge and as all differentiations, imitating the states of sleep and wakefulness through cessation of activity and resumption of it respectively, endowed like rain and forest-fire with the powers of production and destruction respectively, the Lord of All, endowed with all powers, the great word—Bull; those who know the process of union with the word break the ego-sense and are united with it, in complete absence of differentiation. It has been said[3]—

"He has four horns, three feet, two heads and seven hands. He, the great Bull, is tied in three places and roars. The great God has entered into human beings."

[1. *Puruṣasya prabimbopagrāhī. Vṛṣabha* comments— '*Yo'yaṃ rathyāpuruṣaḥ sa vāktattvavikāratvāt kāryaśabdasvabhāvaḥ, vikārāṇām prakṛtirūpānvayāt* = The man in the street is of the nature of the transitory word, because he is a transformation of the word-principle and the source persists in the products.

2. *Sarvavyavahārayoniḥ.* According to Vṛṣabha, this means that it is the source of the distinction between the end and the means and of all the distinctions accepted in the different śāstras.

3. RV IV, 58.3.]

131. Therefore the purification of the word is (the means to the) attainment of the Supreme Self. One who knows the essence of its activity attains the immortal Brahman.

Once the essence of the word is purified by the form the correctness of which is established and particular merit is manifested by the disappearance of obstacles in the shape of incorrect forms, well-being (*abhyudaya*) is certain. Through repeated practice of it and after attaining union (with the word-principle) through the correct word and after fully un-

derstanding the Intuition which derives from the word-principle and which is the same as being, which is the source of its modifications and possesses the powers of being the means of accomplishment and the thing to be accomplished, attainment of the Supreme Good (*kṣema*) is certain.

"After taking his stand on the word which lies beyond the activity of breath, after having taken rest in oneself by the union resulting in the suppression of sequence,

"After having purified speech and after having rested it on the mind, after having broken its bonds and made it bond-free."

"After having reached the inner light, he, with his knots cut, becomes united with the Supreme Light."

132. Nobody admits that there is any written tradition not associated with a particular author. When all such written traditions disappear, the three Vedas continue as the seed.

In all systems, somebody is thought of as the author of the written tradition and so its human origin is accepted. Vedic sentences, on the other hand, are like consciousness itself, not created by any person. When the authors of the written traditions will have perished, they will serve as the seed for the formation of other traditions.[1]

[1. The word *āgama* is used in a wide sense. In many places, both the Vṛtti and the Paddhati refer to the Mahābhāṣya as *āgama*. In the Vṛtti on verse 11, the word '*āgamena*' occurs and it refers to the Mahābhāṣya. Vṛṣabha calls the twelve verses quoted in the Vṛtti on verse 1 at the end, the quotation *sūkṣmām* etc. and *nāmaivedam* etc. occurring in the Vṛtti on verses 5 and 11 respectively, *āgamas*. Similarly, he calls quotations from the M. Bhā and the Saṅgraha, found in the Vṛtti, by the name *āgama*. (See the Vṛtti on verses 23 and 26 and the Paddhati thereon.)

Here the word occurs both in the verse and the Vṛtti. It stands for ancient tradition, especially for written Tradition.]

133. Even if the doctrines perish and there are no more authors to compose others, cultured people follow the right path mentioned in the *śrutis* (Scripture) and the *Smṛtis* (written tradition).

In all discussions, it is admitted that, like the authors, the written traditions themselves can disappear. When they come to an end and before other authors arise and other written traditions are elaborated, there may be an interval during which cultured people do not violate the rites taught in the Scripture nor the regulations relating to what to eat and what not to eat embodied in the written traditions.

134. If knowledge were spontaneous, there would be no purpose in the composition of the *śāstras*. If spiritual merit is the cause of knowledge, the Veda is the cause of the former.

If it is accepted that a particular person can acquire knowledge without instruction, then written traditions prohibiting what is harmful and enjoining what is beneficial would become useless. If only a particular individual, due to special merit, acquires knowledge without instruction, while some others have to be instructed by a treatise, then the merit which has brought about that particular individual must have a definite basis. All other bases disappear. Therefore, writers who follow the right path which is based on Scripture, compose different doctrines and attain different modes of realisation.

135. Reasoning which does not go against the Vedas and the *śāstra* is authority for those who cannot see. The meaning of a sentence does not become clear from its mere form.

Reasoning makes divisions within the words and meanings of the sentences of the Scripture. And that is done for the benefit of those who see superficially. That is why such

reasoning has been adopted by the ancients in the investigating sciences (*nyāyavidyāsu*). Only that much of reasoning is to be adopted as will not go against one's Scripture. In all the sacred works, there is much that is beyond reasoning and has to be accepted through faith. What purpose does he seek to serve who does not follow reasoning, but accepts Scripture alone as authority? Correct understanding of the sentences of the Scripture would be his purpose. The power of the sentences of Scripture to convey their meaning varies, even when their form is the same, due to the presence of some other factor. He who understands the meaning from the mere form, without relying on context, connection etc. ends in confusion as to what is meant and what is not meant.

136. Sometimes what the words say is not meant, sometimes it is included in something wider, sometimes it is specified by other indications, many such conclusions are arrived at by reasoning.

In the sūtras

"What the agent wishes most to reach is the object." (P. 1.4.49)

and

"The suffix has the meaning of 'child of' so and so." (P. 4.1.92.)

and in the sentence

"He cleans the vessel" (Cf. Tai. Saṃ. 3.2.2.3 and Jai. Mī. Sū. 3.1.13-14.)

and in the sūtra

"The person for whom the object is meant is the recepient." (P. 1.4.32.)

and in

'Those who live on a woman have attained the characteristic of a dead person'

gender, number and tense are not meant; sometimes they are meant; such specification in regard to definitions depend upon reasoning. Similarly, in the sentence

"He should release his speech after seeing the star." (Kā. Śaṃ. 23.5.)

the seeing of the star is meant to convey a particular time (when the stars are ordinarily visible). Thus, it, the releasing (of speech), is done when the main thing (the time) is otherwise ascertained or as (seeing the star) stands for something else, the particular time is ascertained when the stars are visible. In the sentence 'let the curds be protected from crows,' as it is meant to ward off all damage, even if there are no crows, the curds are protected from dogs etc. As the sentence 'let the vessels be cleaned' is meant to denote the completion of all the preliminaries to the act of eating, even if there are no vessels, the other preliminaries are completed. Clarifications can be done by other indications also (*liṅga*). In the sentence "he puts the sugar mixed with fat," all kinds of fat come to the mind, but through the indication contained in the sentence—

"Clarified butter is indeed lustre itself"

a particular fat is understood. Such conclusions are reached by reasoning and definitions are specified.

137. Reasoning based on human intelligence (as distinct from written tradition) is also ultimately the power of words. Argument not based on words among those who have no written tradition, is really without any basis.

It is the word which is the instructor. Speakers follow the power of words and act when urged by a desire to speak based on the availability of the right word. When the hearer follows the fixed power of words to convey a meaning, through reasoning based on meaning, context, indication, interconnection etc., people look upon the capacity of the words as the reasoning of the hearer.[1] As for the reasoning

which does not proceed from the power of words, but follows the similarities and dissimilarities of objects, it is destructive of all tradition, without any basis and it is called 'dry reasoning.' As in the following—

"If the drinking of wine contained in a big circle of rose-coloured jars cannot take one to heaven, what can the little that is drunk in a sacrifice do?"[2]

Or in the following—

"To say that one should express oneself in words means that one should do so in the Drāmilaka language."

[1. The relevant considerations for determining the meaning of words are given in Vāk. a. II, p. 214 ff.

2. M. Bhā, I, p. 3, l. 3.]

138. Just as colour and other qualities are seen to have powers in regard to particular effects, so are words seen to have such powers to remove poison etc.

For those who have understood from the sacred books that divine happiness results from the knowledge and use of correct words, accompanied by a knowledge of the science of Grammar, this verse provides an argument strengthening the tradition recorded in the sacred books. It is seen in this world that colour, taste, smell and touch, whether singly or in combination, have powers to produce particular visible or invisible results.[1] Power to produce visible result is seen in poisonous plants, magnet and trees. Power to produce invisible result is seen in wine and in the waters of holy places. In the case of some words also, visible result such as the curing of snake poison is seen. Similarly, it is accepted that an invisible result is obtained by the repetition of mantras.

[1. Vṛṣabha gives the following examples. Blue and bright are both colours, but one is soothing to the eyes and the other is irritating; sweet and bitter are both tastes, but one causes phlegm and the other bile.

These are visible results. Only a white goat can be sacrificed to Vāyu, otherwise the invisible result expected will not be produced. The

touch of wine leads to a bad invisible result while that of the waters of holy places leads to a good one. That the mantras of the Atharvaveda have the effect of curing snake-poison is an example of visible effect from the word.]

139. Let it be understood that just as they (the words) have such powers, similarly they also have the power to produce merit. Therefore, good people who desire well-being should use only correct words.

It is learnt from the sacred books that there are powers leading to visible results associated with every word. As there is such a tradition, let it be understood that correct words are the means of acquiring merit and, therefore, those who wish to attain divine happiness must follow the trustworthy tradition uninteruptedly practised by the cultured and use only correct words in worldly transactions.

140. Everybody understands things having invisible effects from the sacred texts. In regard to everything mentioned in it, it would be possible to postulate the opposite.

Some argue as follows:— Just as words have the capacity to cure poison, in the same way, why not understand that they have the capacity to cause demerit. From this very illustration, let one conclude the existence of an opposite power. Against this objection, it is maintained that, in regard to all conclusions relating to visible or invisible results of sacred texts, it would be possible to postulate an opposite effect. Therefore, if after taking some sacred text as authority, its meaning is settled, then any reasoning that is put forward would strengthen the understanding of it.

141. Knowledge of the correctness of words is the subject of this tradition called Grammar. It is here that the uninterrupted tradition of cultured people is recorded.

Just as traditions relating to what can be eaten and what cannot be eaten, which woman one can marry and which woman one cannot marry, what can be said and what cannot be said are well established and cultured people do not go against the code of conduct based on them, in the same way, this tradition called Grammar relates to what particular words can be used and what not. What is remembered from generation to generation, in an uninterrupted manner is again and again embodied in words. A tradition which has no written basis but the observance of which is well-known is preserved by the continuity of the practice of the cultured.

142. This Science of Grammar is the supreme and wonderful source of the knowledge of the threefold word, comprising many paths, of the *Vaikharī* (the Elaborated), the *Madhyamā* (the Middle One) and the *Paśyantī* (the Seeing One).

That is called the Elaborated (*Vaikharī*) the form of which is cognised by others inasmuch as it comes within the range of the sense of hearing, and is well defined. It is mixed up or uttered in distinct phonemes; it has well-established correctness or is devoid of correctness. It is what comes out of the axle of a cart, a drum, a flute and a lute (*vīṇā*); thus, it has infinite varieties.[1] The Middle One (*Madhyamā*), on the other hand, is what exists within, it looks as if it has sequence and mind is its only substratum. According to some, it is accompanied by the subtle functioning of breath (*prāṇa*) and even though sequence is suppressed in it, yet it has distinct functioning of breath in it.[2] The Seeing one (*Pas'yantī*) is that in which sequence is merged and though it is One, the power to produce sequence has entered into it. It is restless (*calācalā*) and also still in concentration,[3] hidden and pure;[4] the forms of the objects of knowledge have entered into it or merged into it or it has no form at all; it has the appearance of limited objects or of connected objects or the appearance of all objects has come to an end in it; thus it has infinite variety. According to some, in all the states of the

word which come within the range of usage, the distinction between what is correct and what is not is well-established and brings about the perfection of the individual. But the supreme form of the Seeing One is devoid of all correct forms, it is not mixed up and it is beyond worldly usage. According to the tradition of some, it is the form of this (state of the Word) which can be attained either by a knowledge of Grammar or through Union preceded by the word, obtained by the knowledge of the correct form of the words.[5] On this point, illustrations are found in the *Itihāsa*.[6]

"One of them, the word—Cow, having a radiant smile and an excellent nature, in her divine and non-divine form, yields milk as the Cow does."

"See the difference between the two, both subtle and throbbing; the other one is present in the interval between *prāṇa* and *apāna*."[7]

"Another one, not being prompted at all, exists without the breath. From that is breath born, which, in its turn, strengthens the word."

"Strengthened by the breath, it becomes the basis of usage; by reaching the breath of everybody, the word does not speak in any case."

"That which has always resonance, that which has acquired resonance, and that which has no resonance at all, exist. To the two which have resonance, that which has none at all is superior."[8]

Again, it has been said—

"The Elaborated (*Vaikharī*) assumes the form of phonemes when the air strikes against the places of articulation and is based on the functioning of the breath of the speakers."

"The Middle One proceeds by going beyond the functioning of breath, has sequence and has the mind alone as its substratum."

"The Seeing One is indivisible and is entirely without sequence. It is the Inner Light, the subtle word, imperishable."

"Though always attacked by adventitious impurities, it, like the last digit of the moon, is never overwhelmed."

"When its form is perceived, all obligations cease.[9] Of man having sixteen parts, that is the immortal part."

"The Elaborated One (*Vaikharī*) coloured by adventitious impurities, is not really affected by them, any more than the pure Being is affected by qualities."

This three-fold word, has, like the appearances of the knots of Consciousness, indefinable dimensions, and a fourth of it exists in man. Even of this, only a little comes within the range of usage, the rest is beyond the usage of ordinary man. It has been said—

"There are four states in regard to the word. The wise among the Brāhmaṇas know them. Three of them are kept in a cave and do not move. Men speak the fourth part of the word."[10]

The pure form of that word is embodied in this descriptive Science called Grammar, consisting of general and special rules. The powers of those of lower visions, generally admit of degree, are liable to meet obstruction and to commit mistakes. Hence this method of acquiring the words, free from error and consisting of definitions and elaborations and containing many paths, has been developed.

[1. *Śliṣṭā vyaktavarṇasamuccāraṇā prasiddhasādhubhāvā bhraṣṭa-saṃskārā ca ... aparimāṇabhedā.*

It is stated that *Vaikharī* has infinite varieties. To an objection that what comes out of the axle of a cart is just noise and not *vāk*, Vṛṣabha replies that the inclusion of it is based on a śruti which he proceeds to quote.

By explaining *śliṣṭā* as *avyaktākṣarā,* he makes it the opposite of *vyaktavarṇasamuccāraṇā*. It is not clear whether the noise coming out of the axle of a cart or a drum is meant to be an example of *śliṣṭā*. If even such noises can be examples, it is only natural that incorrect forms of words also should be considered as varieties of it. They are, after all, *Vāk*.

2. *Kramasaṃhārabhāve' pi vyaktaprāṇaparigrahaiva.* Vṛṣabha gives as a proof of the presence of subtle *prāṇa* in the *Mahyamā* stage that sequence can be observed when one silently recites something to oneself. As he puts it—*Śvayamapyasyopāṁśutaraṃ paṭhataḥ tat spaṣṭam.*

3. *Calācalā pratilabhasamādhānā ca.* Vṛṣabha explains these two expressions in terms of Yogic teminology. He says: *calācalāiti rūpādiṣu viṣayeṣv arvāgdarśanānaṃ vikṣiptotpadyate buddhir, vāgeva hi sā. Pratilabdhasamādhānā ca iti avikṣiptā Yoginām śabdapūrvayogena samāhitatvāt.*

4. Vṛṣabha explains *viśuddhā* in two ways: (1) free from all differentiation, as Yogis see it, (2) free from all corrupt forms, as Grammarians know it.

5. According to some, the supreme form of the *Paśyantī* can be attained in either of two ways: either through a knowledge of Grammar or through union with the word, induced by a knowledge of the correct form of the word. Vṛṣabha also understands it in this way. The use of the expression *'ekeṣāṃ'* suggests that this is not the orthodox view. In fact, elsewhere *śabdapūrvayoga* alone is mentioned as the means of attaining it. See the Vṛtti on Vāk. I. 14, 131.

6. The following verses are found in a very different form in the Mahābhārata, Āśvamedhikaparvan, 22.

7. *Prāṇāpānāntare.* Vṛṣabha explains *'antara'* as absence. So the absence of *prāṇa* and *apāna* would mean something beyond the range of *prāṇa,* ie, *buddhi,* the seat of the *Madhyamā.*

8. In these verses which are supposed to be quotations from *Itihāsa,* ie, the Mahābhārata, the names *Vaikharī, Madhyamā* and *Paśyantī* are not used (unlike the later quotations where they do occur), but the descriptions are sought to be interpreted by Vṛṣabha as relating to them. Thus *prāṇāpānāntare tiṣṭhati* is equated with *Madhyamā; āpūryamāṇeva vinā prāṇena tiṣthati* is also understood as referring to *Madhyamā, vyavahāranibandhanā* means *vaikharī.* *Ghoṣiṇī* and *jātinirghoṣā* are interpreted as standing for *Vaikharī* and *aghoṣā* for *Paśyantī* and *Madhyamā* together.

9. *Adhikāro nivartate* = all obligations cease. *Adhikāra* is explained by Vṛṣabha as *niyogo bandhākhyaḥ.* The bond of obligation which is the cause of *saṃsāra* ceases to be and one attains *Mokṣa.*

10. R. V. I, 164, 45.]

143. As the powers of words are seen by those who know the true nature of things, the Science of

Grammar is composed on the basis of analysis or without analysis.

What is called analysis is the postulation of divisions like stem and suffix for teaching others. For example, the statement that the suffix *tavyat* etc. are added to the root. So it has been said—

"Whatever he can teach in a general manner, he does accordingly."[1]

There is absence of analysis where a word is given as it is. For example, the words *dādharti, darddharti,* etc.[2] and the words *dāśvān, sāhvān.*[3] In some Grammars, there is a great deal of absence of analysis and they teach many words directly (*pratyakṣapakṣeṇa*). Others, on the other hand, resort to analysis and by adopting the indirect method of inference, teach whole groups of words. This Grammatical tradition is established in different ways, according to the times and keeping in view the mental capacities of people. There are cultured people and that they are so can be inferred only from their use of correct words. They, whose inner vision is unobstructed in regard to all things to be known, see, without error, the power of words, differing at different periods of time and consisting in their being the means of merit or demerit, according to the times.

[1. M. Bhā on P. 1.1.46.
2. P. 7.4.65.
3. P. 6.1.2.]

144. Scripture (*Śruti*) has been declared to be beginningless, continuous and without an author. Written tradition (*Smṛti*) is composed by cultured Ancients and has continuity.

There are those who accept the authority of Scripture only and consider only the sacred books as trustworthy in regard to matters having invisible fruit and the views of men as doubtful and, threfore, not authority. According to them, even though there is no difierence between Scripture and

written Tradition as far as continuity of what is taught is concerned, yet Scripture has no deviations in the rules relating to accent, phoneme, sequence, place and time of study nor has it been established differently by any other person and it has always been established in all the countries in divisions according to branches. Written Tradition, on the other hand, has continuity of meaning, but is composed by the cultured differently at different times in prose, verses, sentences etc.

Some teachers think as follows: No act has, in itself, a visible or invisible fruit. It is only by acting according to Scripture that merit is manifested and by going against Scripture that one is tainted with sin. Scripture itself ordains that an act like the killing of a Brāhmaṇa which is a sin in some contexts becomes the cause of divine happiness if done in another context.[1]

Others, on the other hand, think that Scripture only makes known the specific power of objects. What would be the interest of Scripture to be a playful cause (of merit and demerit) and favour or harass men? It is seen to be better to assume that it (the causing of merit or demerit) is the nature of substances rather than that it is the nature of Scripture. In such written traditions as that of the Science of treatment, it is things like poison or herbs which have the capacity to fulfil a purpose and not the traditional texts. Therefore, it is nature of substances which is followed by Scripture, as it is the nature of Scripture in the other view. Just as, in the world, causes of benefit or harm are clearly distinguished, in the same way, there is uninterrupted establishment of the means of knowing them.[2]

[1. Vṛṣabha points out that in Puruṣamedha and Sautrāmaṇī, *brāhmaṇavadha* leads to heaven. As he puts it— *Puruṣamedhe sautrāmaṇyāṃ ca svargāṅgatvam.*

2. What is meant is that the power to produce their effects, good or bad, belongs naturally to substances, but, by uninterrupted tradition, it is Scripture that makes it known. Similarly, the power of correct words to produce merit and that of incorrect words to produce demerit are inherent in them. Grammar only makes them known].

145. In those who evolved out of the undifferentiated, there is knowledge of the *Śruti* (revealed Scripture) as in a dream. The written Tradition, on the other hand, is composed by the sages, after understanding the nature of things and following the indication (found in the Vedas).

It has been stated in the immediately preceding verse what the *dharma* is that is taught in the Scripture and in the written Tradition according to those who believe that the present diflerentiated condition of the world is eternal, that distinctions such as *Yuga, Manvantara,* etc. do not exist nor such an extraodinary division called the day of Brahmā. According to those who hold that the ultimate cause works in the manner of sleep and wakefulness and the differentiated individuals, some sages manifest themselves as identical with Intuition; they see it, the great Self in the form of Being, the source of Nescience and endowed with all knowledge and they become one with it. Some sages manifest themselves together with (the means of) knowledge. They identify themselves with their Self in the form of mind-knot, free from the elements ether etc., either severally or collectively, ie., devoid of any sense of 'I' in regard to them. All the activity of those sages is the product of Nescience and, therefore, adventitious and secondary. Their being essentially knowledge is eternal, non-adventitious and primary. They see the whole Scripture, endowed with all power of differentiation and all power of unity, as one hears sound in a dream, inaudible to the ear.

Some other sages, after perceiving the nature of objects, conducive either to the welfare or to the harm of man and after seeing in the Scripture indications thereof, compose the tradition, (the observance of which) leads to visible and invisible results. At first, they hand down the Scripture in an undivided manner, without any deviation in the words, as they saw it and later, they hand it down, divided into branches. Such is the tradition.

146. The impurities which belong to the body, the speech and the mind are removed by the sciences of Medicine, Grammar and Philosophy.

Just as, after seeing forces leading to illness in the body and the capacity of precious stones, herbs etc. to remove it, the Science of Treatment has been initiated; just as, after seeing that passions etc. cause disturbance of the mind, systems of philosophy have been composed which are the means of acquiring knowledge which leads to their cure, in the same way, the Science of Grammar has been initiated in order to make known the features of correctness in words and to enable us to discard the corrupt forms which are obstacles.

Of what nature are the corrupt forms?

147. When one wants to utter the word *gauḥ* and actually utters one which is devoid of correctness to convey that particular meaning, it is called a corrupt form (*apabhraṃśa*).

The author of the Saṅgraha has said:

"The correct word is the original of the corrupt form."

There is no corrupt form which is independent, without an original. Of every corrupt form, a correct form is the original. But some corrupt forms acquire independence by being constantly used and becoming conventional. Instead of saying *gauḥ*, one uses, either through lack of capacity or through mistake and other causes, the corrupt forms *gāvī* etc. having the correct form as the original. Such forms lose their correctness when used to denote an object having dew-lap, etc. When used in another meaning (which is its own) it is looked upon as correct. Their incorrectness is not linked with their form only.

148. Words like '*asva*' and '*goṇī*' are correct in regard to other meanings. Everywhere correctness is determined by the particular meaning which the word is to convey.

The two words *goṇī* and *asva* are correct, the former in the sense of a receptacle and the latter in the sense of one who owns nothing. These two words which have acquired their correct form in regard to some other meanings are considered to be correct if, due to some special reason,[1] they are used to denote an object having dew-lap etc. and one which neighs etc. respectively. When a cow carries much milk and is, therefore, like a receptable, one says: this cow is a receptacle because she is like a receptacle. In the same way, a horse (*aśva*) is called *'asva'* when it is a priceless one.[1] Therefore, till some feature is isolated on the basis of which correctness or incorrectness can be established, no object is definite.

[1. *Tathā sāsnādimati hreṣitādilinge ca .... tathāvidyamānaṃ svam asya so'yamasva iti.* What is stated here that, in certain circumstances, the words *'goṇī'* and *'asva'*, applied to a cow and to a horse respectively, would be correct. Figurative use of words is meant here. This passage of the Vṛtti should be compared with the commentary of Bhartṛhari on the M. Bhā (Paspaśāhnika), p. 13 (the edition now being printed in Benares) or p. 11 (of the edition of K. V. Abhyankar and V. P. Limaye) A.B.O.R.I., Vol. XLIII:

*Sa eva śabdo'rthaviśeṣe Kasminścidasādhurityetadākhyāyate. Yathā goṇīśabdaḥ sāsnādimatyasādhustathā aśvaśabdaḥ kesarādimati sādhur na niḥsva iti. asva iti nirdhane sādhuḥ, naikaśaphādilakṣaṇe. Yadi tu goṇīśabdo'pi nimittāntarāt sāsnādimati prayujyeta goṇīva goṇīti sādhur eva syāt. Aśve vā asvaśabdaṃ dhanābhāvadvārakam prayuñjīta sa sādhur eva.*]

149. They (the incorrect words) are the cause of the correct words (figuring in the mind) by inference. By identifying themselves, as it were, with them, they convey the meaning of the correct words.

When corrupt forms are used to denote objects which are the sphere of the correct forms, they convey the meaning through the correct words, just as winking etc. are, through familiarity, well known to appear as having taken on the form (of the words which express the same idea).

The purpose of another verse[1] on the subject is to say that corrupt forms do not convey the meaning directly.

[1. That corrupt forms do convey a meaning was already stated in Vāk. I. 147. *Viśiṣṭārthaniveśinam.*]

Why is it that *goṇī* etc. are not considered to be synonyms of *gauḥ?* In regard to such matters which are embodied in the written Tradition, no other cause other than being well-known in the practice of the cultured can be adduced. If *gāvī* etc. were synonyms, they would also have been included in their rules and actually used. That word is correct which is used, like perception, to convey the thing which cause its use. The correct words convey that meaning which directly prompt their use. Therefore, it is being said—

150. Since they are not explained like correct synonyms by cultured people in the written Tradition (*smṛtiśāstra*), therefore, they are not directly expressive.

The meaning of the verse has already been explained.

151. Just as the child who is learning the words *ambā, ambā,* pronounces them indistinctly and those who know his speech understand their distinct forms,

When the baby makes the necessary effort, but due to deficiency in the vocal organs, utters indistinct sounds when it wants to use the correct word, those who hear it understand the distinct word which is the original thereof. And they look upon the correct word as connected with the meaning and not the corrupt form used by the baby.

152. In the same way, when an incorrect word is uttered in place of the correct one, the understanding of the meaning is preceded by the correct word coming to the mind.

When words are mixed up, corrupt forms are used instead of correct ones. But the cultured people who know Grammar understand the correct ones. They also look upon the meaning as having been expressed by the correct words. The corrupt form is the cause of the inference of the correct one as smoke is of fire.

153. In the case, however, of those ignorant speakers among whom incorrect words have become established through habit, the correct words do not (first come to the mind and then) convey the meaning.

Corrupt forms are used habitually by women, *śūdras* and *cāṇḍālas* and by speakers who make mistakes and thus they enter into convention and usage is more based on them (than on the others). When a doubt arises after the use of the correct form, now it is resolved with the help of its corrupt form. They look upon the corrupt form as being on the side of perception and place the correct form on the side of inference.

154. This Divine Speech has been mixed up (with the corrupt forms) by incapable speakers. Those who consider words to be transitory are mistaken in this matter.

It is heard that, in the old days, the word of those whose body itself was light was free from all corrupt forms as it was free from falsehood. But it became contaminated and through the persistence of the tendency towards contamination by the repetition of the first corruptions, it became, for those speakers, the original and the convention. Upholders of non-eternality, on the other hand, do not believe that correct words lead to merit and look upon the rules relating to correctness as similar to the rules among wrestlers and consider the whole collection of correct words as prākṛta, i.e. derived from prakṛti (the original, i.e. the corrupt forms). The form which is settled by some narrow-

minded persons by regulating accent, correctness and so on is a modification and established later.

155. Both (the correct and the corrupt forms) have been handed down to us uninterruptedly. Still, when, intending to use one (the correct form) the speaker uses the other (the corrupt form) it is not the latter which must be deemed to be expressive of the meaning.

Even according to those who do not believe in old times nor in an unmixed Divine Word which existed sometime ago, this distinction between correct and corrupt words, as the distinction between which woman one can marry and which not, has always been transmitted, without a break, by the cultured. The word, which, like the talk of children, is actually used to convey a meaning when some other word was meant to be used and has entered into usage and the one (which is similarly used) but which has not entered into usage, neither is expressive of the meaning. In such cases, either the meaning is understood preceded by the remembrance of the correct word or, as with the ignorant, something is understood from those words as from winking and the like.

Thus has ended the chapter relating to Brahman, entitled "Collection of Traditions" in the 'Treatise on the Sentence and the Word' composed by Harivṛṣabha, the Great Grammarian.

## ERRATA

| Page | Line | For | Read |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 31 | meanning | meaning |
| 3 | 30 | defination | definition |
| 6 | 32 | ādhāne | ādhāre |
| 12 | 27 | in which the | in which the universe rests. |
| 22 | 16 | conception | conceptions |
| 22 | 28 | errrors | errors |
| 26 | 31 | eternity | eternality |
| 27 | 15 | phonemess | phonemes |
| 44 | 6 | concommittant | concomittant |
| 60 | last | action | quality |
| 61 | 14 | coveys | conveys |
| 63 | 3 | as used | is used |
| 64 | 2 | relations | relation |
| 68 | 28 | . For | for |
| 80 | 10–11 | These two notes should be on p. 79, before verse 76 | |
| 82 | 8 | essense | essence |
| 83 | 20 | which | while |
| 84 | 17 | could be | there could be |
| 89 | 10 | sphoṭāsi° | Sphoṭasi° |
| 91 | 22 | It | it |
| 91 | 23 | it | It |
| 92 | 8 | external | eternal |
| 95 | 29 | The only | The smell of nail is manifested only |
| 128 | 2 | Mahyamā | Madhyamā |
| 134 | 12 | cause | causes |
| 134 | 13 | prompt | prompts |

## DECCAN COLLEGE
## BUILDING CENTENARY AND SILVER JUBILEE
## MONOGRAPHS

| | |
|---|---|
| Dharaṇī Kosa of Dharaṇīdhara edited by E. D. Kulkarni, Vols. I. II & III .. | BC 89–91 |
| Paryāya-Śabdaratna of Dhananjaya, edited by E. D. Kulkarni and M. C. Dikshit, Vols. I & II .. | BC 92–93 |
| Prakrit Languages and their Contribution to Indian Culture by S. M. Katre .. | BC 97 |
| Some Problems of Historical Linguistics in Indo-Aryan by S. M. Katre .. | BC 101 |
| The Formation of Konkani by S. M. Katre .. | BC 103 |
| The Patterns of Migration and Occupation in a South Gujarat Village by I. P. Desai .. | BC 99 |
| Social Dynamics of a Growing Town by Mrs. I. Karve et al .. | BC 112 |
| Caste Ranking and Community Structure in Five Regions of India and Pakistan by McKim Marriott .. | BC 114 |
| Stone Age Hill Dwellers of Tekkalkota by M. S. Nagaraj Rao .. | BC 115 |

**DECCAN COLLEGE**

**BUILDING CENTENARY AND SILVER JUBILEE**

**MONOGRAPHS**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Stone Age Tools: their techniques, names and functions by H. D. Sankalia .. | BC | 81 |
| The Faunal Remains from the Microlithic Site of Langhnaj (Gujarat) by Juliet Clutton-Brock .. | BC | 107 |
| Ancient Human Skeletons from Langhnaj (Gujarat) by Sophia Erhadt .. | BC | 108 |
| Word Hunting in Seven Continents by S. M. Katre .. | BC | 82 |
| Kharia Phonology by H. S. Biligiri .. | BC | 83 |
| Morphology of Verb and Noun in Spoken Sinhalese by D. N. Shankara Bhat .. | BC | 84 |
| Marathi Dialect Texts I: Dialect of Cochin by A. M. Ghatage .. | BC | 94 |
| Historical Phonology of Russian by Gordon H. Fairbanks .. | BC | 96 |
| Descriptive Analysis of Tulu by D. N. Shankara Bhat .. | BC | 95 |
| A Bondo Dictionary by Sudhibushan Bhattacharya .. | BC | 98 |
| Nepali Transformational Structure: A Sketch by Franklin C. Southworth .. | BC | 100 |
| A History of the Tamil Language by T. P. Meenakshisundaran .. | BC | 102 |
| Nirukta Notes: Series I by M. A. Mehendale .. | BC | 104 |
| Sphotasiddhi of Mandanamisra: Text and English Translation by K. A. Subramania Iyer .. | BC | 105 |
| Vakyapadiya with Vrtti: English Translation with critical notes, Kanda I by K. A. Subramania Iyer .. | BC | 106 |
| Sugamānvayā Vṛtti of Sumativijayagaṇi—I: Introduction and Text, edited by W. H. Maurer .. | BC | 85 |
| II: Critical Notes .. | BC | 86 |
| Paramānandīya Nāmamālā edited by E. D. Kulkarni, Vols. I, II .. | BC | 87–88 |

*Continued on cover page 3*